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Cumulative Dynamics and Strategic Assessment: 
U.S. Military Decision Making in Iraq, Vietnam, and the American Indian Wars 
 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines why military decision makers struggle to evaluate their policies and 
why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long. The core argument is that strategic 
assessment involves genuine analytic challenges which contemporary scholarship typically does 
not take into account. Prominent theoretical frameworks predict that the longer decision makers 
go without achieving their objectives, the more pessimistic they should become about their 
ability to do so, and the more likely they should be to change course. This dissertation challenges 
those ideas and explains why we should often expect the very opposite.  
The theoretical crux of this argument is that standard models of learning and adaptation (along 
with many people’s basic intuitions) revolve around the assumption that decision makers are 
observing repeated processes, similar to the dynamics of slot machines and roulette wheels – but 
in war and other contexts, decision makers often confront cumulative processes that have very 
different dynamics, along with a different logic for how rational actors should form and revise 
their expectations. Empirically, this dissertation examines U.S. decision making in Iraq, 
Vietnam, and the American Indian Wars. These cases demonstrate how cumulative dynamics 
affect strategic assessment and how understanding these dynamics can shed light on prominent 
theoretical frameworks, ongoing policy debates, and salient historical experience. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
RATIONAL STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 
 
 
 
Military decision makers often struggle to assess strategic progress. This is one of the central 
storylines of the Vietnam War, in which U.S. officials consistently underestimated their 
opponents’ resolve and maintained the war was winnable even as the Saigon regime’s political 
legitimacy decayed. Similarly, scholars have often asked why Germany took so much time to 
moderate its demands in World War I, why Japan did not admit defeat earlier in World War II, 
why so many colonial powers failed to understand that they could not suppress nationalist 
resistance, and why so many states seem to resist learning similar lessons today. The notion that 
leaders make mistakes is not necessarily surprising – much more concerning, perhaps, is how 
they often seem to find it so difficult to realize and correct those mistakes, and that they often 
stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long. 
Of course, it is just as easy to point out cases where decision makers struggled to foresee 
strategic gains. The Korean War, for instance, ended with an armistice signed in July 1953 – but 
just two months earlier, the National Security Council declared in a planning document 
(endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by President Eisenhower) that negotiations 
with the communists had “clearly demonstrated” that “under present conditions” the search for 
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an acceptable political settlement “is hopeless.”1 In 2007, much of the United States’ senior 
military leadership and perhaps a majority of its citizens opposed reinforcing the troop presence 
Iraq on the grounds that the country could not be stabilized, yet by year’s end violence in that 
country would fall by ninety percent (at least, for the time being). And when the Berlin Wall 
came down in 1989, it was a surprise to policy makers, military officials, intelligence agencies, 
and the general public alike, even though the event signaled the culmination of a grand strategy 
that had dominated U.S. foreign policy for nearly half a century. On balance, one could therefore 
argue about whether leaders tend to be unduly optimistic or pessimistic when it comes to 
assessing strategic progress; either way, strategic assessment is clearly a challenge that 
confounds decision makers even (and perhaps especially) on questions of first magnitude. 
In many instances, the result is that debates about military strategy become mired in 
ambivalence. When President Barack Obama began withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in 
2011, for example, he was harshly criticized by those who believed he was removing critical 
forces on the cusp of success. But he was also challenged (and just as harshly) by critics making 
the exact opposite argument, saying that the war was a lost cause and so the troops should come 
home even sooner. Ten years into the longest war in U.S. history, officials, experts, and the 
general public were still not remotely close to consensus when it came to estimating how much 
longer it might take or how much more it might cost to defeat (or otherwise contain) the Taliban. 
When these kinds of debates fail to converge, or when military decision makers seem unable 
to update their expectations, it is not only frustrating – it is also deeply puzzling to scholars of 
                                                 
1
 The document (NSC-147) can be found in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, 
Vol. XV, pp. 841-42. See Malkasian 2002: 176-177 for a discussion of NSC-147 and how it 
indicated misplaced pessimism about U.S. strategy in the Korean War. 
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armed conflict who believe that fighting provides information that reduces uncertainty and 
facilitates strategic assessment. While there are many reasons why wars can be protracted, it is 
much less clear why military decision makers should seemingly find it so hard to learn, adapt, 
and evaluate their policies.  
Existing scholarship typically approaches this problem using mechanisms like organizational 
behavior, culture, domestic politics, and psychology. This dissertation, by contrast, explains why 
strategic assessment involves genuine analytic challenges that scholars often overlook. These 
challenges should inhibit strategic assessment on the part of even unitary, rational actors. And 
because this argument requires no assumptions about the characteristics of armies and their 
leaders, it may help to explain why military decision makers in many different contexts seem to 
find strategic assessment so difficult. 
The theoretical crux of this argument is that most academic models of learning and adaptation 
(along with most people’s basic intuitions about decision making more generally) revolve around 
analogies to repeated processes, with dynamics similar to slot machines or roulette wheels – but 
in war and other contexts, decision makers often confront cumulative processes that have very 
different dynamics, along with a very different logic for how rational actors should form and 
revise their expectations. This dissertation lays out that argument and its implications in five 
subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides the basic theoretical groundwork. It draws the key distinction between 
repeated processes (which characterize most scholarship in the prominent international relations 
literature on the “bargaining model of war” as well as theories of decision making in other 
fields), and cumulative processes, which better reflect the dynamics that military decision makers 
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face. In forming concepts for analyzing cumulative processes, Chapter 2 relies on both inductive 
and deductive reasoning. Inductively, the chapter examines how U.S. decision makers grappled 
with cumulative dynamics during the Vietnam War. Deductively, the chapter identifies 
theoretical principles that generate these dynamics, showing why we should expect them to arise 
in a wide range of circumstances. From both angles, Chapter 2 develops the conceptual 
foundations for the remainder of the analysis, while explaining why this framework lies outside 
the boundaries of existing literature. 
Chapter 3 then describes the dissertation’s primary theoretical argument, explaining why 
understanding the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict has fundamental implications for 
thinking about the way that decision makers should be able to learn and adapt. It is generally 
believed that the longer rational decision makers go without achieving their objectives, the more 
pessimistic they should become about their ability to do so and the more likely they should be to 
change course. Chapter 3 challenges those ideas and explains why we should often expect the 
very opposite. The logic in this chapter is expressed formally, in order to explain precisely why 
intuitive premises about cumulative dynamics in war generate surprising predictions, including 
the idea that rational decision makers might actually become more optimistic about their ability 
to achieve their goals, even as they continually fail to do so. In showing how and under what 
conditions this is the case, Chapter 3 demonstrates that we do not need to invoke nonrational 
factors in order to explain why military leaders often find it so difficult to realize and correct 
their strategic mistakes. We can explain this behavior simply by taking a careful look at the 
cumulative dynamics of armed conflict and understanding how they differ from other 
phenomena.  
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Chapter 4 presents an empirical application of this argument, showing how it offers a new 
lens for evaluating past experience by examining U.S. military strategy during the American 
Indian Wars. This set of cases was chosen for specific methodological reasons. In total, U.S. and 
British forces fought more than one hundred different Native American tribes; these tribes fought 
in reasonably similar ways, with reasonably similar technology, against similar opponents, over 
similar stakes. This is not to say that the American Indian Wars were literally identical, of 
course, but the units of analysis here are much more comparable than in almost any other cross-
section of insurgencies, or conventional wars, or other kinds of political violence. This provides 
an opportunity to assess the way that U.S. commanders such as George Custer and Winfield 
Scott formed and revised their expectations in light of a relatively large body of objective, 
empirical evidence. Rarely is it possible to evaluate beliefs about military strategy in this 
manner, and Chapter 4 exploits this opportunity through newly-gathered, event-level data, which 
along with this dissertation’s overarching theoretical framework help to explain why U.S. 
commanders in the American Indian Wars often acted in otherwise puzzling ways. To the extent 
that this analysis provides insight into the behavior of commanders like Custer (whose actions 
have been scrutinized as much those of almost any other decision maker in U.S. history), it 
indicates the potential promise of the new framework for re-evaluating established scholarship 
and conventional wisdom. 
Chapter 5 then turns to U.S. policy during the occupation of Iraq. The goal of this chapter is 
partly to show how understanding cumulative dynamics helps to reframe contemporary policy 
debates, just as Chapter 4 shed light on the analytic challenges that U.S. commanders faced in 
the American Indian Wars. The main purpose of examining U.S. policy in Iraq, however, is to 
motivate a discussion of how decision makers can deal with these analytic challenges. The 
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central argument in this chapter revolves around the importance of managing what scholars call 
the “reference class problem,” which requires decision makers to continually update their views 
about the scenario they are facing, and to understand why different classes of problems require 
different policy responses. If this sounds truistic, Chapter 5 explains how decision makers, 
military doctrine, and scholarship on armed conflict place limited emphasis on the issue, often 
focusing on common patterns that hold across cases, rather than providing information on how to 
diagnose the ways in which circumstances differ and to assign different policy prescriptions 
accordingly. 
Chapter 6 concludes by expanding the scope of the analysis: it argues that understanding the 
cumulative dynamics of armed conflict has significant implications for empirical research design 
and it discusses how cumulative dynamics affect policy assessment in other fields. Armed 
conflict offers many salient examples of decision makers struggling with cumulative dynamics, 
trying to determine how long it might take and how much it might cost to achieve their goals. 
But similar analytic challenges recur in many other areas. Will economic sanctions cause Iran to 
disable its nuclear weapons program before developing a functional bomb? How much economic 
assistance will it take to break developing countries out of poverty traps? When is it worth 
continuing to spend money on expensive scientific projects that have not yet succeeded but could 
produce significant breakthroughs down the road? When a political campaign’s negative 
advertisements do not seem to be increasing vote share, does that mean the advertisements are 
ineffective or that the campaign should run more of them?  
These questions emphasize that while military decision making is the primary subject matter 
in this dissertation, the theoretical framework developed here is ultimately intended to be a 
contribution to the study of international relations and policy analysis more generally. When 
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people debate whether policies are not succeeding because of the concept or the execution – 
whether decision makers are doing the wrong thing or just not doing the right thing enough – 
they are generally dealing with the kinds of cumulative dynamics that make it difficult to decide 
whether it would be better to switch strategies or stay the course. The following chapters revolve 
around the difficulties that assessing these dynamics entails. 
 
Section 1.1. Strategic assessment and military decision making 
The subject of this dissertation is strategic assessment, defined here as the way that decision 
makers form and revise their expectations about how long it might take and how much it might 
cost to achieve a particular goal. Strategic assessment thus entails estimating the potential means 
required to obtain desired ends. Military decision makers must grapple with this challenge both 
at the start of an armed conflict and also as that conflict unfolds. 
Strategic assessment is just one component of decision making, and performing strategic 
assessment well does not guarantee that decisions will be sound. For instance, the following 
chapters generally do not discuss the kinds of value judgments that are crucial for determining 
whether the prospective costs of some military strategy are “worth it” in order to achieve a 
particular objective. The following chapters do not discuss the ways that policy decisions can be 
interdependent (such as how adopting a certain policy in one case can foreclose or otherwise 
affect decision makers’ options elsewhere), and they generally do not discuss the difficulties of 
evaluating options in relation to plausible alternatives. Studying how long it might take or how 
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much it might cost in order to achieve a particular goal is thus substantially more limited in 
scope than evaluating the quality of decision making writ large.2 
With that said, it is not possible to make a good decision in the absence of sound strategic 
assessment. Decision makers who design military strategies or other policies based on flawed 
assumptions may achieve favorable outcomes, but that does not justify poor reasoning or suggest 
that others who follow their lead would obtain similar results.3 Douglas MacArthur’s landing of 
U.S. forces at Inchon during the Korean War is perhaps the archetypal example of an excessively 
risky decision that ultimately succeeded, and few people would argue that this implies the need 
for military decision makers to discard cautionary advice. MacArthur believed strongly in his 
personal luck, which worked out well for landing at Inchon but then fared poorly for crossing the 
Yalu. One of the cardinal principles of decision analysis is the importance of separating ex post 
knowledge about outcomes from information available to decision makers ex ante.4 The way that 
decision makers assess that information is central to evaluating their performance, and it is the 
focus of this study. 
                                                 
2
 See Robert and Zeckhauser 2011 and Keeney 1982 for overviews of basic criteria for analyzing 
policies and decisions in general. 
3
 As Richard Betts wrote in a well-known essay on evaluating military strategy, “judgment is 
often contaminated by hindsight, as good fortune is mistaken for strategic foresight” (2000: 9-
10). 
4
 Ronald Howard (1988: 682) argues that this is perhaps the fundamental takeaway from decision 
theory: “I tell my students that if they learn nothing else about decision analysis from their 
studies, this distinction will have been worth the price of admission. A good outcome is a future 
state of the world that we prize relative to other possibilities. A good decision is an action we 
take that is logically consistent with the alternatives we perceive, the information we have, and 
the preferences we feel. In an uncertain world, good decisions can lead to bad outcomes, and 
vice versa. If you listen carefully to ordinary speech, you will see that this distinction is usually 
not observed. If a bad outcome follows an action, people say that they made a bad decision. 
Making the distinction allows us to separate action from consequence and hence improve the 
quality of action.” 
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Strategic assessment is also one of the more analytically tractable components of military 
decision making (though this is not to say that the task is easy to execute). Value judgments are 
difficult to analyze objectively, especially concerning military strategy and national security, 
where moral issues tend to be prominent and hotly debated.5 In general, one of the central 
challenges of studying foreign policy is to identify the outcome variable that decision makers 
should be maximizing. The “national interest” is a notoriously fuzzy concept – it is far harder to 
define than factors like “profit” or “net present value” that drive the microeconomic analysis of 
firms – and thus debates about the soundness of foreign policy decisions often fail to get beyond 
disagreements about how to conceive objectives properly.6 A question like “how long might it 
take and how much might it cost to achieve a particular goal” is more readily accessible. Time, 
casualties, and expenditures can all be defined conceptually and measured empirically, which 
facilitates the enterprise of building and testing theory.  
Moreover, this dissertation argues that current theoretical frameworks for understanding 
strategic assessment have important limitations, especially when it comes to dealing with the 
                                                 
5
 See Schelling 1984 on how apparently intractable disagreements about values can in fact often 
be reduced to disputes about modeling choices; in general, one of the foundations of utility 
theory is that, in principle, almost any issue can be incorporated into a rational framework using 
analytic tools like the comparison of lotteries (Von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944, Luce and 
Raiffa 1957, Keeney and Raiffa 1976, Keeney 1992). In practice, however, while objective 
analysis can facilitate the evaluation of value-laden decisions, it is rarely dispositive. See 
Smelser 1992, Elster 1979, 1993, Levi 1986, and Manski 2011 among others, for discussion of 
how preferences, discount factors, risk attitudes, regret, and issues of fairness largely lie outside 
the scope of rational choice theory, implying that in many cases there may be no firm answer to 
what the rational or optimal decision might be. By excluding these factors from the analysis here, 
it is possible to analyze a component of decision making in a relatively objective fashion.  
6
 The difficulty of defining concepts like the “national interest,” or “national security” is a central 
theme in the 2009 history of international security studies by Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen. For 
more on these debates, see Trubowitz 1996 who focuses specifically on debates over the national 
interest in U.S. foreign policy, along with Wolfers 1952, Weldes 1996, and Baldwin 1997 for 
theoretical perspectives. 
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cumulative dynamics of armed conflict. Though few people would agree that war is a repeated 
process in which the odds of success are the same in one stage as they are in the next, this is the 
explicit assumption on which many prominent works are currently based. This assumption tends 
not to receive much attention or debate, but as Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate, it plays an 
important role in defining the way that scholars expect decision makers to assess their strategic 
prospects, which in turn influences the way that scholars expect these decision makers to behave. 
It is not possible to form a theory of rational decision making without first building a theory of 
rational strategic assessment, and that is the goal here. 
 
Section 1.2. Components of strategic assessment 
Strategic assessment has two key components: forming prior assumptions about how long it 
might take and how much it might cost in order to achieve a particular goal, and then revising 
those assumptions in light of subsequent events. While stating these tasks is simple, carrying 
them out – or even articulating how a rational decision maker should carry them out in principle 
– is the subject of widespread debate in decision theory.7 The following chapters largely revolve 
around the subject of forming and revising prior expectations in the context of military decision 
making, and to preface that analysis, it is worth laying out some key concepts. 
First, what are prior assumptions? In the context of strategic assessment, prior assumptions 
represent decision makers’ assessments of how long it might take and how much it might cost in 
order to achieve their desired goals. These assumptions revolve around subjective probabilities, 
                                                 
7
 For reviews of Bayesian decision theory, see Raiffa 1968, Lindley 1971, Keeney and Raiffa 
1976, Pratt, Raiffa, and Schlaifer 1995, and Winkler 2003. Hunter 1984 examines several 
applications in the context of military decision making in particular. 
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which capture a decision maker’s degree of belief that a given statement is true. Before the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, for instance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote what has become 
known as his “Parade of Horribles” memo to stimulate discussion about the “potential problems 
to be considered and addressed” in relation to the coming war. One of the prospects he raised in 
this memo was that “Rather than having the post-Saddam effort require 2 to 4 years, it could take 
8 to 10 years, thereby absorbing U.S. leadership, military, and financial resources.”8 This is a 
rough way of stating a prior assumption about how long it might take and how much it might 
cost in order to achieve U.S. objectives in Iraq. The memo indicates Rumsfeld’s belief that the 
most likely scenario was that the post-invasion occupation would not last long (two to four 
years) but that there was a chance of the mission dragging on much longer than that (eight to ten 
years). It is also well-known that several Bush administration decision makers held out hope that 
U.S. forces would be “greeted as liberators” and so there would be little need for a protracted 
occupation at all.9 Thus while there is no indication that these decision makers ever attempted to 
stipulate numerically the probabilities of the occupation lasting for any particular period of time, 
it is possible to get a rough sense of their degrees of belief in different possible outcomes.10 
                                                 
8
 Donald Rumsfeld, “Iraq: An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and 
Addressed,” memorandum October 15, 2002. 
9
 See Gordon and Trainor 2006 and Wright and Reese 2008 for discussions of U.S. planning for 
the occupation of Iraq. Chapter 5 will return to this subject in more detail. 
10
 The United States intelligence community in fact self-consciously avoids using numbers to 
assess probabilities on the grounds that doing so would lend an undue aura of scientific precision 
to their estimates. See Gourley 1997 and Johnston 2005 along with Kent 1964 and Friedman and 
Zeckhauser 2013 for critiques. But the point remains that, whether formally or not, intelligence 
analysis and strategic assessment revolve around analysts’ and decision makers’ degrees of belief 
in what kinds of scenarios are more likely than others. This is a matter of subjective probability, 
however analysts choose to articulate it. 
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Though subjective probabilities about complex political events can rarely be calibrated with 
the precision of gambling odds or actuary tables, likelihood is an inherently quantitative concept, 
and subjective probabilities can always be elicited numerically.11 You can try this yourself by 
picking an ongoing conflict and considering how long it might take for the violence to end. As of 
this writing, for instance, Syria is in turmoil as opposition forces attempt to unseat President 
Bashar al-Assad. Roughly speaking, what do you believe are the chances that Assad remains in 
power for another month? What are the chances that he remains in power for another six 
months? A year? Two years? Permanently? Now ask yourself how deadly you think this conflict 
will ultimately be: roughly speaking, what do you believe are the chances that the war ends up 
claiming fifty thousand lives, or seventy-five thousand lives, or a hundred thousand lives, and so 
on? By assessing these chances you are articulating subjective probabilities that capture your 
                                                 
11
 The standard thought experiment that decision theorists use to demonstrate this point involves 
the comparison of lotteries. Say that you are asked to predict the likelihood of some event taking 
place, such as whether the leader of a particular foreign country will be ousted within a year. If 
this takes place, you will receive a valuable prize, and if this does not take place you will receive 
nothing. You have the option of taking this lottery, or else accepting an alternative gamble in 
which an experimenter reaches into an urn containing one hundred marbles, of which thirty are 
black and the rest are red. If the experimenter draws a black marble then you win the prize, and 
otherwise, you receive nothing.  
  Which of these lotteries would you prefer? If you prefer to bet on the leader’s ouster, then this 
means that you believe the probability of this outcome is at least 30 percent, or else you would 
have chosen to have the experimenter draw from the urn. If you chose to bet on the urn, then this 
shows you believe that the odds of the leader’s ouster are no higher than thirty percent. In 
principle, we could repeat this experiment using different comparisons of lotteries until you were 
indifferent between the gambles, and that would indicate how likely you believe it is that the 
leader will be deposed within a year. 
  The purpose of this review is not to advocate that betting strategies actually be used in strategic 
assessment – a topic of substantial controversy in recent years (see Meirowitz and Tucker 2004) 
– but simply to show that even subjective assessments of probability can still be elicited in a 
coherent form. See Friedman and Zeckhauser 2013 on this point. For reviews of scholarship on 
measuring degrees of belief (both in principle and in practice), see Hampton, Moore, and 
Thomas 1973, Hogarth 1975, Lad 1996, Garthwaite, Kadane, and O’Hagan 2005, Winkler 2003: 
ch. 2. There is a substantial literature on how to apply these concepts to political-military 
analysis; some relevant sources include Dalkey 1969, Zlotnick 1972, Hunter 1984, and Schum 
1987. 
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degrees of belief about how long it might take and how much it might cost for the Syrian 
opposition to depose the government. Together, these estimates form what decision theorists call 
probability distributions, a concept that will recur throughout subsequent chapters.  
How should decision makers revise these expectations over time? In many ways, that is the 
question driving this dissertation, as the following chapters will argue that standard models of 
learning and adaptation (and perhaps most peoples’ intuitions about strategic assessment more 
generally) make questionable assumptions about how decision makers can update their beliefs 
when observing cumulative processes. Briefly stated, however, the core concept in rational 
learning is the notion of conditional probability, in which decision makers adjust their prior 
assumptions in a manner that incorporates any information they obtain. As of this writing, for 
instance, the Syrian Civil War has been ongoing for about two years, during which it has claimed 
perhaps forty thousand lives. Whatever our beliefs about the potential scope and protractedness 
of this conflict might have been heading into the conflict, we now have substantial information 
that will help us to revise our prior assumptions. There is no longer any chance that the conflict 
will last any less time or claim any fewer lives than what has transpired already. Conditional on 
this and other information, we can form new assessments about how the Syrian Civil War might 
play out.  
It is important to reiterate that even when decision makers do not articulate those beliefs 
explicitly, they still possess beliefs about how long it might take and how much it might cost to 
obtain their objectives, which they must form and revise as their policies unfold. The purpose of 
dealing with those beliefs explicitly is not to pretend that these inputs to decision making are any 
more objective or scientific that they really are, but rather to discuss how to form coherent 
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inferences based on available information, subjective foundations and all.12 Moreover, when we 
examine these inferences systematically, it becomes apparent that some dynamics of learning 
and adaptation in war can be surprising, even counterintuitive. Chapters 2 and 3 in particular 
explain how the ways in which rational decision makers should adapt to cumulative processes lie 
outside the boundaries of much existing scholarship, and often fly in the face of what readers 
may expect. 
 
Section 1.3. Why study rational action if there are no rational actors? 
In particular, the following chapters build theory about the way that unitary, rational actors 
should form and revise their expectations. In the most general sense, rational action entails 
maximizing expected utility based on consistent preferences and logical beliefs.13 Preferences are 
rational when they satisfy basic requirements such as being complete, stable, consistent, 
transitive, and independent of irrelevant alternatives.14 Beliefs are rational when they follow the 
                                                 
12
 For especially well-articulated statements of this point, see Raiffa and Schlaifer 1960: vii, 
Keeney and Raiffa 1976: 12, Dawes 1979, Keeney 1986: 130, and Lad 1996: 8-9. 
13
 There are many ways in which this approach can be specified and critiqued (Elster 1986, 
Friedman 1996, Monroe 1991, Mele and Rawling 2004, Binmore 2009, Manski 2011), but as 
Becker writes, “everyone more or less agrees that rational behavior simply implies consistent 
maximization of a well-ordered function” (1976: 153). See MacDonald 2003 for a related 
argument that rationality essentially entails the purposive and consistent attempt to maximize 
well-being. 
14
 See Winkler 2003: 233 for a list of requirements for rational preferences. There is, however, 
controversy about how many of these requirements are in fact mandatory for characterizing 
“rationality” – see Sen 1993, Binmore 2009, and Clark 2013 for important arguments to this 
effect. 
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axioms of conditional probability.15 Actors are unitary when there is no conflict of interest or 
asymmetric information among decision makers and the groups that they represent. 
Once again, these standards are easy to articulate but difficult, if not impossible, to follow. In 
the real world, decision makers, organizations, and states are all fallible and they operate under a 
wide range of political, organizational, and cognitive constraints. The purpose of assuming 
rationality here is thus not that this assumption is descriptively accurate, but rather that it is 
analytically useful in the following senses.16 
First, theories of rational decision making are prescriptive. They offer guidance about what 
kinds of information should (or should not) facilitate decision making, along with insight into 
how that information should (or should not) be processed in order to evaluate decisions 
objectively.17 Here, the following chapters provide an especially clear break from existing 
scholarship. Prominent theoretical frameworks state that war itself provides information allowing 
combatants to form more accurate perceptions of each others’ capabilities and resolve in a way 
that makes negotiated settlements more likely.18 This more or less automatic view of rational 
                                                 
15
 Savage 1954. 
16
 Schelling 1960a: 108 provides an early discussion of how the assumption of rationality, 
though often not descriptive, is nonetheless “peculiarly conducive to the development of theory” 
as argued below. See Walt 1999 and Green and Shapiro 1994 for critiques of the descriptive 
utility of rational choice theory in security studies and political science, respectively (although 
their work places less a critique of the rationality assumption per se as opposed to the way that 
contemporary scholars often develop rational choice theories through the use of formal, game-
theoretic models). 
17
 See Raiffa 1968: 128. 
18
 For instance, see Smith and Stam: “The act of waging war reveals information about the 
relative strengths of each side. As a war progresses, each side’s beliefs about the likely outcome 
of continuing the war converge. Once the warring parties’ beliefs have converged sufficiently, 
they can find a bargained solution to the conflict” (2004: 783). Or Filson and Werner: “War itself 
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decision makers improving their strategic assessments through trial-and-error clearly clashes 
with the persistent ambivalence, uncertainty, and lack of adaptation and compromise we observe 
in many cases. As Chapters 2 and 3 will show, the existing literature’s prediction that war is an 
information-revealing and self-terminating largely revolves around the assumption that armed 
conflict is a repeated process. Once armed conflict is taken to be a cumulative process, however, 
it becomes apparent that fighting can actually cause combatants’ perceptions of one another to 
diverge. One of the most important implications of this theoretical framework is thus that 
decision makers must often use other sources of information to improve their estimates of 
opponents’ capabilities and resolve. In particular, the following chapters explain why decision 
makers’ prior assumptions play a critical but underappreciated role in driving strategic 
assessment. Both scholars and decision makers could benefit from devoting more attention to 
these issues. 
Second, theories of rational action are normative, helping to define the kinds of behavior we 
should to expect to see, all else being equal. We generally expect decision makers to become 
more pessimistic about policies that do not succeed. We generally expect debates about military 
strategy to converge towards consensus over time. We expect these things because this is how 
we think rational people should function, and when people deviate from this model, we typically 
assume that their behavior is nonrational.  
In this respect, theories of rational action serve as important benchmarks for evaluating salient 
experience. Chapter 4, for example, examines George Custer, Winfield Scott, and other 
commanders during the American Indian Wars. These commanders are often thought to have 
                                                                                                                                                             
provides the information necessary for disputants to reach a settlement to end the war” (2002: 
820). Chapter 2 describes this literature in more detail. 
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been hubristic, dogmatic, racist, politically motivated, or simply careless in directing their forces. 
Making, defending, or critiquing these judgments relies on having some idea of what rational 
behavior would have entailed in these circumstances – it is not possible to assess the rationality 
of any action without first defining what rationality means, and this dissertation explains why 
commonly-held beliefs about rational strategic assessment may be mistaken.19 
Rationalist theories thus establish counterfactual scenarios that drive analyses of cause and 
effect.20 For example, one of the most prominent components of the existing literature on 
strategic assessment examines the role of psychological factors. In general, these studies 
demonstrate that cognitive frameworks, confirmation bias, defensive avoidance, overoptimism, 
and emotional stress influence the way that decision makers process information and evaluate 
their options.21 The mere fact that these mechanisms matter is unsurprising, as all individuals 
suffer from cognitive distortions.22 The more important issue is the extent to which these factors 
                                                 
19
 Charles Glaser expresses similar views: “[I am] skeptical that as a general rule states actually 
act rationally,” yet understanding their behavior nevertheless “requires a rational theory, even if 
states do not always act in line with its constraints…. [M]y theory provides a rational baseline 
against which actual state behavior can be evaluated. We cannot evaluate whether a state is 
acting rationally/optimally without such a theory…. Therefore, theories of suboptimal behavior, 
whether built on arguments about domestic politics or errors in individual decision making, rely 
at least implicitly on a rational theory” (2010: 2-3). Kydd 2008: 437-438 and Elster 1979: 153-
156 discuss how rational actor theories are logically prior to their alternatives. 
20
 On counterfactuals and historical reasoning in international relations, see Fearon 1996, Tetlock 
and Belkin 1996, Sylvan and Majeski 1998, and Tetlock and Lebow 2001. 
21
 Prominent examples from this literature include Leites 1953, Wohlstetter 1964, George 1969, 
White 1970, May 1973, Jervis 1976, Lebow 1981, Staw 1981, Janis 1982, Larson 1985, 
Vertzberger 1990, Khong 1992, Levy 1996, Mercer 1996, Reiter 1996, Heuer 1999, Wrangham 
1999, Johnson 2004, McDermott 2004, Rosen 2005, Kahneman and Renshon 2007, Butler 2007, 
Renshon 2008, Gayer et al. 2009, Woods and Stout 2010, Duelfer 2011, Johnson and Fowler 
2011, Johnson and Tierney 2011, Lopez et al. 2011, Mercer 2013. 
22
 See Kahneman 2011 for a recent review. 
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affect perceptions and decision making, and it is not possible to make this kind of judgment 
without first establishing an alternative conception of what strategic assessment would look like 
absent psychological, organizational, political, or other constraints.23  
Establishing that baseline can be difficult and tenuous. For instance, one of the most famous 
works on how psychology influences national security decision making is Roberta Wohlstetter’s 
1964 book Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, which argues that intelligence analysts and 
policy makers operated under a “mind-set” that essentially took it for granted that Japan would 
never attack the United States directly. Wohlstetter showed how, consistent with this mind-set, 
analysts and policy makers disregarded pieces of information that suggested an impending attack 
– indications were there, she argues, but they were buried within broader intelligence, and the 
mind-set of the U.S. national security community impeded its ability to separate the “signals” 
from the “noise.” Wohlstetter’s book helped to lay the foundations for a much broader literature 
on the psychology of intelligence analysis, and the U.S. intelligence community attempts to train 
its personnel to combat the kinds of obstacles that Wohlstetter and others have described.24 But it 
                                                 
23
 Scholars often advance models of nonrational decision making without specifying what a 
rational baseline would entail, or how one would determine just how substantially decision 
makers deviated from that ideal. For example, Scott Sigmund Gartner’s 1997 book, Strategic 
Assessment in War is perhaps the most thorough existing study of strategic assessment. Gartner’s 
main argument in this book is that decision makers evaluate their policies through the lens of 
“dominant indicators,” a highly imperfect approach that is the result of bounded rationality and 
organizational satisficing. Gartner shows that this model fits empirical behavior more 
convincingly than two alternative, nonrational theories (a “standard-organization” approach and 
an “action-reaction” model). Gartner does not, however, state what rational strategic assessment 
would entail – thus to the extent that he demonstrates how his model is perhaps the best 
nonrational approach to strategic assessment, it is still unclear how much adopting a “dominant 
indicator” model improves upon assuming that decision makers perform their duties in a fairly 
reasonable manner that is not distorted by organizational constraints. 
24
 See Heuer 1999 on the psychology of intelligence analysis more generally along with Davis 
1992, 2008 and Marrin 2011 on how the Central Intelligence Agency approaches the matter.  
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is not at all clear that even perfectly rational analysts could have anticipated the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. Other scholars have argued that the signals of the Pearl Harbor attack were so faint, and 
the noise of confounding information so strong, that perhaps analysts’ mind-set correlated with 
the outcome without really causing it.25  
One could make a similar argument with respect to the enormous existing literature on the 
pathologies of U.S. learning and decision making in Vietnam. Among other arguments, scholars 
have stated that the Army’s culture and organization inhibited its ability to adapt to 
counterinsurgency,26 and that military officials tracked misleading indicators of progress,27 
deliberately misrepresented battlefield assessments,28 and failed to correct perceptions of civilian 
leaders that they knew to be mistaken.29 White House officials are then said to have been 
disposed to overoptimism30 while processing information based on misleading cognitive filters31 
in order to form policies guided not only by military considerations but also by concerns over 
                                                 
25
 Among others on this issue, see Betts 1976, 2007. 
26
 Krepinevich 1988, Nagl 2002. 
27
 Gartner 1997. 
28
 Adams 1994. 
29
 McMaster 1997. 
30
 Johnson 2004. 
31
 Khong 1992. 
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impending presidential elections,32 distributional politics,33 and the desire to avoid congressional 
criticism.34 
Once again, there is a difference between asking whether these mechanisms mattered versus 
how much they actually influenced key outcomes. Assigning causal relevance to these factors 
requires defining a plausible counterfactual scenario that articulates the way that rational (or at 
least more reasonable35) decision makers might have behaved. And while almost all of the works 
cited above address this issue explicitly, they have been unable to establish a baseline conception 
of rational behavior in Vietnam that scholars generally accept. 
Military historian Gregory Daddis, for instance, has argued that the Army was in fact a fairly 
effective “learning organization” in Vietnam, that it incorporated “best practices” and “lessons 
learned” about as well as anyone could expect, but that learning was not enough, in itself, to win 
the war.36 Political scientist John Mueller observed that the communists in Vietnam sustained 
more casualties than almost any other insurgent movement in history – being such a radical 
                                                 
32
 Downs and Rocke 1997. 
33
 Caverley 2009/10. 
34
 Craig and Logevall 2009. 
35
 Manski 2011, 2013 distinguishes between “rational” or “axiomatic” approaches to decision 
theory (e.g., Savage 1954), which aim to prescribe specific policies, versus “reasonable” or 
“actualist” approaches to decision theory, which accept that there are no unambiguous criteria for 
choosing among undominated actions. (Manski argues that people facing actual decision 
problems have no inherent preference for consistency per se – all they care about is making a 
choice that is reasonable given their particular context.) The reasonability standard is thus more 
flexible, but it can still be difficult to assess how close actual decision makers come to satisfying 
it. 
36
 See Daddis 2011, 2012, and especially 2013. Daddis argues that the conventional wisdom 
about Army learning in Vietnam is unduly influenced by the war’s outcome. Consistent with the 
argument made above, Daddis argues that strategic failure does not necessarily imply poor 
strategic assessment, even though existing literature implicitly assumes this to be true. 
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outlier, this was a situation that decision makers would naturally have found all but impossible to 
anticipate ex ante.37 And despite the inevitably-flawed nature of the policy making process, 
Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts argued that decision makers actually weighed the costs, benefits, 
and uncertainties of the situation in a fairly reasonable way such that it might be said, ironically, 
that “the system worked.”38 Thus even though Vietnam has been one of the most formative and 
well-studied experiences in U.S. military history, scholars still profoundly disagree on how 
rational decision makers should have approached the situation. This disagreement, in turn, drives 
historical assessments and broader questions about what lessons to take away from the 
experience. 
In a similar fashion, entire research programs in the study of international relations can 
revolve around different views of rational strategic assessment. For instance, scholars have 
disagreed for nearly a century about Germany’s decision making in the opening weeks of World 
War I. Some say that Germany’s attempt to knock France out of the war quickly (an adaptation 
of the infamous “Schlieffen Plan”) was fatally flawed.39 A wide range of scholarship hinges on 
                                                 
37
 Mueller 1980. In another argument relating to casualty counts, there is a prominent 
disagreement among historians as to whether the United States failed to pacify South Vietnam 
largely due to its excessive emphasis on killing and capturing insurgents, or conversely, whether 
it placed so many constraints on U.S. commanders that they could not attrit their opponents 
enough. Thus the title of a 2011 biography by Lewis Sorley of the general most closely identified 
with attrition in Vietnam is titled Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam, while an 
opposing perspective is articulated in a 2008 article by Dale Andrade entitled “Westmoreland 
Was Right.” 
38
 Gelb and Betts 1979.  
39
 Farrar 1973, Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1984, 1999, Blainey 1988: 35-40, Johnson 2004: 71-84. 
There is some disagreement about whether an original “Schlieffen Plan” actually existed (see 
Zuber 2002 and more than a dozen articles debating this idea in the journal War in History). But 
regardless of whether the German attack in 1914 was modeled after a pre-existing document, the 
question remains as to how well the attack was designed, and whether its main problems had to 
do with the concept or the execution. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
22 
 
explaining how it was that German leaders could have possibly believed that this strategy was in 
their interest, invoking ideas about the sources and influence of flawed leadership, bureaucratic 
politics, or ideas like the “Cult of the Offensive.”40 But others believe that Germany’s strategy 
was basically sound, noting that the German army advanced to the outskirts of Paris and that the 
French would not have called their victory “The Miracle of the Marne” if the outcome were not 
seriously in doubt. Many observers have in fact argued that Germany’s main mistake in 1914 
was not following the Schlieffen Plan closely enough: since the General Staff reallocated forces 
initially assigned to the main wing of the invasion, it has been criticized for “watering down” the 
attack.41  
Few military experiences have been studied more thoroughly than this one. Yet historians still 
hold fundamentally different views about the kinds of mistakes Germany made in the opening 
stages of World War I and what a rationally-designed strategy might have looked like; political 
scientists have then developed fundamentally different theories of German behavior (often seen 
as a window into military behavior more generally) based on these diverging assessments. 
Without first defining what we should expect to see out of rational actors, it is hard to know how 
to evaluate past actions, what aspects of past experience require explanation, and what that 
means for informing broader scholarship.  
One could make a similar argument for informing public policy debates. Chapter 5, for 
instance, examines U.S. policy during the occupation of Iraq. Despite escalating violence from 
2003 through 2006, top officials largely stuck to their initial strategy of building Iraq’s security 
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 See, for instance, Miller, Lynn-Jones, and Van Evera 1991 and Lieber 2007. 
41
 Craig 1955, Van Creveld 1977, Turner 1979, Sagan 1986, and Herwig 2009.  
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forces while minimizing the U.S. military footprint. To much of the public, the administration’s 
refusal to change strategies indicated that it was in a “state of denial,” or that it was playing 
politics with the war.42 Yet throughout the occupation of Iraq, the administration had insisted that 
progress would be cumulative: it was only once Iraqis had reached a political consensus at the 
top that the country would consolidate and the insurgency would lose momentum. Thus even as 
critics pointed to unfavorable violence trends, U.S. officials maintained that they were meeting 
their benchmarks, and that just because their strategy had not worked yet this did not necessarily 
mean that it would not work soon. Top officials may or may not have genuinely believed these 
arguments when they made them – perhaps they were simply offered as a defense that could hold 
up in public debates – but that would only accentuate the notion that these kinds of arguments 
possess a logic that can be surprisingly difficult to disprove. Simply from the standpoint of 
effectively critiquing public policy, it will often be important to engage these analytic issues. 
Policy initiatives also largely depend on assessments of rationality and nonrationality. For 
example, one of the largest bureaucratic reorganizations in recent memory was the restructuring 
of the U.S. armed forces via the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1986.43 This bill aimed to mitigate 
rivalries among the military services, promoting the concept of “jointness” by changing 
command structures, encouraging services to develop doctrine, plans, and equipment in tandem, 
and requiring officers to adopt assignments outside their home service in order to earn 
promotions. One of the primary motivations for these changes was the widespread belief that 
interservice rivalry had hamstrung the U.S. military in Vietnam (as well as in subsequent 
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 The term “state of denial” was the title of a prominent book by Bob Woodward 2006; see 
chapter 5 for examples of similar assessments at the time. 
43
 See Locher 2002 for a history of Goldwater-Nichols. 
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operations like the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt). The Goldwater Nichols Act thus largely 
turned on a key counterfactual assumption, that if the military had been organized differently, 
then it would have been able to plan and execute its missions in a more rational and effective 
manner. 
A similar debate is currently taking place in Washington, D.C., where in the wake of 
criticisms about the invasion and occupation of Iraq, many policy makers and analysts have 
called for a “Goldwater-Nichols II” process to reform the interagency system as a whole along 
the lines of how the 1986 bill targeted relations among the military services specifically.44 Once 
again, this effort hinges on the premise that a better-designed system would have achieved better 
results. But how much better would those results have been? How much more accurately would 
an ideally-designed bureaucracy have assessed the situation in Iraq and how much more 
effectively would it have executed its plans? Do these improvements justify the cost of a major 
institutional restructuring?  
The answers to these sorts of questions are often left implicit, but as we have seen, they can be 
difficult to establish and defend. In this way, evaluating the merits of high profile policies ex ante 
(or their impact ex post) requires laying out conceptions of what kinds of actions would be 
rational, accepting that even if that standard is unrealizable in practice, it serves as an important 
benchmark for making normative, prescriptive, and causal claims. 
This discussion highlights that while the following chapters offer historical judgments, 
empirical predictions, and policy implications, these arguments are secondary to (and conditional 
on) a primary theoretical focus. The main goal of this dissertation is to rethink and rebuild 
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 See, for example, Murdock, Flournoy, Williams, and Campbell 2004 and Bowen 2009. 
Chapter 1: Introduction  
25 
 
conceptual frameworks for defining rational strategic assessment, and to show how doing so 
sheds light on why it is that military decision makers often struggle to evaluate their policies, and 
why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long.  
Ultimately, the notion that armed conflict involves cumulative dynamics is not new. The 
cumulative dynamics of war have been a central theme of writing on military strategy since 
Clausewitz, and most people find these dynamics intuitively obvious. What is much less obvious, 
however, is why those cumulative dynamics matter, how they influence learning and adaptation, 
how they affect decision making, and why existing approaches do not capture key issues. The 
following chapters show how examining these issues provides an opportunity to question 
prominent theoretical frameworks, to inform ongoing policy debates, and to re-evaluate salient 
historical experience. 
 
  
 
 
Chapter Two: Conceptual Foundations 
REPEATED PROCESSES, CUMULATIVE PROCESSES,  
AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM 
 
 
 
One of the central themes of Carl von Clausewitz’s book On War is that armed conflict is a 
cumulative process. “The course of battle,” Clausewitz wrote, is “a slow process of mutual 
attrition that will reveal which side will first exhaust its opponent.” “Losing an engagement” is 
thus “like the gradual sinking of a scale” as “every engagement is a whole, made up of subsidiary 
engagements that add up to the overall result.” Clausewitz argued that this kind of cumulative 
dynamic characterized war not only at the level of individual battles, but also at the level of 
broader military offensives, which gradually lose force and are eventually halted at a 
“culminating point.” To Clausewitz, this implied that one of the key characteristics of a 
successful general is the ability to “detect the culminating point with discriminative judgment” 
ex ante, and to determine whether it is feasible to achieve strategic objectives before the 
offensive runs out of momentum.1  
Clausewitz was writing about Napoleonic warfare, but decision makers wrestle with similar 
dynamics in many areas of national security. In his famous 1947 essay on Cold War grand 
                                                 
1
 See Clausewitz 1832/1976: Book IV, Chapter 7; Book IV Chapter 9; and Book VII, Chapter 5. 
For centuries, scholars have theorized about the ways in which military outcomes at each level of 
analysis in war are the combined product of actions at lower levels. While this “levels of war” 
concept is often cited to Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri de Jomini, it dates back to earlier thinkers 
such as Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy, Henry Lloyd, and G.F. von Templehoff. See Gat 1989: 
esp. 42, 79 and Handel 2000: ch.3 and app. E for reviews. 
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strategy, for instance, George Kennan explained that since the communist system “bears within it 
the seeds of its own decay,” a policy of “patient but firm and vigilant containment” could 
“promote tendencies which must ultimately find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual 
mellowing of Soviet power” – though Kennan was clear that this assessment was shrouded in 
uncertainty (“This cannot be proved. And it cannot be disproved.”) U.S. military strategy during 
the Korean War largely revolved around the notion that “continued piecemeal destruction of the 
offensive potential of the Chinese Communist and North Korean Armies” would eventually push 
them to make acceptable concessions, though it was by no means apparent how much attrition 
these opponents would be able to sustain.2 When the United States launched airstrikes against 
Serbia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote 
that the administration believed “a NATO bombing campaign directed at [Serbian president 
Slobodan] Milosevic’s sources of power would weaken him, but we didn’t know how long he 
would hold out.”3 These statements all reflect Clausewitz’s conception that cumulative dynamics 
play a central role in strategic assessment as decision makers struggle to determine how long it 
might take and how much it might cost to achieve their desired goals.  
If these dynamics sound intuitive, this chapter shows how contemporary scholarship on 
military decision making often does not take them into account. In fact, Section 2.1 explains how 
prominent theoretical frameworks revolve around nearly opposite premises, assuming that 
military decision makers are observing repeated processes that remain the same from one round 
of fighting to the next, much like the odds of playing a slot machine or a roulette wheel. These 
                                                 
2
 This quote is from Ridgway 1967: 167. See Malkasian 2002: chs. 7-9 on attrition strategies 
(and the difficulty of assessing them) in the Korean War. 
3
 Albright 2003: 406. 
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theoretical frameworks reflect broader scholarship on decision making in fields like optimal 
stopping, dynamic programming, sequential analysis, and bandit problems. Yet these fields were 
not developed to deal with the kinds of cumulative dynamics that are so central to strategic 
assessment. Section 2.1 makes this argument in more detail and thus motivates the need for 
developing new conceptual foundations for analyzing cumulative dynamics in armed conflict. 
Section 2.2 begins to develop these conceptual foundations through inductive theory-building, 
placing special emphasis on U.S. military decision making during the War in Vietnam. For more 
than a decade, U.S. policymakers struggled to determine how much attrition the Viet Cong could 
sustain, how difficult it would be to bring Hanoi to the bargaining table, and whether it might be 
possible to create a stable government in Saigon. These questions all revolved around cumulative 
dynamics, and the way that U.S. officials approached them constitutes some of the most 
controversial decision making in this country’s military history.4 If a theoretical framework is 
intended to be useful for informing salient debates about national security then it should be 
relevant to this experience, and so the Vietnam War is a useful place to ground this dissertation’s 
conceptual structure.  
Section 2.3 then expands on the deductive logic of this theoretical framework in order to 
demonstrate how it can also be derived from basic principles that apply to military decision 
making more generally. Section 2.4 closes by discussing the scope conditions associated with 
this framework in more detail.  
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 For a review of scholarly debates on Vietnam, see Chapter 1, Section 3.  
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Section 2.1. Conceptual foundations of existing literature 
The standard theoretical framework that political scientists use to model the way that rational 
decision makers form and revise their expectations in armed conflict comes from the literature on 
informational asymmetries and the “bargaining model of war.”5 This is one of the most 
prominent developments in the contemporary study of international relations, and it may be the 
most widely-taught research program that uses formal theory to analyze armed conflict.6 This 
framework assumes that combatants enter conflict with uncertainty about their opponents’ 
capabilities and resolve. These factors determine a combatant’s overall “type,” which dictates the 
chances that they will be defeated in each “round of fighting.” 
The term “round of fighting” is conceptually more useful than talking about a war’s 
“duration,” since many armed conflicts contain protracted periods of relative calm. Scholars 
typically conceive of “rounds of fighting” as taking either of two different forms. Donald 
Wittman, R. Harrison Wagner, Robert Powell, and James Fearon examine war at the strategic 
level, assuming that each round of fighting induces some probability that one side will defeat the 
other and take control of whatever stakes the combatants were fighting for.7 By contrast, Alastair 
Smith, Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner, Branislav Slantchev, and Smith and Allan Stam 
examine war at the tactical level, where each “round of fighting” constitutes an individual battle 
                                                 
5
 As mentioned in Chapter 1 (note 23), Gartner 1997 is one of the most prominent works on 
strategic assessment in general, but it does not thoroughly discuss what rational strategic 
assessment would entail.  
6
 The literature on asymmetric information and coercive bargaining is typically traced to Blainey 
1973, whose insights were then developed and formalized by Fearon 1995. For reviews of the 
literature on the bargaining model of war, see Powell 2002, Reiter 2003, and Walter 2009.  
7
 Wittman 1979, Wagner 2000, Powell 2004, Fearon 2007a. 
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within a broader conflict.8 This model (often called “battling for forts”) assumes that combatants 
enter conflict with a certain number of forts in their possession, each round of fighting 
determines whether a marginal fort changes hands, and if one side captures all of its opponent’s 
forts, then it achieves a military victory. 
In either of these formulations, uncertainty about an opponent’s type is a crucial determinant 
of combatants’ behavior. If both sides had complete information (or even if they just had 
symmetric information) then they should be able to agree on the expected outcome of the war in 
advance. Since fighting is costly, both sides could make themselves better off if they arranged 
for this outcome via negotiated settlement and split the remaining surplus.9 This was the central 
insight in James Fearon’s 1995 article on “Rationalist Explanations for War,” a piece that is 
generally credited with launching the contemporary formal literature on coercive bargaining in 
armed conflict. 
The bargaining model of war thus largely revolves around the way that decision makers 
wrestle with uncertainty in evaluating their strategic prospects, which largely boils down to 
estimating an opponent’s “type.” In the simplest models, opponents can be either of two types, 
strong or weak. Strong types are less likely than weak types to be defeated in each round of 
                                                 
8
 Smith 1998, Filson and Werner 2002, Slantchev 2003, Smith and Stam 2004. 
9
 Two reasons that this might not be possible would be if combatants face commitment problems 
in which one side would have a strong incentive to renege on the deal at a later date (Walter 
2002, Fearon 2004, Powell 2006, 2012), or if combatants are negotiating over indivisible issues 
(Goddard 2006, Toft 2003, 2006, Hassner 2009). The “bargaining model of war” covers these 
issues as well as the problems of asymmetric information that are discussed in the text above. 
Commitment problems and issue indivisibility lie outside the scope of this dissertation, however, 
as by definition, decision makers with complete information would face no uncertainty about 
strategic assessment. 
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Figure 2.1. Standard Model of Learning in War: Armed Conflict as a Repeated Process 
 
Figure 2.1 represents the standard framework for modeling the way that decision makers form 
and revise expectations in war. The top panel represents the assumption that an opponent’s 
“type” dictates its probability of being defeated in each round of fighting. Because those 
probabilities are fixed and repeated, each round of fighting provides “type-separating 
information” leading to the smooth, monotonic learning process shown in the bottom panel. 
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fighting. A common and important assumption, shown in the top of Figure 2.1, is that the 
probability of defeating an opponent remains the same in every round. 
This framework produces an important result, which is that each round of fighting provides 
information that helps to reveal a combatant’s type. After each round of fighting concludes 
without inducing defeat (in strategic-level models) or each time a combatant loses a battle (in 
tactical-level models), rational decision makers should become more likely to think that they are 
facing a strong opponent.10 This leads to the kind of gradual, monotonic learning process 
represented in the bottom panel of Figure 2.1. And this learning process is theoretically 
significant: it indicates that as combatants fight without achieving their goals they should 
become more pessimistic about their ability to do so, and thus they should also become more 
amenable to compromise. As Alastair Smith and Allan Stam explain, “The act of waging war 
reveals information about the relative strengths of each side. As a war progresses, each side’s 
beliefs about the likely outcome of continuing the war converge. Once the warring parties’ 
beliefs have converged sufficiently, they can find a bargained solution to the conflict.”11 
                                                 
10
 For example, Powell 2004: 349-350 develops a model in which each round of fighting 
“generates a risk  that [State]  collapses in that round and a risk  that [State]  collapses.” 
Those probabilities are assumed to remained constant, and thus Powell explains how if there is a 
round of fighting in which  did not collapse, then  can use Bayes’ rule to update prior 
expectations and should thus become “more confident that it is facing the more powerful type  
relative to ′ …. This is the sense in which fighting conveys information.” Wagner 2000 and 
Fearon 2007a use similar models, extending logic put forth by Blainey 1973, Wittman 1979, and 
Fearon 1995. See also the description in the main text above of the “battling for forts” models of 
Smith 1998 and subsequent authors. Slantchev observes (2003: 627) that almost all formal 
models of coercive bargaining with asymmetric information exhibit the “screening property” 
discussed here. 
11
 Smith and Stam 2004: 783. 
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This is an important argument because it indicates that war is a self-terminating process, as 
fighting resolves the uncertainty that led combatants to armed conflict in the first place. As 
Filson and Werner explain, “War itself provides the information necessary for disputants to reach 
a settlement to end the war.”12 The bargaining model also helps to set baseline expectations for 
thinking about the way that military leaders should form and revise their views. As H. E. 
Goemans writes in his study of German decision making in World War I, for instance, “War 
makes agreement possible because war provides information…. As the war progresses, at least 
one side must discover that its estimate [of the balance of power] was wrong. As unexpected 
defeats and failures on the battlefield mount, the relatively weaker side learns it overestimated its 
strength. A rational actor then lowers his estimate of his relative strength.”13 
Contemporary scholars of coercive bargaining generally base these predictions on formal, 
mathematical reasoning, but perhaps one of the reasons why this research program has been so 
successful is that its findings reinforce basic intuitions many people have about the way that 
military leaders should learn and adapt. In general, it seems reasonable to expect that battlefield 
outcomes should reduce decision makers’ uncertainty about their opponents’ capabilities and 
resolve. It also seems reasonable to expect that the longer decision makers go without achieving 
their objectives, the more pessimistic they should become about their ability to do so, and the 
more likely they should be to change course. 
                                                 
12
 Filson and Werner 2002: 820. Cf. Reiter 2003: 31: “Combat can reduce uncertainty by 
providing information about the actual balance of power…. The outcome of combat is observed 
by both sides and should cause their expectations to converge regarding the likely outcomes of 
future combat. This increases the likelihood of reaching an agreement that both sides prefer over 
continued fighting.” 
13
 Goemans 2000: 27-28. 
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Yet it is important to keep in mind that the predictions of the bargaining model rely on the 
notion that armed conflict is a repeated process, in which the odds of winning the war (or the 
odds of winning each battle) are the same in one round as they are in the next. Here, existing 
scholarship clearly clashes with basic intuition.  
For example, when the German Army invaded France at the beginning of World War I, it won 
the early Battles of Charleroi and Mons. The bargaining literature implies that rational German 
decision makers should thus have become more optimistic about their ability to win the next 
major battle at the Marne. Yet as the German Army advanced towards Paris, its supply lines 
were becoming overextended, communication among units was breaking down, and exhaustion 
was setting in among troops and commanders. Germany’s attempt to knock France out of the war 
was already falling behind schedule.14 And surely the French Army would fight more tenaciously 
to defend its capital than to hold peripheral territory. It would thus be tenuous to suggest that 
Germany had the same probability of winning the Battle of the Marne and the Battle of Mons. 
Yet this is the key assumption underpinning theoretical scholarship on the bargaining model of 
war, where rounds of fighting are assumed to have independent and identically distributed 
outcomes.  
Or consider Japanese decision making in World War II. After the Battles of Coral Sea and 
Midway in 1942, U.S. forces established naval dominance in the Pacific and began successively 
rolling back Japanese defenses until Tokyo surrendered three years later. Why did Japan hold out 
for so long, suffering through nearly three years of repeated tactical defeats? This question poses 
a clear puzzle for the bargaining model framework, which argues that each time combatants lose 
                                                 
14
 See Herwig 2009 for a recent history of the war’s opening stages, along with a review of 
debates about German decision making throughout. 
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a battle, they should believe there is a higher chance that they will lose the next battle, too. But 
this argument does not really engage the basic tenets of Japanese strategy. Japan’s goal in the 
Pacific theater was not to capture and hold as much territory as possible – the idea was to 
establish a defensive perimeter, force the United States to expend heavy losses every time it 
rolled that perimeter back, and thus eventually to push U.S. decision makers past their threshold 
for casualty tolerance beyond which they would no longer be willing to continue fighting. In this 
respect, Japanese strategy revolved around the Clausewitzian notion that every offensive 
gradually builds towards a culminating point, Tokyo’s key mistake was in thinking it could bring 
this culminating point about, and this dynamic is largely left out of contemporary models of 
learning and adaptation in war. 
To close this section, it is important to be clear that despite the current literature’s limitations, 
its assumptions are by no means idiosyncratic. In many ways, the bargaining model framework is 
similar to models of learning and adaptation in broader literatures on optimal stopping, dynamic 
programming, sequential analysis, and bandit problems.15 These literatures, like the bargaining 
model of war, capture the way that decision makers learn about repeated processes. Both contain 
many applications to gambling, and when they model processes of learning and adaptation, the 
notion that the outcomes of these processes are independent and identically distributed is 
essentially the assumption of first resort. 
The term “bandit problems,” for instance, comes from the example of a gambler playing a slot 
machine (colloquially known as a “one-armed bandit”), who is attempting to determine the 
machine’s payoff function by playing the game and observing its results. Because a slot 
                                                 
15
 Powell 2004, for instance, explicitly characterizes his model as a “dynamic programming 
problem.”  
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machine’s payoff probabilities are fixed and repeated, decision makers should be able to form 
increasingly accurate expectations over time about what those probabilities are. A rational 
gambler would presumably not begin playing a slot machine unless she believed that it offered 
an acceptable rate of return – but as she continues to play without winning, she will be more 
likely to infer that the machine has a low probability of paying off. At some point she may 
decide that this machine is not as good a bet as she initially thought, and she would stop playing 
it.16  
This is a reasonable analogy for the dynamics that are captured by the bargaining model of 
war. And more broadly than this, when officials, experts, and pundits debate military strategy 
and national security, they regularly invoke terms like “the gambler’s fallacy” and “doubling 
down” to describe people who favor sticking with policies that do not appear to be making 
headway. In the context of slot machines, roulette wheels, or other games that involve repeated 
processes, these models and idioms make sense. Military strategy, however, involves cumulative 
dynamics that have a very different logic for thinking about the way that decision makers should 
learn and adapt.17 The next section will begin a more detailed examination of what these 
dynamics entail. 
                                                 
16
 On optimal stopping, see Dubins and Savage 1965, Chow, Robbins, and Sigmund 1971, Hill 
2009, and Stochastics, Vol. 77, Nos. 1-4. On bandit problems, see Berry and Fristedt 1985 and 
Gittins 1989. On dynamic programming, see Bellman 1957. 
17
 Interestingly, Dubins and Savage begin their famous work by explicitly pointing out that it has 
almost no real-world applicability. Their work is based around the notion that a gambler has 
arrived in a casino, and must win a certain amount of money by the end of the night. They 
explain that “The fantasy with which we have introduced the general problem of optimal 
gambling systems has no immediate practical importance” (1965: 1). They defend this choice 
based simply on precedent (“the probabilist’s tendency to invoke gambling imagery,” vii) and 
theoretical interest (“the problem, once proposed, cries out for attention as pure mathematics,” 
1). Yet as with many scholarly paradigms, these initial caveats have become much less explicit 
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Section 2.2. Inductive theory-building: strategic assessment in Vietnam  
The purpose of this section is to begin constructing a conceptual framework for strategic 
assessment that incorporates the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict. The theory-building in 
this section is largely inductive, based on an analysis of U.S. decision making during the 
Vietnam War. Grounding concepts in this experience helps to ensure that the ideas developed in 
this dissertation are relevant to actual analytic challenges that military decision makers face in 
salient cases. Section 2.3 will then flesh out the deductive foundations of this framework in order 
to demonstrate how the dynamics discussed here generalize more broadly. 
The analysis of Vietnam in this chapter is based on three sets of primary sources. These are 
the Pentagon Papers, which were compiled by the Department of Defense, leaked to the public, 
and then entered into the Congressional Record by Senator Mike Gravel; the U.S. Department of 
State’s Foreign Relations of the United States series, which contain documents that have been 
compiled and published by the State Department’s Office of the Historian; and the National 
Intelligence Council’s Estimative Products on Vietnam, which comprise nearly 200 declassified 
intelligence assessments relating to the war.  
All of these collections have at some point been compiled by government bodies, and so it is 
unlikely that they constitute a truly representative sample of viewpoints. Nevertheless, these 
documents provide systematic surveys of primary source materials on the Vietnam War from 
diplomats, military officers, political officials, and intelligence analysts. To the extent that the 
authors of these documents (or the editors who compiled them for publication) would have had 
                                                                                                                                                             
over time, as standard modeling assumptions acquire inertia and scholars seek for ways of 
extending them. 
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an incentive to bias their selection and articulation of these assessments, they would presumably 
do so in a way that justified their shortcomings by emphasizing the analytic challenges that they 
faced. Since the goal of this chapter is to examine those analytic challenges, the Pentagon 
Papers, Foreign Relations of the United States, and Estimative Products on Vietnam are useful 
source material. 
 
Defining objectives and assessing uncertainty 
U.S. military strategy during the Vietnam War was based on three main objectives: to defeat the 
Viet Cong, to stop North Vietnam from assisting the insurgency, and to create a stable 
government in Saigon.18 Policy makers argued extensively about how long it might take and how 
much it might cost to achieve these goals, and many expressed explicit reservations about their 
ability to make these estimates in clear and rigorous ways. 
When policy makers discussed fighting the Viet Cong (VC), for instance, they often debated 
the feasibility of reaching a so-called “crossover point,” where the insurgents would start to incur 
more losses than they could replace. The crossover point would be an important breakthrough 
because it would suggest that the military balance had tipped against the communists.19 In order 
                                                 
18
 The Joint Chiefs of Staff describe these “three independent undertakings” in Pentagon Papers 
(henceforth PP), Vol. IV, p. 395. Other documents sometimes mention additional objectives (for 
instance, several discuss a fourth strategic objective as being to keep China from entering the 
war), and some documents combine defeating the Viet Cong and halting North Vietnamese 
infiltration into a single objective of ending the insurgency; but since many documents discuss 
the insurgency in the South and the bombing in the North separately, it makes sense to keep 
those subjects separate in this analysis as well. 
19
 Westmoreland believed that achieving the crossover point was his primary strategic objective. 
Documents that discuss the crossover point include: William Westmoreland, Notes on 
Discussions with President Johnson, 27 April 1967: Foreign Relations of the United States 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Foundations 
39 
 
to estimate how close U.S. forces were getting to the crossover point, analysts tracked a range of 
measures. The most well-known of these was the “body count” of insurgents killed or captured. 
It was notoriously difficult to gather accurate information on insurgent attrition, but it was even 
harder to estimate the Viet Cong’s ability to reconstitute its ranks. This depended on the number 
of forces being held in reserve, the remaining pool of potential recruits, desertion rates and 
morale, and capacity to convert new volunteers into effective soldiers.20 From early on, U.S. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(henceforth FRUS), 1964-1968, Vol. V, document 149; Robert McNamara, “Future Actions in 
Vietnam,” Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, 19 
May 1967: FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. V, document 177; Robert Komer, Memorandum  from the 
President’s Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense McNamara, 29 November 1966: FRUS, 
1964-68, Vol. IV, document 318 (in which Komer also discusses several other “major turning 
points”); and Komer, Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson in 
Texas, 9 July 1967: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. V, document 234. See also Lewy 1978: 78-84 and 
Drea 2011: 131-137 for discussions of the crossover point and the body count, as well as 
reflections by Secretary McNamara 1995: 238) and General Westmoreland 1976: 160, 239, 332 
themselves. In other documents, decision makers discussed similar tipping points like the 
chances that “Viet Cong morale cracks significantly” so as to provide the United States with a 
“decisive break.” McGeorge Bundy and Dean Rusk, “Courses of Action in Viet-Nam,” 
Memorandum for President Johnson, 9 November 1965: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. III, document 
194; see also William Bundy, “1967 and Beyond in Vietnam,” Draft Paper prepared by the 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 21 December 1966: FRUS, 1964-
68, Vol. IV, document 347. 
20
 For documents describing the difficulty of estimating and combining these factors, see 
Department of Defense, “Summary Statement on South Vietnam,” Memorandum, 2 March 1964: 
FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. I, document 67; National Security Council, Summary Notes of the 557th 
Meeting of the National Security Council, 10 May 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 
135; “The Vietnamese Communists’ Will to Persist,” 26 August 1966: Estimative Products on 
Vietnam (henceforth EPV), pp. 353-376; McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the President, 17 
November 1966: PP, Vol. IV, pp. 365-373; Westmoreland, Notes on Discussions with President 
Johnson, 27 April 1967: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. V, document 149; Notes from Meeting of the 
President with Secretary McNamara to Review the Secretary’s Findings during Vietnam Trip, 12 
July 1967: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. V, document 238; Special National Intelligence Estimate [SNIE] 
14.3-67, “Capabilities of the Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam,” 13 
November 1967: EPV, pp. 429-455; and SNIE 14.3-69, “Capabilities of the Vietnamese 
Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam,” 17 July 1969: EPV, pp. 473-501. Elsewhere, 
Daddis 2011, 2012 provides some of the most comprehensive assessments of “the problem of 
metrics” in the Vietnam War, conveying the breadth of different indicators which Vietnam 
decision makers tracked. Adams 1994 gives a first-hand account of how bureaucratic politics and 
politicization also inhibited accurate assessments of Viet Cong casualties and order of battle. 
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decision makers acknowledged that they could not reliably evaluate these factors. Ambassador 
Maxwell Taylor wrote, for instance, that “The ability of the Viet-Cong continuously to rebuild 
their units and to make good their losses is one of the mysteries of this guerilla war,”21 while 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara warned that “all of our estimates of enemy strength and 
variations… contain very great uncertainties,” that “any conclusions drawn from them must be 
considered to be highly tentative and conjectural,” and thus that “it is impossible to predict the 
point at which we can expect to attrite enemy forces at the rate he introduces new ones.”22  
Similar uncertainty and intellectual agnosticism surrounded the effort to stop North Vietnam 
(NVN or DRV) from supporting the insurgency. The United States began bombing North Vietnam 
in summer 1964 and then launched a sustained air campaign (Operation Rolling Thunder) in 
March 1965. The bombing was intended to push Hanoi past its “breaking point” where it would 
no longer be able or willing to send supplies and reinforcements across the border. In Taylor’s 
words, the administration hoped that by gradually increasing the intensity and destructiveness of 
the bombing, the United States could “convey signals [to Hanoi] which, in combination, should 
present to DRV leaders a vision of inevitable, ultimate destruction if they do not change their 
                                                 
21
 Maxwell Taylor, “The Current Situation in South Viet-Nam,” Paper prepared by the 
Ambassador in South Vietnam, November 1964 (exact date not given): FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. 1, 
document 426. 
22
 McNamara, Draft Memorandum for the President, 17 November 1966: PP, Vol. IV, p. 370. 
Similarly, National Security Advisor Walt Rostow wrote to President Johnson that while 
intelligence assessments could identify “a progressive decline in the morale and the fighting 
capacity” of the Viet Cong, “no one can tell you when this progressive decline will lead to the 
breaking up of units or to the ending of the war.” See Rostow, Memorandum from the 
President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 2 August 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, 
document 198. 
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ways.”23 (Put more crudely, National Security Council staffer Robert Komer wrote that the 
purpose of the bombing was to force Hanoi to “cry uncle.”24) But again, decision makers found it 
difficult to estimate how long it might take or how much it might cost for these measures to 
achieve their intended goals. Officials generally believed that the bombing depressed morale 
throughout Vietnam, damaged industrial and transportation infrastructure, raised food prices, and 
eroded “discipline” in the communist workforce. Yet what did that ultimately mean for the 
prospects of breaking Hanoi’s will? Evaluating strategic progress required making conjectures 
about the nature of North Vietnamese society, the extent to which a predominantly decentralized, 
agricultural nation could absorb the impact of the bombing, and how the regime in Hanoi might 
potentially react.25 Analysts regularly acknowledged the difficulty of juggling these factors. As a 
general rule, there was “no agreement in the intelligence community as to when [North 
Vietnamese] morale may reach the breaking point.”26 Decision makers did not even have a basic 
                                                 
23
 Taylor, quoted in PP, Vol. III, p. 316; see also SNIE 50-2-64, “Probable Consequences of 
Certain US Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos,” 25 May 1964: EPV, pp. 202-215; 
Rostow and Komer, “A Strategy for the Next Phase in Vietnam,” Draft Paper by the President’s 
Special Assistants, 20 September 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 241. 
24
 Komer, quoted under the heading, “Critical Variables Which Will Determine Success in 
Vietnam,” in PP, Vol. IV, p. 155. 
25
 Documents exemplifying the challenges in assessing the political and economic effects of the 
bombing include SNIE 50-2-64, “Probable Consequences of Certain US Actions with Respect to 
Vietnam and Laos,” 25 May 1964: EPV, pp. 202-215; John McNaughton, “Plan of Action for 
South Vietnam,” 3 September 1964: PP, Vol. 3, document 188; National Security Council 
Working Group on Vietnam, “The Situation in Vietnam,” Intelligence Assessment, 24 November 
1964: PP, Vol. III, document 240; Rostow, “Status of Civilian Morale in Vietnam,” 19 
September 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 239; as well as various documents from 
March 1965 quoted in PP, Vol. IV, pp. 254-65. Rostow was perhaps the most zealous advocate 
of the bombing campaign, and Milne 2008 discusses his assessments in light of how Rostow 
viewed the North Vietnamese economic system. 
26
 Rostow, “Status of Civilian Morale in Vietnam,” 19 September 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. 
IV, document 239. 
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idea of how much North Vietnamese infiltration they would need to interdict in order to 
undermine the insurgency: according to a Special National Intelligence Estimate in 1966, it was 
possible to assess Viet Cong requirements and supply levels to “only rough orders of 
magnitude,” and so even if the bombing “would probably place an effective ceiling on 
Communist capabilities to expand their military effort in the South” there were “too many 
uncertainties to permit estimating at just what level the limit or expansion would be.”27 To 
summarize, U.S. decision makers saw it as one of their main objectives in the Vietnam War to 
coerce Hanoi into dropping its supply efforts below acceptable levels – but they could not say 
how difficult this would be to accomplish, nor could they even define what those acceptable 
levels entailed.28 
A third major U.S. objective during the war was to reinforce the Government of South 
Vietnam (GVN). Here decision makers often spoke of achieving a “leveling off point” where the 
government would at least be able to gain new supporters as fast as it lost others.29 Assessments 
                                                 
27
 SNIE 10-1-66, “Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course of Action on DRV Capability to 
Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam,” 4 February 1966: EPV, pp. 331, 338; see also 
Admiral Lloyd Mustin’s discussion of estimating the “minimum necessary sustaining level” of 
Viet Cong resupply, quoted in PP, Vol. III, pp. 213-214. Another useful description of the 
uncertainties involved with assessing North Vietnamese infiltration can be found in “Summary 
of Recent MACV and CIA Cables on Infiltration,” 27 November 1964: PP, Vol. III, document 243. 
28
 Leslie Gelb (who directed the Pentagon Papers project) and Richard Betts offer a similar 
characterization in their book analyzing decision making during the Vietnam War: “Much of the 
most important information about Vietnam was essentially unquantifiable,” they argue. “[Some 
goals] were so intangible that it was hard to gauge progress or retrogression” (Gelb and Betts 
1979: 303, 306-307). 
29
 Documents which discuss the chances that the loss of political support in South Vietnam will 
“level off” or “bottom out” include: Secretary McNamara as quoted in PP, Vol. III, p. 508; 
Memorandum Prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence, 15 May 1964: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. I, 
document 159; William Bundy, “Where Are We Heading?” 18 February 1965: PP, Vol. III, 
document 252; McNaughton, “Proposed Course of Action Re Vietnam,” Memorandum for 
Secretary of Defense McNamara, 24 March 1965: PP, Vol. III, document 153 (see also PP, Vol. 
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of Saigon’s legitimacy and the morale of South Vietnamese forces varied widely as analysts 
struggled to understand and predict the relevant social dynamics. (There is a famous anecdote, 
for instance, in which President Johnson is briefed by two emissaries just returning from 
Vietnam who provided nearly opposite assessments. Johnson “looked from one to the other” and 
replied “You two did visit the same country didn’t you?”30) William Sullivan (head of the 
interagency Vietnam Coordinating Committee) wrote in 1964 that “If we can obtain a 
breakthrough in the mutual commitment of the U.S. in Vietnam to a confident sense of victory” 
then it would be possible to achieve the necessary political reforms; but as on other issues, he 
also conceded that “No one… can define with precision just how that breakthrough can be 
established.”31 
Thus on each of the war’s principal objectives, policymakers and analysts believed that they 
were making progress toward their desired end point without knowing how difficult it would be 
to get there or whether this was even feasible at all. One of the most revealing documents from 
this standpoint is the 1966 “Summer Study” prepared by the Jasons, an independent group of 
senior scientists who convene for several weeks each year to consult for the Department of 
Defense.32 The Summer Study was commissioned to evaluate the bombing campaign against 
                                                                                                                                                             
III, p. 348); Rostow, Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, 
5 April 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 115; and Military Assistance Command 
Vietnam [MACV] quoted in PP, Vol. III, p. 345. 
30
 Pentagon Papers, Vol. III, p. 23. 
31
 William Sullivan in June 1964, quoted in PP, Vol. III, p. 78. 
32
 The Jason program is still operational: see Finkbeiner 2006, in which pp. 65-70 discuss the 
1966 Summer Study. 
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North Vietnam, and the report is useful because it directly addresses the intellectual challenges 
of doing so:  
 
While conceptually it is reasonable to assume that some limit may be imposed on the 
scale of military activity that Hanoi can maintain in the South by continuing the 
ROLLING THUNDER program at the present, or some higher level of effort, there appears 
to be no basis for defining that limit in concrete terms or, for concluding that the 
present scale of VC/NVN activities in the field have reached that limit…. The 
fragmented nature of current analyses and the lack of an adequate methodology for 
assessing the net effects of a given set of military operations leaves a major gap 
between the quantifiable data on bomb damage effects, on the one hand, and policy 
judgments about the feasibility of achieving a given set of objectives, on the other. 
Bridging this gap still requires the exercise of broad political-military judgments that 
cannot be supported or rejected on the basis of systematic intelligence indicators. It 
must be concluded, therefore, that there is currently no adequate basis for predicting 
the levels of U.S. military effort that would be required to achieve the stated objectives 
– indeed, there is no firm basis for determining if there is any feasible level of effort 
that would achieve these objectives.33  
 
The Jasons’ indictment of U.S. strategic assessment supposedly disturbed Secretary 
McNamara, who became increasingly frustrated with the war effort and eventually resigned in 
1968.34 But others had already reached similar conclusions. As early as 1963, for example, 
National Intelligence Estimates conceded that there was simply “no satisfactory objective means 
of determining how the war is going.”35 McNamara himself had written in 1964 – in a 
                                                 
33
 Pentagon Papers, Vol. IV, pp. 117-119, emphasis in original. 
34
 This claim is made by the authors of the Pentagon Papers (Vol. IV, p. 231); McNamara 
himself discusses the importance of the Jason report in his book Argument Without End (1999: 
341). McNamara’s views on the war in Vietnam are discussed in detail in two recent additions to 
the History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense series: see Kaplan, Landa, and Drea 2005: 
chs. 11 and 19 and Drea 2011 which largely focus on the way McNamara and his colleagues 
struggled with conflicting assessments of the war. 
35
 NIE 53-63, “Prospects in South Vietnam,” 17 April 1963: EPV, pp. 186-198. 
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memorandum that one historian called the “intellectual foundation” for strategic planning36 – that 
there was no way to know whether “our objective [in bombing Hanoi] could be achieved by any 
means within the practical range of our options.”37 
 
Assessing cumulative dynamics 
Even if many U.S. officials were overconfident in assessing the Vietnam War, most were 
nevertheless in agreement that success was unlikely in the short run. When the Johnson 
administration approved Rolling Thunder in 1965, Secretary McNamara explained that among 
senior decision makers, “none of them expects the [Viet Cong] to capitulate or to come to a 
position acceptable to us, in less than six months…. [I]t will take more than six months, perhaps 
a year or two, to demonstrate VC failure in the South.” In an assessment from 1966, McNamara 
again wrote that “I see no reasonable way to bring the war to an end soon… there is no sign of an 
impending break in enemy morale…. The solution lies in girding, openly, for a longer war and in 
                                                 
36
 McMaster 1997: 75. 
37
 McNamara, “South Vietnam,” Memorandum for the President, 16 March 1964: PP, Vol. III, p. 
499. See also McNamara’s Report from Honolulu Meeting (21 April 1965: PP, Vol. III, 
document 256) in which he described that most key decision makers expected that Rolling 
Thunder would not succeed in less than a year. Here McNamara is characterizing his views along 
with those of William Bundy (Assistant Secretary of States for East Asian and Pacific Affairs), 
John McNaughton (Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), Maxwell 
Taylor (U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam), Earl Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff), Ulysses Sharp (Commander of the Pacific Fleet), and William Westmoreland (head of 
Military Assistance Command Vietnam). For more on the Honolulu meeting, see Drea 2011: 30-
31, McMaster 1997: 95-103, and Logevall 1999: ch. 11. 
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taking actions which will in 12 to 18 months give clear evidence that the continuing costs and 
risks to the American people are acceptably limited.”38 
These statements represent an important way in which the cumulative dynamics of armed 
conflict influence perceptions of military strategy: decision makers may not expect initial effort 
to produce immediate returns, but rather to make progress toward reaching a state where success 
might later be achievable. To mix metaphors from the bargaining literature and Clausewitz, each 
“round of fighting” is intended to move decision makers closer to their desired “culminating 
point.” 
Documents throughout the Vietnam War share this perspective. Assistant Secretary of State 
William Bundy, for instance, estimated that “we may have to hang on quite a long time before 
we can hope to see an improving situation in South Viet-Nam… the most likely prospect is for a 
prolonged period without major risks of escalation but equally without any give by Hanoi.”39 
Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach described “a consensus that one year from now we 
will be stronger than we are now, making continued progress against the VC, and slowly building 
up the GVN —but that there will not have been a decisive and undeniable breakthrough, that the 
enemy will still be very much with us, and that it will remain difficult to produce dramatic and 
convincing evidence of a victory in the near future.”40 When the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
                                                 
38
 McNamara, Memorandum for the President, October 1966 (exact date not given): PP, Vol. IV, 
pp. 348-353. 
39
 William Bundy, “Where Are We Heading?” 18 February 1965: PP, Vol. III, document 252. 
For a similar assessment, see NSC Working Group on Vietnam, “Intelligence Assessment: The 
Situation in South Vietnam,” 26 November 1964: PP, Vol. III, document 241. 
40
 Nicholas Katzenbach, “Prognosis for Vietnam,” Memorandum for Secretary of State Rusk, 1 
November 1967: this document is described in FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. V, document 374. 
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recommended a bombing escalation in 1968, they warned that “it is not anticipated that this 
impact will be immediately apparent…. The cumulative effects of the air strikes and naval 
bombardment will gradually increase to significant proportions as erosion of the distribution 
system progresses.”41 When national intelligence estimates predicted the impact of ground force 
commitments, they typically stated that these escalations would not cause the communists to 
buckle immediately. “The real test,” according to one estimate, “would be that of combat,” and it 
was only if “the tide of battle runs against the Viet Cong for a substantial period” that the 
communists might possibly resort to negotiations.42 
 
  
                                                 
41
 Earl Wheeler: PP, Vol. 4, pp. 254-256. 
42
 Directorate of Intelligence, “Memorandum: Reactions to a Further US Buildup in South 
Vietnam,” 10 June 1965: EPV, pp. 255-260. Similarly, see SNIE 10-11-65 (“Probable Communist 
Reactions to a US Course of Action,” 22 September 1965: EPV, p. 291), which states that “it is 
not likely that the North Vietnamese would move immediately to the conference table [following 
a buildup of US ground forces]; they would probably feel that there was still time to test the 
effectiveness of the Viet Cong against US forces.” In a Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam 
to the Department of State (11 November 1965: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. III, document 199), 
Ambassador Lodge wrote that “In conclusion, we believe the enemy will continue for the next 
several months at least on his current course of action… We do not expect the Viet Cong to 
revert to a lesser level of insurgency or to seek a negotiated settlement until they are convinced 
that their current course will not succeed. The point is not likely to be reached until the 
capabilities of the forces now being created and deployed have been neutralized or impaired in 
battle.” Other relevant examples include Lodge, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the 
Department of State, 26 August 1965: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. III, document 127, and Directorate 
of Intelligence, “Memorandum: The Vietnamese Communists’ Will to Persist,” 26 August 1966: 
EPV, pp. 353-376. Lodge reports that MACV held similar views in his Telegram from the 
Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 8 June 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, 
document 153. 
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Figure 2.2  Capturing Cumulative Dynamics 
 
Figure 2.2 lays out a schematic for assessing cumulative dynamics in armed conflict. Here, initial 
rounds of fighting yield no immediate return; this is labeled as the “Buy-In Phase.” Eventually, 
however, the investment advances to a stage (the “Impact Phase”) where it generates the 
possibility of achieving intended objectives: the odds of obtaining those objectives can come with 
certainty at a fixed point (represented here as the “Threshold Model”), they may gradually 
increase over time (represented here as the “Stochastic Model”), or the chances of success may 
always remain fairly low (represented here as the “Shot-in-the-Dark Model”).  
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How might we structure this analytic challenge conceptually? These documents suggest that it 
is possible to characterize the views of Vietnam War decision makers by dividing their policies 
into two, distinct phases. The first of these could be called the Buy-In Phase. During the Buy-In 
Phase, there would be little to no probability of achieving strategic goals. The Buy-In Phase is 
analogous to an entry cost, which does not directly produce profits, but makes it possible to 
achieve returns at a subsequent point. A better analogy from a lesser-known literature would be 
the concept of “time-to-build,” which models the way that real estate or research-and-
development projects often require protracted expenditures before realizing gains.43 The second 
stage could be called an Impact Phase. Success is not necessarily guaranteed here either, but 
once decision makers are in the Impact Phase, their investments will generate a positive 
probability of achieving desired goals.  
Figure 2.2 represents these concepts graphically. The x-axis captures rounds of fighting, 
which we could also represent more generally in terms of the overall amount of costs decision 
                                                 
43
 See Grossman and Shapiro 1986, who describe how “Many research projects, as well as some 
types of investment programs for the installation of physical capital, can be described as follows: 
measurable progress is achieved over a period of time, but the investment yields no returns until 
the entire project is completed. Examples of this include laboratory development of a new 
product or process, the construction of a new building, and the writing of a scholarly journal 
article. When confronted with investment opportunities of this sort, individuals and firms must 
decide how many resources to devote to the project at each point in time. Implicitly, this also 
determines the (expected) duration of the project.” Some works in this field examine situations 
where “total effort required to complete the research satisfactorily is not known” (Kamien and 
Schwartz 1971). See also Majd and Pindyck 1987, Roberts and Weitzman 1981, and Dixit and 
Pindyck’s discussion (1994: chapter 10) on sequential investment.  This literature has featured 
rarely (if at all) in the theory of military strategy, but it connects to the U.S. military’s doctrinal 
concept of “shaping operations” which are intended to “create and preserve conditions for the 
success of the decisive operation” (see U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, paragraph 5-
61). 
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makers have expended in trying to achieve their strategic goals.44 As decision makers invest 
increasing amounts of resources, they will move rightward across the graph, eventually shifting 
from the Buy-In Phase to the Impact Phase. 
Two kinds of uncertainty affect the way that decision makers should approach this situation. 
The first is uncertainty about where the phase change is located, and whether decision makers 
expect the Buy-In Phase to be relatively short or potentially protracted. A second crucial 
uncertainty is just how likely decision makers are to be successful once the Impact Phase begins. 
Figure 2.2 lays out three different examples of what the Impact Phase might look like: there is a 
“threshold model” in which a breakthrough comes immediately after completing the buy-in, a 
“shot-in-the-dark model” in which the probability of success becomes positive but remains 
relatively low, and a “stochastic model” in between. Any number of other functional forms may 
be possible as well.45 
                                                 
44
 An advantage of equating “rounds of fighting” with “expended cost” is that this builds into the 
model the notion that decision makers might face increasing (or decreasing) costs of fighting as 
the war drags on.  
45
 It is important to have some sense of how likely success will be during the Impact Phase, and 
how that likelihood will respond to additional investment. For example, William Bundy argued 
in 1967 that “In short, even if the GVN and we both do the best we possibly can, the odds are on 
the whole against a major strengthening of the GVN position or a true crack in [Communist] 
morale during 1967. The possibility of such a morale break is present, but its chances cannot be 
rated better than about one in three for 1967.” William Bundy, “1967 and Beyond in Vietnam,” 
Draft Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 21 
December 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 347. For a similar, earlier statement, see 
William Bundy, “Holding on in South Vietnam,” Memorandum, 30 June 1965: PP, Vol. IV, 
document 259. 
  This kind of probabilistic thinking may often be appropriate for characterizing the Impact 
Phase. Figuring out how to estimate these probabilities in a rigorous way is another important 
challenge for dealing with cumulative dynamics. In fact, one of the most common themes in the 
literature on intelligence analysis is the trouble analysts face when attempting to estimate and 
express probabilities. On this point, see Kent 1949, Zlotnick 1972, Heuer 1999, and Friedman 
and Zeckhauser 2012, 2013. 
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These uncertainties are double-edged. On the one hand, they can impede forming accurate 
estimates of how long it will take or how much it will cost to achieve a desired goal (let alone to 
make precise predictions about the locations of phase changes or the shape of probability 
distributions). As we have seen, the Jasons, Secretary McNamara, the intelligence community, 
and a wide range of policymakers repeatedly noted this problem throughout the Vietnam War. 
Yet at the same time, these dynamics can offer decision makers grounds for optimism, 
because they imply that just because some strategy has not worked yet, this does not necessarily 
mean that it will not work soon. If the entry point into the Impact Phase is uncertain (and 
especially if strategic success should become highly likely thereafter), then decision makers 
might often find it plausible to believe that they are sitting on the cusp of a major breakthrough. 
Several documents from the Vietnam War offer similar perspectives. For instance, a 
memorandum written by the Joint Chiefs of Staff argues that “Although there is presumably a 
point at which one more turn of the screw would crack the enemy resistance to negotiations, past 
experience indicates that we are unlikely to have clear evidence when that point has been 
reached.”46 Similarly, intelligence reports urged decision makers not to give up hope just because 
                                                 
46
 PP, Vol. IV, p. 65. The Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote that even though “the [bombing] program 
has not yet successfully interdicted infiltration” this did not imply that the North would be able to 
resist further escalation (PP, Vol. IV, p. 42). PP, Vol. III, p. 20 quotes the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff arguing that even though “up until now the battle against the Viet Cong has 
seemed endless,” this did not imply that success had to be far off; a similar assessment from the 
CIA is quoted in PP, Vol. IV, p. 137. Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford similarly concluded 
that even though “the steady and accelerated bombing of the North has not brought North 
Vietnam closer to any real move toward peace,” it was impossible to discount the possibility that 
“apprehensions about [escalated bombing attacks] that would destroy Hanoi and Haiphong may 
at some time help move them toward productive negotiations” (PP, Vol. IV, pp. 250-252). See 
also Lodge (Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 26 August 
1965: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. III, document 127), who wrote that even “if they have not done so 
thus far, the Communists must soon acknowledge their inability either to achieve an early victory 
or to dislodge the growing military strength of the U.S. forces in the south.” 
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they had not achieved success thus far. A Central Intelligence Agency assessment once argued, 
for instance, that “although the progress made in the complex counterinsurgency program in the 
last six months failed to produce a turning point in the war against the Viet Cong (VC), nothing 
occurred to change our basic belief that the VC will eventually be defeated.”47  
This idea will recur throughout the following chapters. In the context of cumulative processes, 
previous investments may be sunk costs, but that does not mean they are irrelevant to future 
decisions: even when those investments have not allowed decision makers to achieve their 
intended objectives so far, they may very well have allowed decision makers to advance closer to 
their desired goals.  
This is a key place where the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict depart from the repeated 
processes of the gambling table. If you are playing roulette and think that you are “due” for a win 
because of how many times you have lost in a row, then you are making a mistake. But if you 
have invested substantial resources in advancing a cumulative process, it can be much less clear 
what to make of the situation. If you are climbing a mountain, then every step takes you a bit 
closer to the summit, even if you cannot see that point from where you currently stand. 
 
Summary 
Altogether, the Vietnam War documents thus suggest two key features of strategic assessment 
given the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict:  
                                                 
47
 Central Intelligence Agency, “Assessment of the Progress of the War Against the Viet Cong in 
South Vietnam During the First Half of 1963,” Central Intelligence Agency Information Report, 
2 August 1963: FRUS, 1961-63, Vol. III, document 244. 
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First, decision makers may believe that there is little to no probability of achieving their goals 
in the short run. This is important, because it implies that early rounds of fighting would not 
automatically provide the kinds of type-separating information that are central to the bargaining 
model of war. If no U.S. decision makers believed they would see progress in the war’s opening 
stages, for instance, then the fact that the communists did not concede within that window would 
have come as no surprise. Since all potential opponent “types” would be able to fight for at least 
that long, the early phases of the war would not have helped to reduce uncertainty about how 
long it might take or how much it might cost to win the war thereafter.  
Second, learning and adaptation will largely be driven by decision makers’ prior assumptions. 
When decision makers evaluate their prospects, this will depend on whether they believe that the 
Buy-In Phase will be relatively short or relatively long, and how rapidly they believe the odds of 
success should rise beyond that point. Prior assumptions that look like the “threshold model” in 
Figure 2.2 will have very different implications for the way that decision makers adapt and 
behave than if they held prior assumptions that looked more like the “shot-in-the-dark model.” 
Yet this is another aspect of strategic assessment that scholars generally do not take into account, 
as existing theoretical models generally express uncertainty in terms of a single parameter, 
namely the chances of defeating an opponent in each round of fighting, which remain constant as 
fighting unfolds.  
Both of these properties will play an important role in Chapter 3, which explains why taking 
these dynamics into account can generate surprising predictions about the way that military 
decision makers should form and revise their expectations. The next section, however, fleshes 
out the deductive foundations of this conceptual framework in order to show how it is not 
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idiosyncratic to Vietnam, and how the same ideas can be derived, in a general form, from basic 
theoretical principles. 
 
Section 2.3.  Deductive foundations of cumulative dynamics in war 
One of the central tenets of scholarship on military strategy is that the basic purpose of fighting 
is to alter an opponent’s cost-benefit analysis. Clausewitz, for instance, wrote that “if the enemy 
is to be coerced you must put him in a situation that is even more unpleasant than the sacrifice 
you call on him to make.”48 Thomas Schelling similarly explained that “coercion requires finding 
a bargain, arranging for [an opponent] to be better off doing what we want.”49 This also seems to 
be a fair characterization of the perspective that Vietnam War planners took: as Walt Rostow and 
Robert Komer explained, “Our problem is to present [North Vietnam] with a situation where, 
whatever their will to hold on and sweat us out, they have no realistic option but to accept our 
terms.”50 
                                                 
48
 Clausewitz 1832/1976: 75. 
49
 Schelling 1966: 2, 4, 8. 
50
 Rostow and Komer, “A Strategy for the Next Phase in Vietnam,” Draft Paper by the 
President’s Special Assistants, 20 September 1966: FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. IV, document 241.) 
Similarly, John McNaughton wrote that the purpose of the air campaign was to “increase the 
actual and portended cost of the war to DRV,” and thus to make “a convincing demonstration 
made of the great costs and risks incurred by a country which commits aggression against an ally 
of ours” (“Plan of Action for South Vietnam,” 3 September 1964: PP, Vol. III, document 188). 
A National Security Council Working Group on Vietnam stated that “Increased US pressures on 
North Vietnam would be effective only if they persuaded Hanoi that the price of maintaining the 
insurrection in the South would be too great and that it would be preference to reduce its aid to 
the Viet Cong and direct at least a temporary reduction in Viet Cong activity.” “Intelligence 
Assessment: The Situation in South Vietnam,” 26 November 1964: PP, Vol. III, document 241. 
Additional examples of this approach include Lodge, Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to 
the Department of State, 11 November 1965: FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. III, document 199; 
Rostow, “Some Observations As We Come to the Crunch in Southeast Asia,” Memorandum for 
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Contemporary studies of military strategy typically adopt a similar starting point. Robert 
Pape, for example, built his prominent analysis of air power on the premise that “The problem in 
coercion is to persuade the target state that acceding to the coercer’s demands will be better than 
resisting them.”51 This assumption also lies behind recent formal theory on the bargaining model 
of war. As Branislav Slantchev explains, “although fighting can result in complete military 
victory, its more important function is coercive: to convince the opponent to accept a settlement. 
This happens after opponents learn enough about their prospects in war to decide that 
continuation is unprofitable.”52  
Slantchev’s distinction between resolving war through “settlement” and through “total 
military victory” is important, and it drives much of the literature on the bargaining model of 
war. Recall, for instance, that one of the central assumptions of the “battling for forts” model 
used by Slantchev and others is that once a combatant has lost enough battles, it will have to 
concede the entirety of the stakes for which it is fighting;53 similarly, in strategic-level 
bargaining models, each round of fighting induces a chance that one side will be totally defeated, 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Secretary of State, 23 November 1964: PP, Vol. III, document 238; NSC Working Group on 
Vietnam, “Intelligence Assessment: The Situation in Vietnam,” 24 November 1964: PP, Vol. III, 
document 240; and discussion in PP, Vol. III, pp. 70-71, 381-382, and 482, as well as PP, Vol. 
IV, p.292. 
51
 Pape 1996: 15. 
52
 Slantchev 2003: 621. 
53
 For instance, see, Slantchev: “The game continues until an agreement is struck or until one of 
the players is decisively defeated” (2003: 623). Smith: “Over time, one nation's advantages could 
accumulate until it completely overwhelms its foe… Put simply, nations fight battles until one 
nation decisively defeats the other or until one nation surrenders” (2000: 302). Filson and 
Werner: “Wars end when one side is defeated militarily or when the attacker alters her 
negotiating position sufficiently such that the defender is willing to accept the proposed 
settlement” (2002: 820). 
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and will have to concede the full stakes to its opponent.54 This ultimate threat of losing 
everything (along with the potential gains of winning everything and the material costs of 
fighting each round) is what drives decision makers’ perceptions of the expected value of 
continuing to fight.  
A potentially confusing aspect of these models is that their bargaining dynamics are thus 
contingent on the prospect of military outcomes that involve no bargaining at all. Historically, it 
is difficult to find many examples that correspond to this assumption.55  
Japan in World War II, for instance, is often held up to be one of the cardinal examples of 
“unconditional surrender” – but in fact, Japan retained important bargaining leverage up through 
the end of the war, which it used to extract concessions from the United States (including 
convincing the Truman administration to relent its earlier insistence than Japan abolish its 
emperor). The Axis occupation of France in World War II is also often thought to be one of the 
most decisive military victories in history, and yet the western front did not simply close once 
France had lost all of its “forts” – the French resistance simply transitioned to partisan warfare 
while waiting for a conventional counteroffensive, just as Confederates in the southern United 
States turned to guerilla methods once their conventional forces were defeated in the Civil War, 
                                                 
54
 For instance, Powell 2004: 345: “The present study sees war as a bargaining process during 
which the states run a risk of military collapse.” To Wagner, war is fought “to influence 
expectations about the outcome of a contest in which states try to disarm each other,” and where 
a disarmed state would thus have to cede all of the stakes in dispute (2000: 473). Fearon: 
“fighting may result in the government eliminating the rebel group completely, in which case the 
strategic interaction ends” (2007a: 7). 
55
 Bargaining model scholars typically acknowledge this. Slantchev, for instance, writes that 
“although it is possible for a war to end with a complete military defeat of one side… most wars 
do not terminate with the obliteration of the losing side but are settled long before that” (2003: 
628).  
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and just as Spanish forces adopted an insurgent strategy once Napoleon had conquered Iberia in 
the Peninsular War. Even in the most extreme examples of “military victory,” the weaker side 
can retain substantial military capabilities and bargaining power. And even if one side were 
fighting for limited objectives that it could entirely capture by means of brute force alone, the 
war would not be over until opponents decided that it was no longer worth fighting in order to 
take those objectives back. Wars simply do not end through the kinds of exogenous, involuntary 
mechanisms that prominent theoretical models invoke. 
One way to address this issue while staying close to previous work is as follows. Assume that 
combatants go to war having made a set of political demands. During the War in Vietnam, for 
instance, the United States demanded that Hanoi stop supporting the communist insurgency, and 
that the insurgency stop challenging the government in Saigon. (Seen from the opposite 
perspective, the communists demanded that the United States cease supporting the Saigon 
regime and allow the country to hold free elections.) The objective of fighting is to obtain these 
concessions by imposing costs on an opponent, convincing the other side that fighting is a 
costlier option than they originally anticipated, and thus persuading the opponent that it would be 
in their interest to make the desired concessions. The central challenge of strategic assessment is 
to determine how costly it will be to do this, and whether decision makers would be better off 
pushing for more limited (or more expansive) objectives. The war ends when once a combatant 
agrees to its opponent’s demands (an outcome less extreme than total disarmament and collapse), 
or both sides agree to a compromise settlement, or neither side determines that it is worth 
continuing to fight. 
This conception of military strategy is not original – there is little in this formulation that does 
not appear in the writing of scholars like Clausewitz, Schelling, and others cited at the top of this 
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section. The central point of departure from contemporary theoretical frameworks is simply 
dropping the notion that there is some exogenously-determined, probabilistic chance of obtaining 
total military victory outside of the bargaining process. This reformulation has important 
implications for thinking about strategic assessment. 
Figure 2.3, for instance, presents stylized ways of capturing how a combatant might react to a 
given demand for concessions. The x-axes in these plots represent rounds of fighting, as in 
standard theoretical frameworks. The y-axes represent the combatant’s expected utility for 
refusing to grant the concessions their opponent is demanding. This calculation will be based on 
combatants’ subjective assessments of a number of factors, including the costs of war in current 
and future periods, the prospects that the opponent might reduce their demands, and the value 
each combatant places on the stakes in dispute. The horizontal lines in Figure 2.3 represents the 
combatant’s “reservation value” for fighting – if they believe that the expected utility of resisting 
concessions is above this point then they will refuse the deal, and if they believe that the 
expected utility of resisting concessions is below this point then they would naturally grant 
them.56 
Both plots in Figure 2.3 shows the results of a military strategy that is working. With each 
round of fighting, the combatant is becoming progressively pessimistic about their prospects for 
refusing to grant the demanded concessions. Eventually, the combatant will be in a situation 
where they would prefer to concede. 
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 Assume that these calculations capture estimates of expected net present value. Thus if the 
opponent’s expected utility of continuing the war is negative, it would not make sense to say that 
the opponent might wait a few more rounds of fighting in order to see whether the situation 
changes – rationally calculated estimates of expected net present value would already account for 
these prospects. 
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Figure 2.3.  Expected Utility and Thresholds for Conceding 
Figure 2.3 captures the key challenge of assessing cumulative dynamics in war. Assuming that an 
opponent will fight so long as the expected utility of doing so is positive, then the opponent will 
only concede once the expected utility of fighting crosses their reservation value. This implies that 
there may be no change in observed behavior, even as the opponent continually revises its cost-
benefit analysis: even if their expected utility of continuing the war gradually decreases over 
multiple rounds of fighting, opponents will not have an incentive to concede until the reservation 
value threshold has been crossed. If the opponent’s cost-benefit calculation has a stochastic 
component, then the dynamic may be more along the lines of the bottom panel. 
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Though simplistic, this framework helps to motivate some of the key dynamics developed in 
the previous section. The dashed line in the top panel of Figure 2.3, for instance, shows how 
combatants would respond to this situation, so long as they operate under the basic decision rule 
that they will resist granting concessions if they believe they are better off doing so. The result is 
that the probability of obtaining the intended concession reproduces the “threshold model” we 
saw earlier. The important point is that even though the opponent is assumed to be continually 
revising its cost-benefit analysis, its observed behavior may not change for a significant period of 
time.57 As the opponent’s expected utility of fighting grows progressively smaller, it still has an 
incentive to avoid making concessions until the reservation value has been breached. Before that 
point, a military strategy might very well be working, and it might very well be making 
cumulative progress towards its desired goal of convincing opponents to give in, but there is not 
necessarily a reason to expect that this will result in any observable changes in behavior. 
 This provides a deductive foundation for the concept of distinguishing between a Buy-In 
Phase and an Impact Phase, and it reflects the dynamics discussed above in the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff assessment of the Vietnam War that “Although there is presumably a point at which one 
more turn of the screw would crack the enemy resistance to negotiations… we are unlikely to 
have clear evidence when that point has been reached.” 
An important component of the discussion in Section 2.2 was that there is often uncertainty 
about where this kind of phase change will occur. It is thus important to be explicit where that 
uncertainty comes from. There are a number of possibilities, and they are not mutually exclusive. 
For example, Clausewitz famously argued that combat outcomes are inherently probabilistic. 
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 See Fearon 2007a for additional reasons why combatants have an incentive to continue 
fighting and avoid bargaining even as they learn about their opponent’s capabilities and resolve. 
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Clausewitz is perhaps best known for describing how the “friction” of war can lead to 
substantial, irreducible uncertainties, and that how “in the whole range of human activities, war 
most closely resembles a game of cards.”58 (Though Clausewitz presumably did not mean for 
this analogy to extend to the notion that each battle, like each draw from a shuffled deck, is 
independent and identical. If that were true, then there would be a fundamental contradiction in 
Clausewitz’s crucial argument: if rounds of fighting were independent and identically 
distributed, then the more of them there were, the less uncertainty there would be about overall 
outcomes, as probabilistic draws are more predictable in larger samples.)  
Compounding battlefield friction is the notion that decision makers surely operate under the 
constraints of imperfect information and bounded rationality: it is unreasonable to expect that 
they will be able to make perfectly accurate predictions about a complex social phenomenon 
such as armed conflict.59 Moreover, contemporary scholars have emphasized how even perfectly 
rational actors might still be unable to agree on their expectations about the outcome of combat. 
The idea is that combatants have incentives to misrepresent their capabilities and resolve; this 
makes it difficult to gather credible information, and it means that combatants often have to 
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 Clausewitz 1832/1976: 86. A related line of thinking summarized by Beyerchen 1992/93 holds 
that war is a “nonlinear” phenomenon, in which the same action can produce very different 
results across different times and contexts. Beyerchen writes that war is analogous to systems 
studied by chaos theorists, in which “feedback loops, delays, ‘trigger effects,’ and qualitative 
changes over time produce surprises, often abruptly crossing a threshold into a qualitatively 
different regime of behavior” (p. 93). On nonlinear dynamics and military thought, see also 
Mann 1992, Czerwinski 1999, and Moffat 2003. 
59
 Jervis 1976 provides one of the best-known works on the ways in which psychology and 
misperception can influence foreign policymaking; Heuer 1999 examines the psychology of 
intelligence analysis in particular. 
Chapter 2: Conceptual Foundations 
62 
 
guess about how long their opponents will be able to resist granting concessions.60 Each of these 
arguments helps to explain why it can often be difficult to estimate how long it will take or how 
much it will cost to convince an opponent that they would be better off granting some 
concession. 
Factors like friction, bounded rationality, and incentives to misrepresent can also help to 
explain why anticipated behavior need not always take the form of the threshold model that is 
represented in the top panel of Figure 2.3. This figure assumes that combatants will be able to 
revise their cost-benefit analyses in an immediate, accurate, and continuous fashion, but that 
assumption is almost certainly too strong. It is therefore reasonable to think that the likelihood of 
a combatant granting concessions involves a probabilistic component, which captures all of these 
various obstacles to strategic assessment in war. The bottom panel of Figure 2.3 captures this 
dynamic: as the expected utility of fighting nears the reservation value, then the chances that the 
opponent concedes rise and then gradually taper off. Needless to say, there are any number of 
ways in which to model this process – this line of thinking implies that the likelihood of success 
can take a number of functional forms, and that is consistent with the argument in the previous 
section. 
 
Summary 
We can summarize the deductive argument here in the following way. Decision makers 
should develop prior assumptions about how long it might take and how much it might cost to 
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 See Fearon 1995: 395-401 and Meirowitz and Sartori 2008 on private information and 
incentives to misrepresent. 
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obtain their political demands. Almost all opponents should be able to resist making concessions 
for at least the opening stages of armed conflict – this is the Buy-In Phase, where decision 
makers should not expect that fighting will lead to any changes in observed behavior. Decision 
makers will presumably face uncertainty about how long this initial phase will last, and what the 
probability of obtaining concessions will look like thereafter.  
These propositions are straightforward and consistent with long-standing theoretical 
scholarship on coercion, but they deviate from existing models which revolve around the 
assumption that war is a repeated process which induces an exogenously-determined threat of 
total military victory absent negotiation. Chapter 3 will go on to show how the alternative 
framework of war as a cumulative process developed here entails a substantially different set of 
predictions for how rational decision makers should learn and adapt. Before moving on, 
however, the chapter will close by describing scope conditions for this theoretical argument. 
 
Section 2.4. Scope conditions 
The conceptual framework developed in this chapter applies to the way that decision makers 
assess uncertainty about how long it might take or how much it might cost to achieve their 
strategic objectives. This framework applies when two conditions hold: first, decision makers 
must be observing a cumulative process in which they are attempting to move progressively 
closer to their intended goals; and second, decision makers must not be able to observe their 
progress directly (or else there would no uncertainty that they needed to resolve).61  
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 As stated earlier, this helps to make clear how the theoretical argument in this dissertation does 
not generally speak to models of coercive bargaining in which combatants have “complete 
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A general rule of thumb for considering where this framework is most likely to be relevant is 
to think about situations where people disagree about whether their policies have not been 
successful as a result of the concept or the execution: whether the problem is that decision 
makers are doing the wrong thing or that they are just not doing the right thing well enough. 
These kinds of debates often revolve around uncertainty about cumulative dynamics, and this 
uncertainty is what makes it difficult to understand whether the right response to an unsuccessful 
policy is to switch strategies or stay the course.  
To motivate the conceptual framework, this chapter used the example of U.S. military 
decision making in Vietnam. In general, counterinsurgency is an area where the challenges of 
assessing war’s cumulative dynamics are especially difficult. Insurgents do not usually attempt 
to hold ground; it is not possible to benchmark strategic progress in terms of closing in on an 
opponent’s capital, or by how much territory an opponent has left to defend. Since insurgents 
generally draw their personnel and resources fluidly from the population at large, it is often 
difficult to know how close they are to running out of manpower or materiel. Strategic 
assessment in counterinsurgency is largely an abstract challenge: estimating an opponent’s 
willingness to continue fighting despite the mounting costs of doing so. In recent years, U.S. 
decision makers have struggled greatly in performing this kind of assessment with respect to 
insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan.62 
                                                                                                                                                             
information” – an assumption that is unrealistic, but which helps to draw out important dynamics 
of armed conflict, such as commitment problems, time horizons, and issue indivisibility. 
62
 Unsurprisingly, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have thus generated a broad literature 
on the challenges of assessing strategic progress in counterinsurgency: among others, see Kagan 
2006, Patel and Ross 2006, Baker 2006/07, Clancy and Crossett 2007, Westerman 2008, 
Schroden 2009, Kilcullen 2010: ch. 3, Daddis 2011, 2012, and Kapstein 2012. For official 
doctrine on the subject, see U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, paragraphs 5-90 to 5-112. 
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To what other forms of war should the concepts in this dissertation apply? In order to 
understand the scope of the analysis, it is useful to employ Thomas Schelling’s distinction 
between achieving strategic objectives through coercion versus brute force. Schelling described 
this distinction as being between “taking what you want and making someone give it to you.” 
Brute force generally entails physically seizing and holding material assets such as territory or 
natural resources: it thus revolves around tangible factors which tend to be relatively easy to 
conceptualize and assess. Coercion, by contrast involves using the threat of imposing costs on an 
opponent in order to convince them to grant concessions voluntarily. Because the success or 
failure of coercion is thus contingent on altering an opponent’s cost-benefit calculations for 
behaving in certain ways, it is something that is relatively abstract and difficult to assess with 
precision. Generally speaking, we can expect that the more military strategy relies on coercion 
relative to brute force, the more this will exacerbate the uncertainties surrounding strategic 
assessment that are the subject of this dissertation.63 
Strategic bombing, for instance, is similar to counterinsurgency in the way that it often 
revolves around coercion. We have seen that the principal U.S. goal in bombing North Vietnam 
was to escalate the pressure on Hanoi gradually, so as to “convey signals which, in combination, 
should present to DRV leaders a vision of inevitable, ultimate destruction if they do not change 
their ways.” Similarly, we saw Madeleine Albright describe that the goal of bombing 
Milosevic’s power base in 1999 was to convince him that it would be in his interest to halt ethnic 
cleansing in Kosovo. When the Israeli Air Force bombed Lebanon in 2006, the stated intention 
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 Schelling developed the distinction between brute force in his book Arms and Influence (1966: 
ch. 1) Byman and Waxman 2002 provide a more recent review of broader literature on the 
subject. Biddle and Friedman 2008 use the distinction between brute force and coercion as way 
to structure assessments of strategic choices. 
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was to impose costs that would convince the government that it would be in its interest to 
somehow restrain Hezbollah. Because strategic bombing tends to be so heavily coercive, and 
because its objectives are so closely tied to influencing an opponent’s cost-benefit analysis, this 
is another form of military strategy that will presumably involve a great deal of the uncertainty 
that is the subject of this dissertation.64 
Even military campaigns that rely heavily on brute force, however, typically involve at least 
some coercive component, and some substantial uncertainty about the kinds of cumulative 
dynamics discussed here. Take Napoleonic warfare, for instance: conventional combat with 
massed armies and set-piece battles to sever enemies’ lines of communications and control their 
territory. Commanders in this context could track many tangible indicators of progress. After the 
Battle of Austerlitz, for instance, it was fairly clear that the Third Coalition had suffered a major 
blow, just as after the Battle of Waterloo, it was clear that the French power had been severely 
curtailed. Yet Napoleonic warfare was exactly the subject that Clausewitz wrote about in On 
War, where he characterized armed conflict as a cumulative process and described the difficulty 
of anticipating the way offensives gradually build towards culminating points. Conventional land 
warfare may be more analytically tractable than many elements of counterinsurgency or strategic 
bombing, but it is still a context with substantial scope for uncertainty in evaluating cumulative 
dynamics. 
                                                 
64
 On coercion and air power, see Pape 1996 and Byman, Waxman, and Larson 1999. Pape 
points out that some strategic bombing strategies revolve more around brute force than others – 
in fact, his central argument is that bombing campaigns that focus on “denial” rather than 
punishment tend to be the most successful – but these denial strategies constitute a minority of 
cases, and even they involve at least some coercive element of convincing an opponent that it 
would not be in their interest to continue resisting. 
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Naval warfare is an area in which the concepts in this dissertation may not apply as well. 
Naval battles are often thought to be the epitome of Jominian strategy, with commanders 
maneuvering into positions where they can strike each others’ decisive points and thereby 
eliminate the enemy fleet with a rapid stroke. There have been no major naval battles between 
great powers since World War II, so it not entirely clear if this model carries over to the present 
day; and as several strategists have emphasized, even the most decisive naval victories play only 
one part among many in determining the outcomes of broader wars. But naval warfare is a 
domain of armed conflict which, if viewed by itself, revolves so heavily around brute force and 
measurable capabilities that may lie largely outside the scope of this dissertation.65 
Finally, counterterrorism is a domain of conflict that could fall within or outside the scope of 
this analysis depending on what aspects one wishes to examine. There are some elements of 
counterterrorism that decision makers can observe and assess directly: for instance, when 
missions are designed to apprehend a certain set of targets, the relevant outcome variables are 
easy to measure. One could even make the case that some kinds of intelligence leads (such as 
tips about the locations of enemy personnel or improvised explosive devices) are roughly 
analogous to a repeated process, where the odds of different pieces of information paying off are 
relatively independent and similarly distributed. 
At the same time, other aspects of counterterrorism directly engage the kinds of cumulative 
dynamics discussed in this dissertation, and of this there is no better example than the ten-year 
hunt to capture Osama bin Laden. Since the attacks on September 11, 2001, it was one of the 
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 Alfred Thayer Mahan is particularly associated with the view that naval strategy should be 
seen in Jominian terms; Julian Corbett was perhaps Mahan’s most prominent critic, arguing that 
decisive battle at sea was much less feasible than Mahan had suggested.  
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U.S. government’s top national security priorities to find al Qaeda’s leader. To say the least, 
there was substantial uncertainty about how long it might take and how much it might cost to do 
this. The process of tracking bin Laden was a cumulative one, with intelligence analysts 
gathering information from a wide range of sources, combining them together, and eventually 
developing the hypothesis that bin Laden was hiding in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Even after 
tracking a suspected bin Laden courier to the compound, intelligence agencies spent months 
trying to pare down remaining ambiguity about whether they had truly found their target, with 
President Obama insisting that he would not assault the compound unless the intelligence 
community could pass a reasonable threshold of certainty in making this assessment. From start 
to finish, the hunt for bin Laden was a story in which decision makers wrestled with uncertainty 
in assessing cumulative dynamics.66 
This review serves to frame the analysis in this dissertation by making clear that it does not 
apply to all forms of armed conflict, nor does it apply to different kinds of military strategy in 
equal measure. Yet almost any military action involves at least some substantial element of 
uncertainty about how long it will take or how much it will cost to achieve strategic objectives. 
This uncertainty may be correlated with how much certain strategies depend on coercion versus 
brute force, and the extent of this uncertainty may vary across cases; but most of the time, 
military decision makers will face at least some salient challenges in assessing strategic progress. 
How decision makers can deal with this uncertainty is the subject of this dissertation, and as 
Chapter 3 will demonstrate, many common assumptions about this subject are worth assessing 
themselves. 
                                                 
66
 The hunt for bin Laden has rapidly become the subject of a large literature, which prominently 
includes Bergen 2012, Bowden 2012, and Sanger 2012: ch.4. 
  
 
 
Chapter Three: Theoretical Argument 
FORMING AND REVISING EXPECTATIONS 
 
 
 
This chapter demonstrates how simple assumptions about the cumulative dynamics of armed 
conflict can generate surprising predictions for strategic assessment and military decision 
making. Existing scholarship (and perhaps most people’s basic intuitions) suggests that the 
longer decision makers go without achieving their objectives, the more pessimistic they should 
become about their ability to do so and thus the more likely they should be to change course. 
This chapter challenges those ideas and explains why we should often expect the very opposite. 
In showing how and under what conditions rational actors should behave this way, the 
following sections offer a new perspective on prominent puzzles in existing literature. When 
scholars ask why military decision makers seem to find it so difficult to realize their strategic 
mistakes, or why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long, they typically turn to 
nonrational explanations. For instance, scholars often argue that militaries are built to fight in 
certain ways, while bureaucratic politics and standard operating procedures can inhibit self-
evaluation and change.1 Cognitive frameworks, confirmation bias, defensive avoidance, 
                                                 
1
 For example, Wildavsky 1972, Lewy 1978, Snyder 1984, Van Evera 1984, 2002, Cohen 1984, 
Herwig 1987, Krepinevich 1988, Cable 1988, Rosen 1991, Zisk 1993, Avant 1994, Sorley 1999, 
Gartner 1997, Nagl 2002, Lyall and Wilson 2009, and McAllister 2010/11. 
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overoptimism, or emotional stress may impede military decision making.2 Political 
constituencies may inherently prefer some methods of fighting over others, and officials may 
have incentives to “gamble for resurrection” in risky wars so as to boost their electoral 
prospects.3 These ideas have all been the subjects of valuable research programs, and nothing in 
this chapter challenges the notion that these mechanisms affect military decision making in 
important ways. Yet each of these arguments requires making assumptions about why groups 
might act in ways that violate their overall interests. They either assume that decision makers 
knowingly adopt inefficient policies in response to some other incentives, or that something 
prevents decision makers from evaluating their strategies in clear-headed fashion. 
This chapter, by contrast, shows that we do not need to invoke nonrational factors in order to 
explain why some actors find it so difficult to realize and correct their strategic mistakes. We can 
explain this behavior simply by examining the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict and 
understanding how they differ from other phenomena. This argument proceeds in four sections. 
Section 3.1 begins by demonstrating why military decision makers might actually become 
more optimistic about achieving their objectives even as they continually fail to do so. This 
argument is developed using formal theory, which explains precisely why it is that relatively 
                                                 
2
 For example, Leites 1953, Wohlstetter 1964, George 1969, White 1970, May 1973, Jervis 
1976, Lebow 1981, Staw 1981, Janis 1982, Larson 1985, Vertzberger 1990, Khong 1992, Levy 
1996, Mercer 1996, Reiter 1996, Heuer 1999, Wrangham 1999, Johnson 2004, McDermott 2004, 
Rosen 2005, Kahneman and Renshon 2007, Butler 2007, Renshon 2008, Gayer et al. 2009, 
Woods and Stout 2010, Duelfer 2011, Johnson and Fowler 2011, Johnson and Tierney 2011, 
Lopez et al. 2011, Mercer 2013. 
3
 For example, Weigley 1973, Mack 1975, Downs and Rocke 1997, Kier 1997, Reiter and Meek 
1999, Huth and Allee 2002, Goemans 2002, Merom 2003, Freedman 2004, Gray 2006, Berinsky 
2007, Stanley 2009, Craig and Logevall 2009, Goemans and Fey 2009, Caverley 2009/10; Debs 
and Goemans 2010, Trubowitz 2011.  
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intuitive premises can lead to these potentially surprising predictions. Section 3.1 builds this 
logic in stages, starting with a simple model in which decision makers are trying to distinguish 
between two types of opponents, and then generalizing into broader and more complex 
situations. This section constitutes the dissertation’s core theoretical argument. 
Section 3.2 fleshes out this argument by going into more detail about where decision makers’ 
prior assumptions come from, and explaining why these assumptions play a crucial role in 
understanding the way that these decision makers should learn and adapt. This discussion is 
important not just for clarifying the theory’s underpinnings but also for drawing further 
distinctions with respect to existing literature, which generally does not focus much attention on 
the importance of prior assumptions in the manner shown here.  
Section 3.3 then discusses what the theoretical framework implies for models of strategic 
interaction. A wide range of theoretical scholarship on armed conflict uses game theory to 
examine strategic interaction explicitly. While these bargaining dynamics are not the principal 
focus of this dissertation, Section 3.3 provides at least a brief discussion of what rethinking 
strategic assessment in light of cumulative dynamics implies for broader, game-theoretic 
scholarship. Section 3.4 then concludes the chapter by summarizing its intended theoretical 
contributions. 
 
Section 3.1. Cumulative dynamics and the costs of fighting 
This section explains why taking the cumulative dynamics of war into account leads to 
predictions that sharply deviate from existing scholarship. To draw this out in a simple case, 
Figure 3.1 begins by comparing the way that rational decision makers would adapt their 
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expectations in a situation where opponents can be either of two types, “strong” or “weak. Figure 
3.1a represents the way that existing models would capture this situation, under the standard 
assumption that war is a repeated process. As Chapter 2 discussed, contemporary literature on 
the bargaining model of war generally assumes that an opponent’s “type” determines the odds 
that they will be defeated in each round of fighting. Those odds remain the same from round to 
round. This means that each round of fighting provides “type separating information”: each time 
a round of fighting concludes without defeating an opponent, a rational decision maker should 
raise their prior probability that the opponent they are facing is a strong type. Using a 
straightforward application of Bayes’ rule, Figure 3.1a shows how this leads standard models to 
predict a gradual, monotonic learning process: as rounds of fighting mount and decision makers 
continually fail to achieve their goals, they should continually become more pessimistic about 
their ability to do so. 
Figure 3.1b shows how matters differ if we assume that war is a cumulative process. As 
Chapter 2 discussed, this viewpoint suggests a different way of conceptualizing an opponent’s 
“type.” Rather than assuming that an opponent’s capabilities and resolve dictate the chances that 
they will be defeated in any round of fighting (and that these odds stay the same from round to 
round), Chapter 2 argued that it might be more appropriate to think of a combatant’s “type” as 
the amount of fighting they can sustain before giving in to an opponent’s demands. In this 
formulation, stronger opponents are still able to hold out for longer periods, but even “weak 
types” should be able to conduct some amount of fighting without being defeated. This is also a 
stylized way to think about the issue – but it is no more stylized than existing models, and 
Chapter 2 offered both inductive and deductive reasons why this formulation may be more viable 
than the underpinnings of standard frameworks. 
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Figure 3.1a.  How Decision Makers Learn if War is a Repeated Process 
 
When war is a repeated process, such that every round of fighting generates an independent 
and identical probability of success, then every round is also type-separating: each time an 
opponent resists defeat, a rational decision maker should become more convinced that they 
are facing a “strong type.” 
Weak Type
Strong Type
 
 
Lo
w
H
ig
h
Pr
ob
.
 
of
 
De
fe
a
tin
g 
O
pp
on
en
t E
ac
h 
R
ou
n
d
1 2 3 4 ... N...
Rounds of Fighting
Strong vs. Weak Opponents
 
1.
0
Pr
io
r 
Pr
o
b.
Pr
o
b.
 
th
at
 
O
pp
on
en
t i
s 
a 
St
ro
n
g 
Ty
pe
1 32 4 N......
Rounds of Fighting
Result of Bayesian Updating
Chapter 3: Theoretical Argument 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1b.  How Decision Makers Learn if War is a Cumulative Process 
 
When war is a cumulative process, such that multiple types of opponents should be able to 
withstand initial rounds of fighting, then those rounds do not necessarily provide type-
separating information. In this simple, “two-type” model, it is not possible to distinguish 
between strong and weak opponents until the latter is forced to concede.  
Weak Type Strong Type
0
1
Pr
o
b.
 
o
f D
e
fe
a
tin
g 
O
pp
on
e
n
t E
ac
h 
R
o
u
n
d
1 2 3 4 W S N......
Rounds of Fighting
Strong vs. Weak Opponents
1.
0
 
Pr
io
r 
Pr
o
b.
Pr
o
b.
 
th
a
t O
pp
on
en
t i
s 
a 
St
ro
n
g 
Ty
pe
1 2 3 4 ... W N...
Rounds of Fighting
Result of Bayesian Updating
Chapter 3: Theoretical Argument 
75 
 
Figure 3.1b also shows how this alternative framework produces a learning process that is 
very different than the one proposed in the standard literature. Because both strong and weak 
types can withstand some initial rounds of fighting, those rounds do not provide type-separating 
information. The updating process in this model is therefore discontinuous – there is a point at 
which decision makers will be able to rule out the notion that they are facing a weak type, but 
otherwise they should not have the ability to revise their prior assumptions. And once decision 
makers reach this point where they can be sure that they are facing a strong opponent, it may 
make sense for them to continue fighting the remaining rounds it will take to achieve their 
objectives, even if they might not have begun the war if they had known that they were facing a 
strong opponent ex ante. 
A model with only two types of opponents is overly simplistic of course, but this example 
makes clear how accounting for cumulative dynamics provides a clear point of departure from 
existing theory on learning and adaptation in armed conflict. The remainder of this section will 
expand this analysis in order to show how decision makers might respond to a much more 
general set of circumstances in which they must account for a wider range of possibilities of how 
capable and resilient their opponents might be. 
 
The linear case 
Consider, for instance, if decision makers enter conflict with a “flat prior” about how 
opponent types are distributed: this is to say they believe it is equally likely that their opponents 
will be able to resist defeat for one round of fighting, for two rounds of fighting, or any other 
number out to some theoretical maximum denoted 	. (It is important to define a theoretical 
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maximum here, or else the expectation of the number of rounds of fighting an opponent could 
sustain would be infinite. As shown below, it is not necessary to define this maximum for most 
other kinds of prior distributions.) In this case, we can define the Expected Total Cost (ETC) of 
fighting as the number of rounds that the average opponent could withstand: we can express this 
quantity as 
  	

. Figure 3.2 demonstrates that this is simply the midpoint of the range of 
possible opponent types. 
Now consider what happens after combatants have already conducted a certain number of 
rounds of fighting, which we denote as ′. After having fought this number of rounds, decision 
makers can update their prior expectations. Specifically, they can rule out the notion that they are 
facing an opponent who is weak enough to have been defeated already. Conditional on having 
already fought for ′ rounds, a rational decision maker could thus re-estimate Expected Total 
Cost as 
 ′  		′

. Expressed visually in Figure 3.2, this corresponds to the midpoint of 
the range of remaining opponent types. 
This is not the quantity of interest, however. Keep in mind that Expected Total Cost represents 
the total amount of fighting that the opponent can be expected to withstand. By this point, 
however, combatants have conducted a portion of that fighting already, and those costs are now 
sunk. The quantity of interest here is thus the Expected Remaining Cost of fighting, which we 
can express as 
 ′   ′  		′

.  
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Figure 3.2.  Expected Total and Remaining Cost for the Linear Case 
 
Figure 3.2 represents the way that decision makers should form and revise their expectations 
about the expected total and remaining costs of defeating their opponents, in cases where these 
decision makers begin with a “flat prior” where they believe it is equally likely that their 
opponents can hold out for one round of fighting, two rounds of fighting, or any other number of 
rounds out to some theoretical maximum. 
 
 
The important thing to note is that Expected Remaining Cost is strictly decreasing. This 
means that the longer combatants fight without achieving their objectives, the more optimistic4 
they should become about their prospects moving forward. The uniform distribution is again a 
highly stylized way to represent prior expectations, but it is also theoretically significant, as it 
reflects a state of total uncertainty about an opponent’s potential type – it thus serves as the 
baseline case for judging the way that rational decision makers should behave absent any 
additional assumptions about which types of opponents are more common than others. And in 
                                                 
4
 Following Slantchev 2003, the words “optimism” and “pessimism” refer simply to a decision 
maker’s views about whether the expected marginal costs of achieving their objectives are higher 
or lower than what they previously believed. 
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this baseline case, the prediction for how rational decision makers should update their views is 
exactly the opposite of the conventional wisdom. 
 
The general case 
From here, we can extend the framework in order to cover a much broader range of 
assumptions about the way opponent types might be distributed. Generally speaking, we can say 
that a decision maker’s estimated probability that an opponent will be defeated in the #$ round 
of fighting can be represented by the function %.5 The decision maker’s overall expectation of 
how many rounds of fighting it will take to achieve their strategic objectives will then be 

  & %' · ')'
∞
*
. After fighting for  ′ rounds, the new Expected Total Cost will be 

 ′ 
& +#·#,#
∞
′
& +#,#
∞
′
.
6
 Backing out sunk costs, Expected Remaining Cost (ERC) is 
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This expression is useful, because we can take its first derivative with respect to ′, and 
thereby determine the range of cases where a rational decision maker would become more 
                                                 
5
 In this way, the function % represents the way that a decision maker has captured all the 
different kinds of uncertainties discussed in Chapter 2 in order to form different degrees of belief 
about how likely it is that an opponent can hold out for each possible round of fighting. 
6
 The numerator in this expression “truncates” the prior distribution, ruling out the possibility 
that the decision maker is facing an opponent that is weak enough to have been defeated already. 
The denominator then reweights the remaining probabilities such that they sum to 1. 
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optimistic or more pessimistic while attempting to achieve a desired goal. It turns out that the 
range of cases where decision makers become more optimistic is fairly broad, spanning several 
commonly-used distributions. 
For example, the normal distribution is probably the most common tool that scholars use to 
define prior expectations. Yet when decision makers have normally-distributed priors about their 
opponent’s potential type, then Expected Remaining Cost will always decline. Figure 3.3 shows 
this graphically. The prior assumption about the distribution of potential opponent types is 
represented by the shaded density function. The x-axis represents rounds of fighting; as those 
rounds of fighting proceed, the solid and dashed lines in Figure 3.3 show the way that a rational 
decision maker will form new estimates of Expected Total Cost and Expected Remaining Cost. 
The key takeaway from this figure is that Expected Remaining Cost continuously falls. This will 
be the case for all normal distributions, regardless of their parameters.7  
It is worth considering several other ways to model the distribution of opponents’ potential 
types. Figure 3.4 presents the logistic, Laplace, gamma, and exponential distributions. These 
distributions have different shapes and they are used for different purposes, yet each produces a 
similar result: Expected Remaining Cost never increases, giving rational decision makers no 
reason to become more pessimistic about their policies based on how much they have already 
invested in trying to achieve their intended goals. 
                                                 
7
 Expected Total Cost under normally distributed expectations can be expressed as the first 
moment of a truncated normal, which is the sum of a constant - and the Inverse Mills Ratio. 
Thus, 
′ can be expressed as - " .′  ′, where .′ is the Inverse Mills Ratio 
evaluated at ′. A known property of the Inverse Mills Ratio is that .′′ is always between 0 
and 1. Thus )
/)′ is always between -1 and 0. 
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Figure 3.3. Expected Total/Remaining Cost with a Normally Distributed Prior 
 
 
The gray area in Figure 3.3 represents a decision maker’s initial expectations about the likelihood 
of facing an opponent who will be defeated in each round of fighting. In this figure, those 
expectations are normally distributed. Conditional on reaching a certain round, the solid and 
dashed lines then represent the way that decision makers should revise their expectations of the 
Total and Remaining Costs of fighting. Note that Expected Remaining Cost continuously declines. 
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Figure 3.4.  Expected Total/Remaining Cost across Additional Distributions of Types 
 
Figure 3.4 shows how a decision maker’s prior expectations about the distribution of opponent 
types (shown here by the gray areas representing the chances that an opponent will be defeated 
in each round of fighting) affect the way that the decision maker would revise her expectations 
about Total and Remaining Costs as fighting proceeds. Expected Remaining Cost can only 
increase if the decision maker’s prior expectations fall into the class of “heavy-tailed 
distributions.” 
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The exponential distribution is an important case: as shown in Figure 3.4, Expected 
Remaining Cost would be the same in every round of fighting if decision makers believed 
opponents’ potential types were distributed exponentially.8 This gives a more general result, 
which is that Expected Remaining Cost can only rise when a decision maker expects that the 
distribution of opponent types has “fatter tails” than the exponential. In probability theory, this is 
the definition of a “heavy-tailed distribution.” Some examples include the Heavy Weibull 
distribution and the lognormal distribution – these are shown in at the bottom of Figure 3.4, and 
in these graphs, Expected Remaining Cost does indeed increase at certain points. 
There are several caveats to consider here, however. One is that many heavy-tailed 
distributions (such as the Cauchy or the Lévy) do not have finite expectations, and so they cannot 
be used to estimate the potential costs of fighting. A second issue (as shown at the bottom of 
Figure 3.4) is that even with a heavy-tailed distribution like the lognormal, it may take a 
significant period of time before Expected Remaining Cost begins to rise, and even longer before 
it rises enough to exceed its original value. This means that even with heavy-tailed prior 
assumptions about the distribution of opponents’ potential types, it may take a significant amount 
of fighting before rational combatants become more pessimistic about the chances of achieving 
their goals relative to their expectations when the war started. Until this happens, there is no 
reason to expect that they would wish to alter or abandon their chosen strategies. 
 
                                                 
8
 The exponential’s probability density function is 0 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Applications to actual data 
Discussing theoretical probability distributions helps to establish basic conceptual properties 
of learning and adapting to cumulative processes, but how does this framework relate to actual 
data? The following chapters will examine this issue in more detail, but for the moment, Figure 
3.5 demonstrates how the expected total duration and the expected remaining duration of wars 
evolve over time given the empirical distribution of four different kinds of armed conflict.9 
In each of the four panels of Figure 3.5, shaded bars represent the percentage of wars that 
terminate in a given year of fighting. The solid lines then capture how many years a randomly-
selected war in each category would be expected to last, conditional on already being active for a 
certain period of time. The dashed lines then capture the conditional expectation of how much 
time remains in a randomly-chosen conflict. Since we are dealing with actual data in these 
figures, the patterns are neither smooth nor monotonic. But consistent with the argument laid out 
in this section – and contrary to prominent existing theoretical frameworks – these graphs 
indicate that the expected remaining duration of armed conflict does not strictly increase as these 
conflicts unfold. For inter-state wars, in fact, expected remaining duration in fact is almost 
strictly declining. For the other forms of violence the pattern is decidedly mixed, but it certainly 
does not support the commonly-held belief that the longer a war has lasted already, the longer we 
should expect it to continue moving forward. 
                                                 
9
 Data are from the Correlates of War project (Sarkees and Wayman 2012). All wars in the data 
set must cause a minimum of 1,000 total battle deaths to be considered for inclusion, a point that 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. “Extra-state wars” are conflicts that take place 
between a recognized state and a nonstate entity outside its borders. “Non-state wars” are 
conflicts that take place between groups none of whom are recognized as being state entities. All 
four sets of data involve cases between 1816-2007. These data comprise 337 inter-state wars, 
250 intra-state wars, 185 extra-state wars, and 186 non-state wars. 
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Figure 3.5. Expected Total/Remaining Duration  
Across Empirical Distributions of Conflict 
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Extra-State Wars 
 
Non-State Wars 
 
Figure 3.5 (continued). Expected Total/Remaining Duration  
Across Empirical Distributions of Conflict 
Expected Total Duration in Year N
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Summary 
This section has advanced four theoretical arguments: 1) that rational decision makers should 
not necessarily become more pessimistic about their policies, even as they continually fail to 
achieve intended goals; 2) that the way decision makers revise their expectations when observing 
cumulative processes is largely driven by what their prior assumptions were to begin with; 3) 
that it is possible to derive the specific conditions under which decision makers should become 
more pessimistic or more optimistic as they proceed; and 4) that the latter condition contains 
many commonly-used theoretical distributions and the empirical distributions for inter-, intra-, 
extra-, and non-state wars.  
These arguments contradict a wide range of scholarship on strategic assessment in war by 
suggesting the prospect of rational inertia in military decision making. When decision makers 
continually express optimism and continue to “stay the course” despite failing to demonstrate 
success, this is generally assumed to constitute nonrational behavior. As the introduction to this 
chapter explained, political scientists have developed wide-ranging explanations for how 
organizational constraints, domestic politics, psychology, and other factors can prevent decision 
makers from adapting to unexpected situations. Yet this section has demonstrated that we do not 
need to invoke these arguments in order to explain why military decision makers often fail to 
realize and correct their strategic mistakes. That kind of behavior is also potentially consistent 
with rational beliefs and decisions, so long as it is understood how cumulative dynamics affect 
strategic assessment. 
Moreover, if rational learning depends on decision makers’ prior assumptions, then this is 
another important point of departure between the theoretical framework developed in this 
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dissertation and models offered by the existing literature. Existing models tend not to afford 
much weight to prior assumptions – by assuming that war is a repeated process in which every 
round of fighting is independent and identically distributed, existing scholarship essentially 
assumes that decision makers should be able to revise their expectations based on trial-and-error, 
which will eventually cause rational actors to converge on common beliefs. When viewing war 
as a cumulative process, this is not the case: just because a policy has not worked yet this does 
not necessarily mean that it will not work soon, and decision makers’ initial assumptions about 
potential opponent types exert a fundamental impact on the way they will perceive their 
prospects, even after many rounds of fighting have transpired. The next section will explain this 
issue in more detail, saying more about where prior assumptions come from, and providing a 
more in-depth comparison of how decision makers should update their priors depending on 
whether armed conflict is considered to be a cumulative or repeated process. 
 
Section 3.2. The importance of prior assumptions 
Where do prior assumptions come from? 
In practice, decision makers do (and should) form prior assumptions based off a combination 
of inductive and deductive reasoning. The simplest form of inductive reasoning is the use of 
analogies. Heading into World War I, for instance, Germany’s chief of general staff Helmuth 
von Moltke based his plans for the invasion of France on an attempt to achieve the kind of swift 
and decisive victory that Carthage had achieved over Rome at Cannae.10 Similarly, Chapter 5 
                                                 
10
 In planning for the war, Moltke ordered his staff to produce a volume, Cannae Studies, which 
would demonstrate how the principle of envelopment could lead to rapid and decisive victory 
over France. (Rothenberg 1986.) The irony, of course, is that while Carthage won the Battle of 
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will demonstrate how U.S. military planners based their expectations for the occupation of Iraq 
around analogies to Germany, Japan, and South Korea, all cases of “post-war reconstruction” 
where occupying forces faced relatively little organized military resistance. In general, 
analogical reasoning provides a rough heuristic for grounding strategic assessments in empirical 
evidence.11 
Of course, the examples of German planning for World War I and U.S. planning for the 
occupation of Iraq come to mind largely because the analogies they invoked were so flawed. An 
analogy is ultimately just a data point – it is one possible comparison that might be relevant for 
structuring decision makers’ expectations, but there are bound to be other cases to choose from 
as well, and the lessons they offer are bound to vary.  
For instance, when it comes to determining how long insurgencies tend to last, it is possible to 
derive one’s expectations from a broad evidence base. Over the last two centuries there about 
300 insurgencies on record.12 Figure 3.6 demonstrates that about 13 percent of these insurgencies 
collapsed within their first year of fighting, about 15 percent collapsed in their second year of 
fighting, and then the probability of defeating an insurgency tends to decline each year 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cannae, it did not win the Second Punic War, which dragged on for another fifteen years, and is 
now known just as well for the Romans’ “Fabian strategy” of exhausting an opponent through 
protracted attrition. 
11
 On analogical reasoning in national security affairs more broadly, see Hoffmann 1968, May 
1973, Jervis 1976, Neustadt 1986, Khong 1992, and Reiter 1996. 
12
 Data presented below are from Lyall and Wilson 2009, who track 286 insurgencies from 1808 
to 2005. 
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thereafter.13 If we instead conceptualize “rounds of fighting” with respect to the amount of 
attrition that insurgents can sustain (which is consistent with the way that some U.S. decision 
makers approached the Vietnam War) then we see that roughly a quarter of insurgencies collapse 
before sustaining five thousand casualties, about ten percent collapse between sustaining five and 
ten thousand casualties, and again the distribution continually decreases as it extends to the 
right.14 As with the data presented in Figure 3.5, these constitute purely inductive prior 
assumptions about the potential resilience of an insurgent opponent. 
Basing priors on such a broad range of data is surely too broad-brush of an approach, 
however, since the information in Figure 3.6 represents nearly three hundred cases spanning two 
centuries, involving many contexts that may not be especially relevant to thinking about 
contemporary cases. There are many ways to refine this information in order to form a more 
relevant assumption about the distribution of potential opponent types in any given situation. 
Bennett and Stam, for instance, developed a statistical model in order to make explicit 
                                                 
13
 These data represent the proportion of insurgencies who are defeated, an outcome that Lyall 
and Wilson define as occurring “when the insurgency is militarily defeated and its organization 
destroyed or the war ends without any political concessions granted to insurgent forces.” 
14
 Data on insurgent attrition were coded by the author: they are rough measurements of 
insurgents killed in battle, as well as those captured and executed, but they do not include 
civilians killed by collateral damage during the war, nor do they include estimated deaths due to 
displacement or disease. (In this respect, the definition of insurgent attrition employed here 
differs from other data sets that aim to capture “war-related deaths” more broadly.) These data 
were coded through an analysis of more than 500 secondary sources. Some of these sources were 
prominent compilations of historical statistics: Clodfelter’s War and Armed Conflicts (2008), for 
instance, chronicles casualty statistics specifically; some other examples of anthologies used for 
this project include Condit et al., Challenge and Response in Internal Conflict (1967-68), 
Asprey, War in the Shadows (1975), Dupuy and Dupuy, Harper Encyclopedia for Military 
History (1993), Clayton, Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa since 1950 (1999), Beckett, Modern 
Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies (2001), Phillips and Axelrod, Encyclopedia of Wars 
(2005), and Arnold, Historical Dictionary of Civil Wars in Africa (2008). The large majority of 
sources for these data, however, are histories of individual wars. References for each individual 
data point are catalogued within the data set itself. 
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predictions about how long the occupation of Iraq might last.15 More informally, decision makers 
often limit their analysis to cases they believe to be most relevant for whatever reason. The task 
of defining the relevant case universe for structuring expectations is a crucial one, and it will be 
the main subject of Chapter 5.  
Finally, a large part of military planning is essentially deductive, working through the specific 
problems decision makers believe they are confronting through a close analysis of desired ends, 
available means, and opponents’ capabilities. There are a wide range of simulation technologies 
and wargame formats that aim to sort through these factors in order to draw inferences about 
how long it might take and how much it might cost to achieve strategic objectives based on case-
specific reasoning. In a different context, Clausewitz discussed the importance of a commander’s 
“genius”: the intuition that would allow commanders to “rise above the rules” and the strictures 
of past experience in order to perform strategic assessment and guide their forces successfully.16  
Decision makers thus form their prior expectations based on a wide range of inputs, both 
inductive and deductive, broad-based and ad hoc. These forms of reasoning are often left 
implicit, and they form the basis of subjective probabilities about how long it might take and 
how much it might cost for decision makers to achieve their intended goals. The purpose of 
discussing those prior assumptions formally is not to provide a descriptive picture of how 
decision makers perform strategic assessment, but to explain precisely why it is that those prior 
assumptions play such an important role in structuring the process of learning and adaptation in 
war, and how existing scholarship often neglects key dynamics on this score. 
                                                 
15
 Bennett and Stam 2006. 
16
 On “Clausewitz, Genius, and the Rules,” see Sumida 2001 and Rogers 2002, among others. 
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Figure 3.6.  Empirical Distributions of How Long Insurgencies Last 
 
Based on data from Lyall and Wilson 2009 and codings by the author, Figure 3.6 demonstrates 
the empirical distribution of how long it generally takes to defeat an insurgency. See Chapter 5 
for a more extensive discussion of these data and their subsets. 
 
 
Source: Lyall and Wilson (2009)
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Figure 3.7a. How Decision Makers Would Revise their Expectations  
If War is a Repeated Process 
 
When war is a repeated process such that the chances of defeating an opponent in each round of 
fighting are independent and identically distributed, each round of fighting allows decision 
makers to learn that there is a progressively smaller chance that they are facing a “weaker” 
type, and a relatively higher chance that they are facing a “stronger” type. The top panel shows 
how this will lead to a gradual shifting of prior expectations. The bottom panel shows that 
decision makers will become progressively more pessimistic about the chances of defeating their 
opponent in the next round of fighting, and they should believe that it will take longer to defeat 
their opponents at the margin. 
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Figure 3.7b. How Decision Makers Would Revise their Expectations  
If War is a Cumulative Process 
 
When war is a cumulative process, the learning process is very different. In each round of 
fighting, decision makers can rule out that they are facing an opponent that was weak  enough 
such that they would have conceded already – but this does not necessarily provide any way to 
separate the potential types that remain. As a result, decision makers should update their 
expectations by truncating their prior assumptions, not by shifting them gradually. When prior 
assumptions are normally distributed, this has the complete opposite effect as the process shown 
in Figure 3.7a: here, rational decision makers will become progressively more optimistic about 
their chances of defeating their opponents in the next round of fighting, and the expected cost 
remaining to complete the war will continually decline. 
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A closer look at updating expectations 
Of course, the notion that decision makers form prior assumptions is not unique to the 
theoretical framework in this paper – in the existing literature on the bargaining model of war, 
for instance, the way that decision makers form initial expectations of an opponent’s potential 
“type” is a central topic of interest, especially because of the notion that war might often result 
from combatants being “mutually optimistic” about their military prospects based on private 
information.17 Where the theoretical framework in Section 3.1 deviates from the existing 
literature is primarily in the way that decision makers revise these prior assumptions, based on 
the notion that war is a cumulative process and not a repeated process. 
Figure 3.7 shows graphically how these two kinds of learning processes differ. The top panels 
of this figure show how decision makers should update expectations about an opponent’s 
potential type if war were a repeated process. Consistent with contemporary scholarship on the 
bargaining model of war, an opponent’s type here represents the likelihood that they will be 
defeated in each round of fighting. The prior assumption here is that opponent types are 
distributed normally, such that there is some probability that the odds of defeating a particular 
opponent in each round of fighting are very low, there is some probability that those odds are 
very high, and the most likely kinds of opponents are somewhere in between. Every time a round 
of fighting transpires without the opponent being defeated, decision makers can revise these 
assumptions, assigning progressively less weight to the notion that the opponent is relatively 
                                                 
17
 For examples, see Fearon 1995, Ramsay and Fey 2007, Meirowitz and Sartori 2008, and 
Slantchev and Tarar 2011. 
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weak, and assigning progressively more weight to the notion that the opponent is relatively 
strong.18  
The top panels of Figure 3.7 capture the dynamic nature of this process by displaying several 
revised distributions, which move from lightest to darkest each time they are updated. Shown 
graphically in Figure 3.7, the updating process in standard models essentially consists of 
gradually shifting expectations to the right: every time an opponent is able to survive a round 
without conceding, decision makers should think it is increasingly likely that they are relatively 
resilient. As a result of this learning process, rational decision makers should think it is 
progressively less likely that the next round of fighting will produce concessions, and by the 
same logic, their estimate of the total number of rounds required to defeat their opponent will 
continually increase. 
The bottom panels of Figure 3.7 show, in contrast, how decision makers would revise their 
expectations under the assumption that war is a cumulative process. In this framework, a 
combatant’s “type” represents the number of rounds of fighting they can hold out before giving 
in to their opponent’s demands. Once again we start with a normally-distributed prior – there is 
some chance this combatant will concede quickly, some chance they will hold out for a 
protracted period, and it is most likely that their breaking point is somewhere in the middle. But 
the process of updating this prior assumption is quite different from what we saw earlier. 
Conditional on reaching a certain round of fighting, it is possible to rule out the notion that the 
opponent is weak enough such that they would have conceded already, but since all remaining 
types should have been able to resist thus far, fighting does not automatically provide any 
                                                 
18
 See Powell 2004: 358 for a similar discussion of how prior assumptions “shift” across rounds 
of fighting in this fashion. 
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additional information allowing decision makers to determine which of these types is more likely 
than the others. Figure 3.7 thus shows how the updating process here essentially consists of 
truncating the prior assumption, and then raising all remaining probabilities proportionally so 
that they always sum to 1. 
Note also how, in the bottom of Figure 3.7, probability mass becomes progressively 
concentrated to the left of the remaining distribution each time the prior is updated. This provides 
a graphical sense as to why, when decision makers believe that opponent’s types are normally 
distributed, they will perceive that the Expected Remaining Cost of continuing the war is 
continually declining. These dynamics lead to predictions that are the exact opposite of standard 
models of strategic assessment: after each round of fighting, rational decision makers should 
expect that there is a progressively higher chance of defeating their opponent in the next round, 
and their estimate of the total amount of fighting it will take to achieve their objectives will 
progressively decline. Comparing the output of these models on the right side of Figure 3.7, it is 
apparent how defining armed conflict as a repeated or a cumulative process essentially inverts 
expectations about how rational decision makers should learn and adapt. 
 
A closer look at why the shape of prior assumptions matters 
Section 3.1 formally demonstrated that normally-distributed priors generate continually 
decreasing perceptions of Expected Remaining Cost. The reason this is the case is that if you 
pick a point on the normal distribution and start moving to the right, then the remaining 
probability mass will become increasingly concentrated near the point you are considering. This 
is not easy to see when looking at the normal distribution. In fact, first impressions appear to 
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suggest that the opposite, since the right-tail of this distribution “flattens out” as it reaches more 
extreme values. This impression is misleading. It is true that the slope of the normal distribution 
declines in absolute terms as we move along the tails; but in relative terms – if we renormalize 
the remaining probability mass as we go along – the distribution gets progressively steeper. To 
show this, Figure 3.8 “zooms in” on different windows of the normal distribution’s tail. Each 
window has the same width. Focusing on each window individually and rescaling the axes each 
time shows how as we move rightward along the normal distribution, we keep getting closer to 
the mean of the probability mass that remains, and thus Expected Remaining Cost will decline. 
Using a similar technique, we can see why the exponential distribution is a “boundary case” 
for predictions about learning and adaptation – as Section 3.1 explained, if decision makers 
believe that opponent types are exponentially distributed, then Expected Remaining Cost would 
be the same in every round of fighting. Figure 3.9 shows this graphically by again zooming in on 
four different windows of the distribution’s right tail and renormalizing the axes each time. Each 
of these subsets is identical: no matter which point we select along the exponential distribution, 
the remaining probability mass is always spread out in precisely the same way. Thus any point 
along this distribution is always the same distance away from the mean of the probability mass to 
its right, and this is why Expected Remaining Cost remains constant.19 (By a similar logic, if 
priors have thicker tails then the exponential distribution, then probability mass will continually 
shift further to the right as we move along, which is why Expected Remaining Cost will increase 
with each round of fighting when decision makers possess heavy-tailed priors.) 
                                                 
19
 In the literature on probability theory, this property of the exponential distribution is called 
“memorylessness”: no matter where you are on the distribution, you are always the same 
distance from the mean (or any percentile) of the remaining probability mass to your right. See 
Figure 3.8 for a graphical representation. 
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Figure 3.8. Probability Mass along the Normal Distribution’s Tail 
By zooming in on different windows of the normal distribution and renormalizing the axes each 
time, it is evident that as those windows move to the right, the probability mass within them shifts 
to the left. This shows graphically how as we move out along the distribution’s tail, we get 
progressively closer to the center of the distribution that remains. 
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Figure 3.9. Probability Mass along the Exponential Distribution’s Tail 
Expected Remaining Cost is the same at all points along an exponential distribution: zooming in 
on different areas of this distribution’s tail helps to explain that its distribution of probability 
mass always remains constant, a property that is called “memorylessness.” 
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The main takeaway from this discussion is that the shape of the prior assumption is critically 
important for understanding how rational decision makers should learn and adapt over the course 
of armed conflict. If this sounds obvious, keep in mind that this is not something that existing 
models typically take into account. The standard prediction of the bargaining model of war is 
monotonic: one of its central insights is that each round of fighting brings combatants’ 
perceptions closer into alignment, regardless of what those perceptions were to begin with. Here, 
by contrast, we see a learning process that is much more contingent, implying that it is not 
possible to understand how rational decision makers will learn and adapt unless we can 
understand the kinds of prior assumptions that structured their original assessments. 
 
Section 3.3. Implications for strategic interaction 
The principal subject of this dissertation is strategic assessment, defined as the way that military 
decision makers form and revise their expectations about how long it might take or how much it 
might cost to achieve their political objectives. The analysis in this chapter so far has been “one-
sided,” focusing on the way that rational decision makers might learn about their opponents’ 
capabilities and resolve as they fight. Most of the contemporary literature on the bargaining 
model of war, by contrast, seeks to go further, leveraging one-sided decision analysis in order to 
create game-theoretic models of how combatants might optimally negotiate with each other as 
conflict unfolds. While this kind of bargaining behavior lies outside the primary scope of this 
dissertation, it is such an important component of the contemporary theoretical literature that it is 
worth discussing what viewing war as a cumulative process implies for strategic interaction. 
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In doing so, it is useful to begin by providing a brief overview of how the current game-
theoretic literature on bargaining and war developed. This literature is generally grounded in the 
early work of Thomas Schelling, Geoffrey Blainey, and Donald Wittman, who developed the 
notion that war is a tool for coercive bargaining and that fighting can advance this bargaining 
process by revealing information about combatants’ capabilities and resolve.20 James Fearon 
formalized the idea that asymmetric information about combatant’s “types” (along with 
incentives to misrepresent than information) can constitute a rationalist explanation for war, but 
he left it for other scholars to explain precisely how fighting would resolve this informational 
problem.21 
Two works were influential in helping to “open up the black box of war” in this respect. 
Alastair Smith developed the “battling for forts” model described earlier, in which he assumed 
that war consisted of a number of individual engagements fought to control a discrete number of 
objectives, that the odds of each side winning a given battle were fixed and repeated, and that 
fighting therefore allowed combatants to resolve uncertainty about their relative balance of 
power.22 R. Harrison Wagner expanded the foundations of strategic-level bargaining models, 
arguing that it is possible to think of war as having multiple “rounds of fighting,” in which each 
side ran a fixed and repeated risk of military collapse; thus as war continued without obtaining a 
military victory, rational combatants could revise their views of what this risk entailed.23 
Importantly, these early works on learning and adaptation in war were one-sided analyses much 
                                                 
20
 Schelling 1960b, 1966, Blainey 1973, Wittman 1979. 
21
 Fearon 1995. 
22
 Smith 1998. 
23
 Wagner 2000. 
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like the theoretical framework advanced in Section 3.1 – rather than constituting full-blown 
game theory from the start, the early stages of developing the bargaining model of war largely 
consisted of defining assumptions about what fighting entailed (including the notion that war 
could be modeled as a repeated process) and then drawing conclusions about how individual 
combatants would revise their views of their opponents accordingly. 
The contemporary, game-theoretic literature on coercive bargaining then constituted what 
Robert Powell called a “second wave of formal work on war,” building off the foundation of 
scholars who examined learning and adaptation on the part of individual combatants.24 Powell’s 
2004 article on “Bargaining and Learning While Fighting,” as mentioned in Chapter 2, is 
probably the most prominent strategic-level model in the bargaining literature, and it is explicitly 
framed as a game-theoretic extension of Wagner’s earlier framework.25 Similarly, Alastair Smith 
extended his battling-for-forts framework into a model of strategic interaction in his 2004 article 
with Allan Stam on “Bargaining and the Nature of War.” Filson and Werner, Slantchev and 
others built their game-theoretic treatments of coercive bargaining on assumptions that were 
similar to Smith’s earlier, one-sided analysis.26 
In some sense it is trivial to point this out, because no game-theoretic model can be 
constructed without first defining how each side will respond to a given set of circumstances on 
                                                 
24
 Powell 2004: 345. 
25
 Powell writes: “The present formulation is closest to Wagner. He also bases his analysis on a 
model in which rejecting an offer generates a risk that the game will end in that round because 
one state or the other collapses. Wagner, however, does not formally derive the equilibria of the 
game when there is asymmetric information…” (2004: 347). 
26
 Filson and Werner 2002, Slantchev 2003. See Smith and Stam 2004: 784 and Powell 2004: 
347-348 for a review of these models and their origins. 
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its own: finding game-theoretic equilibria requires defining “best response functions” for each 
relevant actor, and then rewriting these functions in terms of one another in a way that identifies 
situations where all actions are optimal and no one would be better off adjusting their behavior. 
In this respect, the validity of game-theoretic models fundamentally depends on core 
assumptions about how each actor will assess its options – and in particular, strategic assessment 
in the bargaining model of war depends on the assumption that war is a repeated process. By 
questioning that basic assumption, and by showing how viewing war as a cumulative process has 
important implications for rethinking strategic assessment, the argument in this dissertation will 
naturally influence the output of game-theoretic models as well. 
In the standard setup for the bargaining model of war, for instance, two combatants – call 
them players 1 and 2 – are making demands over how to divide some stake =. We can think of 
this stake as a piece of territory, a stock or flow of material resources, or any other form of value 
that is possible to exchange. In order to think about the way that combatants would negotiate 
over the division of =, it is first necessary to define how well each of them believes they would 
do if they attempted to decide the issue through war. This will determine each side’s reservation 
value for negotiations, as they should not accept a settlement that gave them less utility than 
what they expect to obtain through fighting.  
Since war is costly, players 1 and 2 would prefer to divide = peacefully and avoid the 
deadweight loss of fighting. But in cases where players possess asymmetric information about 
their military capabilities, it is possible for each side to be mutually optimistic about their 
military prospects, such that neither player is willing to offer the other a deal that they would find 
acceptable. This is the framework which serves as the basis for the contemporary literature on 
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the bargaining model of war.27 As mentioned in Chapter 2, the key takeaway from most of the 
existing literature on this subject is that fighting helps to resolve this asymmetric information. As 
combatants’ perceptions of the military balance converge, so will their reservation values and 
bargaining demands, and eventually this will open up a space for negotiated settlement.  
Powell, for instance, describes a situation where a satisfied state  is fighting a dissatisfied 
state , each round of fighting induces some probability that each side will collapse, and states 
enter war with uncertainty about what these probabilities are: “Suppose,” Powell writes, “that 
that the satisfied state is trying to distinguish between types  and  where  is less likely to 
collapse than  ( >  and therefore is more powerful. At the outset of the game,  
believes that ’s probability of collapse is distributed according to ? with density @.” Using 
Bayes’ rule, combatants can thus update their perceptions of how their opponent’s type might be 
distributed, and as a result of the dynamics laid out earlier, this learning process always pushes in 
the same direction. As Powell writes, “the odds of facing [the stronger type]  rise with each 
round of fighting. If these types have fought A times without collapsing, the odds rise to 1 

B@/91  


B@<. This is the sense in which fighting conveys information.” As 
combatants incorporate this information into their bargaining positions in Powell’s model, it will 
make them more amenable to a negotiated settlement: since they will become progressively more 
likely to think that they are facing a strong opponent, they will also determine that the expected 
costs of fighting are growing progressively higher – thus their reservation value for a negotiated 
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 Fearon 1995. 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Argument 
105 
 
settlement will progressively decline, and it will be more feasible to reach a mutually acceptable 
deal.28 
This chapter has demonstrated, however, that Powell’s key assumptions here do not 
necessarily hold. Section 3.1 showed that once we take war to be a cumulative process and not a 
repeated process, then rational combatants should not necessarily perceive the expected 
remaining costs of warfare to be rising as rounds of fighting mount. We in fact saw how, for 
several possible distributions of an opponent’s potential type, decision makers should 
progressively become more optimistic about their ability to achieve their wartime demands as 
armed conflict drags on. This implies that combatants’ reservation values in negotiations might 
increase, not decrease, which would reduce the bargaining space, not expand it. 
It is possible to rethink Slantchev’s prominent model in a similar fashion. Slantchev’s setup 
assumes that combatants are fighting for a discrete set of “objectives”; each round of fighting 
entails a battle for control of a marginal objective, and the war ends if one side captures all of its 
opponent’s objectives. Slantchev writes how, conditional on going to war, combatants can be 
either of two types: strong or moderately strong (as “weak types” in his model would never go to 
war). Heading into battle, combatants will thus have prior expectations about the probability that 
they are facing each of the relevant types. “Intuitively,” Slantchev writes (as he assumes that war 
is a repeated process), “winning a battle should make [a combatant] more optimistic about the 
chance of facing a weak opponent, while losing a battle should make [a combatant] more 
pessimistic.” The connection to bargaining behavior is clear. “Victories make [a combatant] 
more optimistic about its chances,” Slantchev writes. “Consequently, if [a combatant] wins the 
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 Powell 2004: 349. 
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fight, it demands more than it does if it loses it.” And “it is always the case” that the reverse is 
true, such that if a combatant loses a fight, then they would demand less than if they had been 
successful.29 
 A problem with this formulation, as Section 3.1 showed, is that it is entirely possible for both 
combatants to believe that they are making strategic progress simultaneously. Depending on their 
prior assumptions, it is not necessarily true that everyone will learn the same lessons from each 
battle. In the Pacific theater of World War II, for instance (as discussed in the last chapter), the 
U.S. objective was to successively roll back Japan’s defenses while the Japanese goal was to 
successively exhaust U.S. casualty tolerance – it was thus perfectly logical for both sides to 
believe after each battle concluded that they were making cumulative progress towards achieving 
their intended objectives.  
A similar situation characterized the 1916 Battle of Verdun, one of the costliest battles of 
World War I in which France and Germany attempted to wear each other down through 
cumulative attrition. (The French referred to the battle as “the meat grinder”; German 
commander Erich von Falkenhayn said that his objective was to “bleed the French white.”)  In 
all, the Battle spanned ten months of German offensives and French counteroffensives, 
producing nearly three-quarters of a million casualties combined. How could the battle have 
dragged on for such a protracted and costly period if fighting provides information which 
resolves uncertainty? Both French and German forces were observing the same information, so 
how could they both have maintained mutually optimistic beliefs for so long? Existing models of 
strategic interaction have trouble explaining this, but when viewing war as a cumulative process, 
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 Slantchev 2003: 624, 626, 631. 
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this behavior is no longer surprising. There is nothing inherently contradictory in the notion that 
rational actors observing battlefield outcomes would both believe that they are making progress 
towards achieving their goals. 
If this is true, then an important takeaway is that there are circumstances under which combat 
might in fact hinder – not help – combatants to define an acceptable negotiated settlement. If 
opponents are becoming progressively more optimistic about their chances of extracting 
concessions through force, then all else being equal, this should make them less likely to reduce 
their demands or to make concessions of their own. Here the theoretical framework developed in 
this dissertation clearly departs from prominent scholarship in the contemporary study of 
international relations. 
To reiterate, there is nothing here to say that this behavior is inevitable: while the existing 
literature makes a strong prediction that combatant’s perceptions and bargaining demands should 
strictly converge as war proceeds, Sections 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrated that the way rational 
combatants revise their views is largely contingent on the kinds of prior assumptions that they 
make about their opponents ex ante. The framework developed here thus reinforces the argument 
developed in Chapter 2 about how viewing war as a cumulative process suggests placing much 
more attention on the content of these prior assumptions than existing models. This will continue 
to be a central theme of the analysis in subsequent chapters. 
It is possible that scholars could model strategic interaction in a way such that combatants 
somehow account for the plausible kinds of prior assumptions under which their opponents 
might be operating, and then incorporate those assessments into their own strategic calculus such 
that they anticipate subsequent divergences in bargaining demands and adjust their own 
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negotiation positions accordingly. Ramsay and Fey, for instance, proposed revising standard 
bargaining models in a manner such that decision makers account for the prospects of mutual 
optimism, essentially reducing their demands on the eve of war in the knowledge that they might 
have mistakenly set their demands too high.30 Slantchev and Tarar showed, however, that these 
sorts of adjustments can be quite dependent on assumptions about game structure, while Fearon 
more generally argued that if combatants are allowed to bluff or manipulate their demands 
strategically, then they may not reveal information through offers and counteroffers in the way 
that other literature expects.31 
The purpose of this dissertation is to focus on strategic assessment, and it is not oriented 
towards the broader, game-theoretic literature per se. But since models of strategic interaction 
treat bargaining behavior and battlefield outcomes to be interdependent, then to the extent that 
this chapter has shown how rational decision makers do not necessarily learn from battlefield 
outcomes in ways that the existing literature assumes, this opens the possibility for re-evaluating 
broader literature. This is yet another reason why it is important for scholars to understand how 
war is a cumulative process, and how that influences learning and adaptation in a manner than 
departs from existing theoretical frameworks. 
 
Section 3.4. Summary of the theoretical framework 
To summarize the argument up to this point, Chapter 2 described the standard theoretical 
framework for capturing the way that rational decision makers form and revise their expectations 
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 Ramsay and Fey 2007. 
31
 Slantchev and Tarar 2011, Fearon 2007a. 
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in war; showed how this framework relied on the assumption that war is a repeated process; and 
offered an alternative way to conceptualize combatant types that is more consistent with the 
notion that war is a cumulative process. This chapter then showed how making this change 
resulted in theoretical predictions that are in some cases the very opposite of what existing 
scholarship predicts. In particular, the new framework challenges the common assumption that 
rational decision makers should become more pessimistic about their policies as they fail to 
achieve their intended goals: there are a wide range of conditions under which we should in fact 
expect the very opposite. 
This framework provides a new vantage point for understanding why so many military 
decision makers struggle to realize their strategic mistakes, and why it is that they often stick to 
unsuccessful strategies for so long. This chapter has shown how the cumulative dynamics of 
armed conflict raise genuine obstacles to strategic assessment that do not rely on assumptions 
about organizational behavior, domestic politics, psychology, or any failure of rational 
evaluation. For that reason, it is plausible to think that the discussion here can generalize widely 
across time, space, and subject matter, helping to explain why decision makers in war and many 
other fields are often so reluctant to change their policies, even when those policies do not seem 
to be succeeding. This framework is also relevant to understanding why wars are often so 
protracted if fighting provides information that supposedly promotes compromise – this is one of 
the main puzzles confronting the literature on the bargaining model of war, and this chapter 
indicated why understanding the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict may explain why this is 
the case.32 
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 On the puzzling nature of protracted conflict, see Fearon 2007a and Powell 2012. 
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Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter is to help reformulate baseline expectations for how 
rational decision makers should learn and adapt in armed conflict. Much of the existing literature 
on this subject assumes that decision makers who “stay the course” when their policies are not 
succeeding are obviously behaving in an irrational fashion; this has driven a great deal of 
research on the sources of strategic errors, and this literature has produced many valuable 
insights.33 It may very well be the case that militaries possess organizational cultures that 
emphasize conventional warfare, that leaders have biases that hinder self-evaluation, and that 
domestic politics might create perverse incentives. But this chapter demonstrates that we do not 
need these factors in order to explain why some actors seem to be so unwilling to adapt their 
policies.  
What the existing literature treats as a problem of nonrational behavior may thus simply be a 
natural reaction to the cumulative dynamics of war. Understanding these cumulative dynamics 
suggests that when decision makers fail to achieve their goals this does not logically mean that 
they should become more pessimistic about the policies that they are pursuing. In some cases, 
the theoretical argument in this chapter may thus provide a vantage point for re-opening debates 
about whether some forms of military behavior are truly as irrational or as puzzling as previous 
scholarship has argued. This is the subject of the next chapter, which applies the theoretical 
framework developed here to offer a new interpretation of U.S. military behavior during the 
American Indian Wars. 
                                                 
33
 See the sources reviewed in the opening section of this chapter. 
  
 
 
Chapter Four: Empirical Application 
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT IN THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS 
 
 
 
From the founding of Jamestown in 1607 to the Battle of Wounded Knee in 1890, British 
colonists and U.S. citizens were in continual conflict with one Native American tribe or another. 
The American Indian Wars receive relatively little attention from contemporary political 
scientists, but they occupied the U.S. and British Armies for centuries and significantly shaped 
the development of the “American way of war.”1 Moreover, as this chapter will explain, there are 
specific, methodological reasons why the American Indian Wars provide exceptional analytic 
traction for the study of military decision making.  
Section 4.1 sets the stage for the analysis by describing how U.S. commanders often struggled 
to form and revise their expectations during the American Indian Wars, while Section 4.2 
discusses case selection and research design. Section 4.3 then demonstrates how a theoretical 
understanding of cumulative dynamics, combined with an original data set spanning roughly 
3,000 frontier engagements, sheds new light on U.S. behavior, explaining why officers had a 
puzzling tendency to underestimate tribal forces, and why they maintained those optimistic 
beliefs even as some conflicts dragged on. Section 4.4 discusses how, to the extent that this 
approach provides new insight into the beliefs and actions of commanders like George Custer 
(whose actions have been scrutinized as much as almost any other decision maker in U.S. 
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 On this thesis, see Prucha 1969, Weigley 1973, Lee 2001, Grenier 2005, and Cohen 2011. 
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history), it indicates the potential promise of the new framework for re-evaluating established 
scholarship and conventional wisdom. 
 
Section 4.1. Underestimating tribal forces 
Throughout the American Indian Wars, U.S. and British officials generally articulated their 
policies in terms of coercive punishment: they believed that if they could inflict enough costs 
upon the tribes, then their opponents would conclude that it was not in their interest to continue 
resisting. As Major General George Crook once put it, reflecting on his experience as one of the 
country’s most renowned frontier commanders, sometimes “there was nothing else to do but go 
out and kill them until they changed their minds.”2  
Military and civilian leaders regularly expressed similar sentiments. Secretary of War John 
Floyd ordered that operations against the Navajos “should have for their object to inspire them 
with fear, by a few decisive blows.” Brigadier General Newman Clarke’s battle plan against the 
Coeur d’Alene tribe was to “make their punishment severe, and persevere until submission of all 
is complete.” Brigadier General John Pope’s intention in the Red River War was to “wear down 
the fugitives so that they would hasten back to their agencies and submit.” Indian Superintendent 
Alfred Meacham’s stance on the Modocs’ refusal to leave their land was that “We will whip you 
until you are willing.” In the Dakota War, Governor Henry Sibley aimed to convince his 
opponents that “the long arm of the government could reach the most distant haunts and punish 
them.” Colonel Henry Carrington’s objective against the Cheyennes was to send out “active 
operations in different directions, as best affords chance of punishment.” Colonel Edwin 
                                                 
2
 Bourke 1891: 213.  
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Sumner’s plan for the Utes was to “inflict upon them a severe chastisement,” and Lieutenant 
General William Sherman’s impression of the Arapahos was that “these Indians require to be 
soundly whipped.”3  
Of course, the U.S. Army held the military upper hand in these conflicts over the long term. 
While the United States was in the process of becoming one of the world’s largest, wealthiest, 
and most powerful countries, North America’s indigenous population was sharply declining as a 
result of violence, displacement, and disease.4 Many tribes’ economic foundations were 
gradually eroding as well, through overhunting furs and the depletion of the great buffalo herds 
(which the United States Army at times facilitated in an attempt to undermine Plains tribes). And 
as the United States developed a network of railroads throughout the continent’s interior, this 
diminished the tribes’ main tactical advantage of being able to operate from areas that were far 
from Army bases of supply. 
The puzzle therefore is thus not why the United States commanders believed that they had the 
ability to overwhelm their opponents with force, an outcome that was ultimately overdetermined. 
The puzzle is why so many commanders were so ineffective at judging how long it might take 
and how much it might cost to achieve these military objectives – for even if the United States 
ultimately “won” almost all of the American Indian Wars, their performance with strategic 
assessment was often decidedly mixed.  
                                                 
3
 For these quotes, see Utley 1967: 86, 172, 203; Utley 1973: 219, 103, 144; Dillon 1973: 103; 
Thrapp 1967: 118; Clodfelter 1998: 115; Carroll 1976: 6. 
4
 Diseases were especially problematic – Native Americans were acutely susceptible to diseases 
like smallpox and influenza, which could easily kill half of a given tribe in a single wave. See 
Calloway 1997: ch. 2. 
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For instance, at least twelve tribes – Apaches, Cheyennes, Comanches, Creeks, Delawares, 
Narragansetts, Nez Perces, Pequots, Rogues, Seminoles, Tuscaroras, and Wampanoags – held 
out against U.S. military expeditions until a majority of their military-aged males had been killed 
or captured in battle. In two of these wars (the Creek War of 1813-14 and the Second Seminole 
War from 1835-42, which will be discussed below), the fighting did not end until the U.S. Army 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Nineteenth Century Native American and U.S. Population Shifts 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the total population of Native Americans living in the 
continental United States declined from roughly 600,000 to roughly 200,000, while the U.S. 
population grew from roughly 5 million to more than 60 million. (Data from Reddy 1993 and 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census.) 
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had essentially killed or captured the entire tribe.5 In other cases, tribes only surrendered when 
the U.S. Army posed a credible threat to eliminate the group at once. The Modocs defended their 
positions among California’s lava beds in 1872-73 until they were largely surrounded and the 
Army had begun to bombard them with howitzers. The Nez Perces fought a running string of 
engagements in 1877 as they attempted to escape from Idaho into Canada, and they only gave up 
when they made a break for a mountain pass and the tribe was surrounded by U.S. forces on 
either end. In a sense, the Modocs and Nez Perces succumbed to a coercive threat.  But that 
threat had to escalate to an all but existential scale before they were willing to surrender. The 
expectation that any of these tribes could be “humiliated,” “whipped,” “demoralized,” or 
otherwise “punished” into submission with a moderate show of force was completely out of line 
with reality. Understanding how U.S. commanders could have held these kinds of mistaken 
beliefs is a central question confronting historical scholarship on the period and it is the 
empirical puzzle that motivates this chapter. 
 
Underestimating opponents in the Great Sioux War 
The “Great Sioux War” of 1876, for instance, was fought for control of South Dakota’s Black 
Hills. This land was home to Sioux6 and Cheyennes; it also possessed valuable timber, and when 
an 1874 Army expedition declared there was gold in the region as well, settlers rushed in to mine 
it illegally. At first the Army attempted to restrain the settlers, but by the end of 1875 the Grant 
                                                 
5
 In the Creek War, there were an estimated 3,000 “Red Sticks” fighting the United States, of 
whom roughly 1,200 were military-aged males. The U.S. Army killed or captured 1,000 Red 
Stick warriors on the battlefield (including 600 in a single engagement at Horseshoe Bend, 
Alabama), and captured another 1,000 women and children. 
6
 Predominantly the Teton branch of the broader Sioux family. 
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administration decided to press the Sioux and Cheyennes to cede the territory instead. When the 
tribes refused to do so, and Native Americans began to leave neighboring reservations in order to 
join bands in the Black Hills led by prominent individuals such as Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, 
the Army was ordered to evict them.  
As in most of the American Indian Wars, the U.S. Army expected the coming fight to be 
quick and cheap, if the tribes offered military resistance at all. Lieutenant General Philip 
Sheridan (commander of the Division of the Missouri and thus the principal figure directing the 
operation) chose to deploy his forces in three columns intended to encircle his opponents. “In 
this way,” Sheridan argued, “the Indians would be deprived of the means of escape… and be 
forced to fight until subdued or annihilated.”7 Sheridan was not particularly worried about how 
this fighting would turn out, explaining to Brigadier General Alfred Terry (one of his two 
principal field commanders) “the impossibility of any large number of Indians keeping together 
as a hostile body for more than one week.” Terry shared Sheridan’s optimism, replying that “I 
have no doubt of the ability of my column to whip all the Sioux whom we can find.” And George 
Crook (then a Brigadier General and Sheridan’s other principal subordinate) expected to “strike a 
blow at once which will demoralize the savages from the start.”8  
                                                 
7
 Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri, Office of the Chief Engineer. Annual Report of 
the Chief of Engineers for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1876. July 11, 1876. See also 
Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri. Report of Lieut. Gen. P. H. Sheridan. House of 
Representatives Executive Document No. 1, Part 2. 44th Cong., 2nd Sess. November 25, 1876.  
8
 Sheridan to Terry, 16 May 1876 and Terry to Sheridan, 16 May 1876; Crook interview with 
Denver Rocky Mountain News, 23 Feb 1876. See Gray 1976: 45, 90 and the documents appended 
to the Secretary of War’s 1876 report to Congress: these include Sheridan’s Report of Lieut. Gen. 
P. H. Sheridan (Headquarters, Military Division of the Missouri, 25 Nov 1876), where he 
recollects that Terry believed a “quick movement… might be decisive”; and Crook’s 
recollection, even after the fact (Report of General Crook, Headquarters, Department of the 
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The course of this campaign was, of course, very different. Both Crook and Terry picked up 
the trail of Sitting Bull’s forces, but the first major battle at the Rosebud was indecisive – despite 
engaging roughly one thousand opponents in a fight lasting six hours, the Army was unable to 
kill or capture more than a few dozen. Eight days later at Little Bighorn, cavalry under 
Lieutenant Colonel George Custer located another Sioux and Cheyennes camp. In a move that 
historians have generally interpreted as demonstrating a lack of regard for his opponents’ 
military capabilities, Custer decided to split his forces and assault the camp in broad daylight. 
Outnumbered roughly three to one, the event turned into one of the most infamous defeats in 
U.S. military history. The Sioux and Cheyennes counterattacked, exploiting Custer’s inability to 
coordinate units he had divided, and eliminating five companies entirely. 
 
Persistent optimism in the Second Seminole War 
If commanders entered warfare against the tribes with these sorts of misperceptions, they 
often exhibited extreme difficulty in adapting to unexpected events. The Second Seminole War is 
perhaps the clearest example. From the start of the war in 1835, more than 90 percent of 
Seminoles in Florida were either killed, captured, or forcibly relocated and yet the remainder 
continued to fight until President Tyler ordered a unilateral ceasefire in 1842.  
Yet despite the fact that the Seminoles proved to be such exceptionally resilient insurgents, 
U.S. commanders were consistently optimistic about their prospects for terminating the conflict 
in short order. In December 1835, Secretary of War Lewis Cass reported that while some 
                                                                                                                                                             
Platte, 25 Sep 1876) that “I did not ask for reinforcements because I felt that we were abundantly 
able to take care of ourselves.” 
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Seminoles were preparing to resist relocation, “They will, probably, when the time for operations 
arrives, quietly follow their countrymen.”9 When hostilities did in fact break out, the War 
Department expected a quick fight, relying on militia who were only mobilized for a three-month 
term of service. Brigadier General Winfield Scott took command of forces in Florida with a plan 
(much like Sheridan’s forty years later) for using three columns to surround his opponents such 
that they would be “hemmed in and captured.”10 Scott estimated that he would need just twelve 
days to do this.11 But his first attempt was waylaid by poor coordination among the columns, and 
especially when one of them was brought under siege.  A second attempt ran out of supplies 
before the U.S. Army captured even 60 Seminoles.12 
Over the next six years the Seminoles continually frustrated this kind of “column and 
detachment” strategy, but the U.S. Army rarely attempted to alter its playbook. Though Scott’s 
campaign led to no avail, he argued that the failure was in the execution and not the concept – 
that that strategy was sound, but that he had not been given time to launch the expedition early 
enough in the fighting season, while being undermined by inferior subordinates. A court of 
inquiry investigated the matter and agreed with Scott’s assessment, saying that the “plan of 
campaign was well devised.”13 
                                                 
9
 Annual Report Showing the Condition of the War Department in 1835, 8 Dec 1835. In 
American State Papers: Military (henceforth ASP) Vol. V §613. 
10
 This is how Scott described his strategy in his 1864 memoirs; cf. Sprague 1848: 115, Cohen 
1836: 230. 
11
 Cohen 1836: 230, cf. Scott to President Jackson, 3 Jan 1836. 
12
 Mahon 1967: 157. 
13
 See the documents in Sprague 1848: 114-157. 
Chapter 4: Empirical Application 
119 
 
Florida Governor Richard Call succeeded Scott as commander of the Army of the South. His 
columns and detachments failed, too, but the prevailing view was that this was because Call was 
“insufficiently vigorous” in directing them. Call had in fact been able to locate more than 600 
Seminoles, and to bring them to battle at Withlacoochee and Wahoo Swamp. Both battles ended 
before Call’s forces could inflict more than a few dozen casualties on their opponents. But the 
Battle of Wahoo Swamp closed when U.S. forces decided not to pursue the Seminoles across a 
stream that appeared too deep to ford.  When it later turned out that the stream was indeed quite 
passable, this once again precipitated widespread belief that a conventional offensive had put the 
Seminoles on the ropes, only to let them escape at the last moment.14   
Thus Call was replaced by Major General Thomas Jesup, who received the standard 
instructions, along with the expectation that “should you succeed in bringing the Indians to a 
general engagement, and in defeating them therein, the ready submission of the tribe may 
probably be expected.”15 In spring 1837, Jesup reported that he had the Seminoles located and 
surrounded, that he had induced their leaders to capitulate, that “the war is no doubt ended,” and 
that “there is no danger of a renewal of hostilities.”16 The War Department issued orders for 
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 Interim Secretary of War Butler to Call, 4 Nov 1836 (ASP VI §716); Sprague 1848: 162-67; 
Mahon 1967: 185; Doherty 1961: 104-5. 
15
 Butler to Jesup, 4 Nov 1836: ASP VI §716, VII §760.  
16
 Jesup to War Department, 7 Feb 1837, 6 Mar 1837, 26 Mar 1837, and 5 May 1937: ASP VII 
§760. 
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withdrawing the majority of Army forces from Florida.17 But by June, the war was back in full 
swing.18  
In total, the Second Seminole War persisted through seven commanding generals, five 
secretaries of war, and three presidents, most of whom repeated this pattern of unfulfilled 
expectations. As historian Francis Prucha summarizes: “One commander after another tried his 
hand at bringing the embarrassing affair to a successful conclusion, yet the war dragged on, 
despite optimistic announcements from the commanding generals and the War Department, 
which periodically proclaimed that the war had finally been brought to an end.”19 To go along 
with these failures of strategic assessment were genuine costs: the conflict was politically 
embarrassing and financially draining,20 it killed more U.S. servicemen than the first decade of 
                                                 
17
 Commanding General A. Macomb to Jesup, 7 April 1837 and Secretary of War J. R. Poinsett 
to Jesup, 17 May 1837: ASP VII §760. 
18
 Jesup reported that “this campaign, so far as it relates to Indian emigration, has entirely 
failed,” and he requested to be relieved. Jesup to War Department, 5 June 1837: ASP VII §760. 
19
 Prucha 1969: 268. Jesup’s successor, Zachary Taylor (then a Brigadier General and later the 
12th U.S. president), was the only commander who significantly challenged the soundness of the 
column-and-detachment strategy. After failing to subdue the Seminoles during the 1938-39 
winter season, he suggested a “Squares Plan,” which involved dividing Florida into districts, 
each of which was controlled by a centrally-placed military post from which the Army could 
methodically sweep the area for Seminole holdouts. This system was never implemented, 
however. In May 1839, the Army’s commanding general Alexander Macomb arrived in Florida 
to negotiate with the Seminoles, after which he relayed his “satisfaction of announcing to the 
army in Florida, to the authorities of the territory, and to the citizens generally, that he has this 
day terminated the war with the Seminole Indians” (General Orders cited in Sprague 1848: 228-
29, cf. Macomb to Poinsett, 22 May 1839). After this prospective peace fell apart, Taylor was 
succeeded by Brigadier General Walker Armistead, who was followed by Brigadier General 
William Worth. Their adherence to the standard column and detachment formula (and optimism 
about its prospects) are summarized in Mahon 1967: 276, 285, 295 and Sprague 1848: 256, 273.  
20
 Financially, the Second Seminole War cost roughly $35 million in 1840 USD (Covington 
1993: 72), which may have made it the second most expensive war in U.S. history, as a fraction 
of the contemporary federal budget. 
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the War in Afghanistan,21 and militant Seminoles literally lived to fight another day – thirteen 
years later the U.S. Army would be summoned to fight a Third Seminole War. 
 
Native American decision making 
If U.S. commanders often struggled with strategic assessment during the American Indian 
Wars, what can we say about Native American decision making in these conflicts? To some 
degree, the answer is not much, since the tribes almost never left a written record of strategic 
deliberations. In a general sense, however, historians have emphasized several reasons why 
tribes may have been willing to fight such protracted campaigns against U.S. and British forces.  
Some of the most common explanations for Native American military resilience are that tribes 
were intensely averse to leaving their ancestral lands; that many knew their relocation would 
result in attacks and assimilation by their rivals;22 and that some Native Americans believed that 
supernatural powers would offer them battlefield protection.23 Many scholars have emphasized 
                                                 
21
 1,535 members of the U.S. Army and Navy were killed in the Second Seminole War (out of a 
total of 10,169 who served in Florida, for an attrition rate of 15 percent). In addition, 55 militia 
members were killed in action, and far more volunteers presumably died from wounds or 
sickness. Mahon 1967: 325. By comparison, 1,446 U.S. soldiers died in Afghanistan between 
2001-2010, out of roughly one million who served in that country.  
22
 On the fate of some relocated tribes, see Hoig 1993 and LaVere 2000. 
23
 There are many stories of Native American leaders motivating their followers to fight large 
battles with the U.S. Army by promising that their spiritual “medicine” would render warriors 
invincible to bullets; the Shawnee Prophet, the Comanche leader Isatai, and the leaders of the 
Sioux “Ghost Dance” at Wounded Knee are three prominent examples. It is worth noting, 
however, that faith in supernatural powers often led the tribes to tactical successes. Before the 
Battle of Little Bighorn, for example, Sitting Bull famously had a vision that involved U.S. 
cavalrymen falling upside down from the sky – he and his followers took this to be an omen that 
the Sioux would achieve a major victory in their next battle, which of course is exactly what 
happened. 
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that Native American warfare against the United States should be viewed against the backdrop of 
centuries of intertribal conflict that developed social and cultural norms about how war should be 
waged.24 Native American warfare was often highly individualistic: forces were generally not 
organized into cohesive, hierarchical armies and demonstrations of personal bravery were often a 
primary means of social advancement. Many Native Americans thus sought combat despite (and 
perhaps because of) its lethality.25 At the very least, many tribes had a limited ability to restrain 
“spoilers” who believed – for whatever reason – that fighting was in their interest.26  
                                                 
24
 Anthony McGinnis 2010, 2012, Stan Hoig 1993, and John Ewers 1975 make this argument, 
which resonates with the broader research program of military historian John Keegan, who wrote 
in A History of Warfare (1993) that warfare is powerfully shaped by cultural constraints that 
develop over time and often resist adaptation. For example, the widespread practice of mutilating 
corpses is an example of a cultural practice that exerted a significant, negative impact on the 
tribes’ relations with whites. Many tribes believed that individuals retained their bodily form 
when they entered the afterlife – destroying the corpse was thus “regarded as the ultimate 
revenge” and it was a standard practice among many plains tribes (McGinnis 2010: 28). 
Europeans were shocked by these acts, which reinforced the kinds of animosity and fear that 
underscored the push for Indian removal. Scalping was another practice that can be seen in 
similar terms. Especially in the Southeast, obtaining enemy scalps was a sine qua non for social 
advancement within some tribes, and this also doubtlessly enhanced interethnic animosity 
(Lowie 1954: 106). In general, however, the practice of scalping was probably more limited than 
many people believe – in tribes such as the Ponca and Kiowa, for instance, simply touching an 
enemy was considered the highest form of valor, more so than inflicting any bodily harm 
(Mishkin 1940/1992: 3, 39 cf. Smith 1938: 426-34). 
25
 See, for example, Hamalainen’s discussion of the Comanche “warrior cult”: “If there was an 
all-embracing internal force behind the rise of the Comanche empire, it was the relentless 
competition for social prestige among Comanche men. Violent seizure of livestock and captives 
through pillaging represented the main path to social acceptance: it gave them access to wealth 
and women and lifted them toward full manhood. For Comanche men, raiding was a matter of 
social life and death, and it was a mixture of anxiety and raw ambition that pushed them to 
repeatedly risk life for loot, devote much of their lives to arduous raiding” (2008: 269). Needless 
to say, this “all-embracing internal force” was often at odds with maintaining peaceful social 
relations with the Comanches’ neighbors. 
26
 A good example is the beginning of the war with California’s Modoc tribe (1872-73). The war 
was preceded by increasing hostilities between Modocs and white settlers. The Modoc leader 
Kintpuash favored a peaceful resolution of the dispute. However, his stance was challenged by a 
younger and more militant Modoc leader known as “Scarfaced Charley.” Dillon 1973 explains 
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Yet these factors, while presumably important, do not really tell us much about why tribes 
would have varied in their capability or willingness to resist U.S. forces. As a later section of this 
chapter will demonstrate, many tribes did not offer the kind of lethal or protracted military 
resistance demonstrated by the Seminoles and the Sioux, and this should hardly be taken as a 
sign that those tribes were any less committed to their homelands, or any less spiritual, or any 
less influenced by cultural norms of warfare. Ultimately, the key challenge for social scientists 
aiming to understand the American Indian Wars is to identify ways of systematically predicting 
variation across cases. Of course, predicting how long these conflicts might last and how much 
they might cost was also the principal challenge for Army commanders performing strategic 
assessment in the American Indian Wars – and the next section explains why this set of cases 
provides scholars with an unusual opportunity to evaluate the way that commanders dealt with 
this uncertainty. 
 
Section 4.2. Case Selection and Research Design 
There are two main methodological reasons why the American Indian Wars provide a useful 
base of evidence with which to evaluate the plausibility and usefulness of the theoretical 
framework developed in this dissertation. First, it should be a tough test of this dissertation’s 
theoretical framework to explain U.S. military behavior in these conflicts with concepts that 
characterize the decisions of unitary, rational actors. This is especially true since the experience 
                                                                                                                                                             
how Kintpuash understood that he did not have the ability to restrain Scarfaced Charley, that 
Charley’s faction would eventually retaliate against the settlers in force, and that war was thus 
essentially inevitable. As a result, Kintpuash reluctantly agreed that it was best to initiate combat 
on Modoc terms, laying a trap to kill Major General Edward Canby under the pretence of peace 
talks. Canby was the highest ranking U.S. military officer to be killed in the American Indian 
Wars. 
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is typically seen as being relatively easy for alternative, nonrational theories to explain. George 
Custer, for instance, had a legendary flair for risk-taking, which many scholars have attributed to 
hubris, insubordination, or desire for public acclaim and political advancement.27 Winfield Scott 
was a prominent proponent of Napoleonic warfare, which historians have argued may have 
shaped his insistence on employing columns and detachments in the Second Seminole War.28 
Developing a plausible explanation for how U.S. Army commanders in these conflicts may have 
had a much more rational basis for their actions and expectations than is commonly believed thus 
runs against the weight of conventional wisdom.  
By a similar logic, we should also expect the written record of commanders’ expectations to 
be biased in favor of optimism. The quotes from the Sioux and Seminole Wars mentioned above 
largely came from commanders who were writing for public audiences, to whom they would 
have an incentive to boast of their own capabilities; or writing to subordinates, for whom they 
would have found it important to express optimism in order to maintain morale; or writing to 
superiors for whom they have been inclined to exaggerate their own abilities. These are yet 
additional reasons why it would be a tough test for the theoretical framework developed in this 
dissertation to explain that these statements are plausibly consistent with rational beliefs. 
The second methodological justification for focusing on the American Indian Wars is that 
these conflicts offer a relatively large cross-section of experience with a relatively high degree of 
unit homogeneity. In total, U.S. and British forces fought against 114 different Native American 
                                                 
27
 See Hutton 2004 for assorted views on Custer. 
28
 In fact, Scott had recently translated a French manual into English so that it could be taught at 
West Point. See Scott 1864: 258 and Wooster 1988: 10. Knetsch 2011: 129, 132 describes U.S. 
strategy in the Second Seminole War against the backdrop of Scott’s commitment to Napoleonic, 
Jominian principles. 
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tribes. Despite some important variations in firearms and whether they fought on horseback, 
most tribes waged war in relatively similar ways.29 These tribes fought against either of two 
opponents (the United States or the British). In almost all cases, the stakes were the same, with 
the U.S. and British attempting to stop the tribes from raiding and to eject them from contested 
territory. In every instance, the U.S. and British ultimately succeeded in achieving those 
objectives – by the end of the nineteenth century, even the most militant tribes had been coerced 
into reservation life.30  
Of course, this is not to imply that all of the tribes and all of the conflicts in this sample were 
literally identical. The point is that, relatively speaking, these units of analysis are more 
comparable than those in most existing data sets on interstate wars, civil wars, insurgencies, or 
other kinds of political violence. The most widely-used data set on interstate conflicts31 involves 
multi-party wars of the most destructive magnitude (e.g., World War II) along with much more 
limited conflicts in vastly different contexts (e.g., the Ecuadorian-Colombian War of 1863). The 
most widely-used data set on insurgencies32 involves one case (the Chinese Civil War) in which 
million-man armies employed advanced weaponry throughout a huge East Asian country, along 
                                                 
29
 For more on the tribes’ fighting methods and the influences upon them, see Grinnell 1910, 
Smith 1938, Mishkin 1940, Newcomb 1950, Secoy 1953, Ewers 1975, and McGinnis 2010, 
2012. 
30
 This lack of variation in strategic outcomes is extremely important for facilitating analysis of 
the data. If the U.S. Army had won some conflicts and lost others, for instance, then we would 
need to stratify the sample in order to interpret variables like the campaign’s duration or loss 
rates: being able to hold out for a longer period of time in a losing campaign is generally an 
indication of capability and resolve, but by contrast, when a combatant wins a war, then shorter 
and less costly wars are more indicative of their military potential. 
31
 The Correlates of War Project: Sarkees and Wayman 2012. 
32
 Lyall and Wilson 2009 (see the discussion in Chapter 3). 
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with another case (the Costa Rican Revolution of 1948) in which a few thousand rebels toppled a 
Latin American regime in less than two months. In relation to these bodies of evidence, the 
American Indian Wars offer a much more comparable cross-section of cases, which facilitates 
identifying meaningful empirical patterns.33 
To be specific, this analysis draws on original data that aim to capture a reasonably 
comprehensive sample of armed encounters between the United States (or, prior to 
independence, the British) and each tribe, including anything from scattered raids to major 
battles. In all, there are roughly 3,000 engagements in the data set, based on roughly 5,000 event 
reports. Across these engagements, the United States inflicted more than 33,000 recorded 
casualties on 114 different tribes. The appendix to this chapter provides more detail on how these 
data were gathered and collected, and Figure 4.2 contains summary information.34 
These data provide an opportunity to take military commanders and their statements about 
how long it might take or how much it might cost in order to defeat their opponents – such as 
those laid out in the historical overview above – and then compare these expectations to a 
relatively large body of objective, empirical evidence. Rarely do data on armed conflict make it 
possible to evaluate beliefs about military strategy in this manner. To give a contrasting example, 
                                                 
33
 See Friedman 2013a for a  discussion of how the American Indian Wars offer additional 
methodological advantages to scholars conducting empirical research on the dynamics of armed 
conflict. 
34
 See the Appendix and Friedman 2013b for more information on the data and a discussion of 
their comprehensiveness. The latter work estimates that these data capture roughly half of the 
total casualties inflicted on Native American forces during the American Indian Wars, along with 
perhaps ninety percent of casualties inflicted on U.S. forces.  
  For standards of comparison, these tribes had a combined total of roughly 400,000 people based 
on population estimates corresponding to the time when each tribe entered armed contact with 
the U.S./British; most treatments assume that roughly one-quarter to one-fifth of a tribe would 
have consisted of military-aged males. 
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DATA ON THE AMERICAN INDIAN WARS 
Temporal coverage: 1607-1890 (founding of Jamestown to Battle of Wounded Knee) 
Unit of analysis: violent engagements between U.S. and Native American forces 
Sources: Axelrod, Chronicle of the Indian Wars (1993), Michno, Encyclopedia of Indian 
Wars (2003), Michno and Michno, Forgotten Fights (2008), Nunnally, American Indian 
Wars (2007), Ratjar, Indian War Sites (1999), Webb, Chronological List of 
Engagements (1939), U.S. Army Adjutant General, Chronological List of Actions, &c., 
with Indians (1890s), U.S. Army War College, Compilation of Indian Engagements 
(1925). 
Independent events recorded in the data: 2,958 
Total recorded Native American casualties: 33,207 
Total recorded U.S. casualties: 18,044 
Tribes enumerated in the data set: 114 
See the chapter’s appendix for more details. 
 
TIME SERIES OF RECORDED CASUALTIES 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Overview of the Data 
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recent literature about “what works” in counterinsurgency and what that means for informing 
U.S. military strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan almost always runs up against contentious 
arguments about the relevant case universe for comparison.35 Similarly, scholarly work on 
intelligence analysis generally assumes that it is impossible to test the accuracy of political 
predictions because they often deal with phenomena that are sufficiently unique that it is 
impossible, even ex post, to critique probabilistic assessments objectively.36 Within the field of 
strategic studies, the American Indian Wars provide rare leverage for addressing this inferential 
problem, and the following section demonstrates how this provides a new (and potentially 
surprising) perspective on U.S. military behavior. 
 
Section 4.3. Forming and revising expectations in the American Indian Wars 
For instance, there is little doubt ex post that Custer, Crook, Sheridan and other U.S. 
commanders underestimated Sitting Bull’s forces in 1876. Ex ante, however, their belief that 
most tribes would not fight protracted wars was supported by historical experience. Figure 4.3 
shows this by presenting the 114 tribes in order from fewest to most recorded casualties 
                                                 
35
 For example, many analysts strongly disagree about which cases are relevant for thinking 
about counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan. Krepinevich 2005 and Laird 2005 drew 
insights from the insurgency in Vietnam, while Biddle 2006 argued that Vietnam’s “Maoist 
Peoples’ War” dynamic was inapplicable to Iraq, and he structured his own recommendations for 
U.S. policy around cases of “communal civil war” such as the ethnic cleansing campaigns in the 
Balkans. Sepp 2005 provides a list of 48 “relevant” cases for establishing best practices in 
counterinsurgency, all of which come from the 20th century. Luttwak 2007 and Peters 2007 base 
their own analyses of counterinsurgency in part on the experience of the Romans under Caesar.  
36
 Rieber 2004 surveys the relevant literature (see also Gentry 2010). Tetlock 2005 provides a 
broader study of calibration and discrimination in political and economic analysis. See Betts 
2000 on the difficulty of separating ex ante and ex post analysis in strategic studies. 
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sustained.37 These data place the Great Sioux War into a useful perspective. The right side of 
Figure 4.3 indicates that a few tribes (such as the Sioux, Seminoles, and Creeks) were indeed 
able to continue fighting despite sustaining relatively large numbers of casualties. But Figure 4.3 
also demonstrates how these tribes are outliers. Sixty-nine tribes (61 percent) sustained fewer 
than 100 recorded combat casualties. The median tribe in these data lost only 54 members in 
battle. Thus when U.S. Army commanders such as Custer and Sheridan asserted that the tribes 
could not withstand large amounts of coercive punishment, they were, in expectation, correct.38 
The data offer further insight into the context of the Great Sioux War. For example, George 
Custer is often criticized for dividing his forces in assaulting Sitting Bull’s camp, leaving his 
regiment unnecessarily vulnerable. But it was extremely rare for this sort of vulnerability to be 
exploited in the manner of Little Bighorn. Of the 2,958 engagements in the data set, only thirteen 
caused more U.S. or British battle deaths than Custer’s Last Stand. Only four of these 
engagements involved tribes who did not fight alongside European regulars; of this subset, only 
one had occurred in the nineteenth century, and the majority of casualties there were civilians.39   
 
                                                 
37
 In order to interpret these figures, note that the mean population of each tribe in the data set is 
roughly 3,000, with a standard deviation of 4,000. Rescaling this figure with per capita casualties 
on the y-axis produces results that are substantively similar, but much less precise due to the 
difficulty of estimating tribal populations. Moreover, aggregate counts are more conceptually 
appropriate here. When commanders stated their expectations that these conflicts would be 
relatively brief and cheap, this is inherently a statement about the aggregate costs of fighting. 
38
 Friedman 2013a enumerates an additional 53 tribes who are not recorded as having engaged in 
any organized fighting with U.S. or British forces. It is unclear how many of those tribes belong 
within the scope of the analysis here, but surely some of them were relocated through the use of 
military coercion, even if this did not ultimately result in the use of violence. 
39
 This was the 1813 Fort Mims Massacre during the Creek War (Nunnally 2007: 66). 
Chapter 4: Empirical Application 
130 
 
 
 
0-10 casualties: Achumawi, Cahuilla, Catawba, Cayuga, Chetco, Chickasaw, Chinook, Choctaw, Haida, 
Havasupai, Kansa, Kichai, Koasati, Luiseno, Menominee, Miami, Nanticoke, Niantic, Nipissing, Pamunkey, 
Ponca, Puyallup, Squaxon, Taos, Tonkawa, Tututni, Weanock, Winnebago, Yuchi, Yuki. 
11-50 casualties: Arikara, Atsina, Cayuse, Chippewa, Coeur d’Alene, Crow, Hupa, Kalispel, Kitanemuk, 
Klamath, Mingo, Mohawk, Nipmuc, Osage, Pawnee, Potawatomi, Seneca, Spokane, Susquehannock, Tahltan, 
Tenino, Wallawalla, Wichita, Wintu, Wyandot, Yakima. 
51-100 casualties: Caddo, Coquille, Fox, Gosiute, Jicarilla Apache, Modoc, Nisqually, Nomlacki, Palouse, 
Quapaw, Shasta, Umatilla, Waco, Yokut. 
101-200 casualties: Abenaki, Arapaho, Karankawa, Lipan Apache, Nez Perce, Pocumtuck, Pomo, Sauk, Tolowa, 
Yamasee, Yankton Sioux. 
201-500 casualties: Blackfeet, Delaware, Kickapoo, Mescalero Apache, Mohave, Powhatan, Quechan, Shawnee, 
Takelma, Ute, Walapai, Wiyot, Yavapai. 
501-1000 casualties: Apalachee, Bannock, Cherokee, Kiowa, Navajo, Ottawa, Pequot, Seminole, Wampanoag, 
other Apache bands. 
1001-2000 casualties: Cheyenne, Chiricahua Apache, Narragansett, Paiute, Teton Sioux, Tuscarora, Western 
Apache. 
2001-3000 casualties: Comanche, Creek, Santee Sioux. 
 
Figure 4.3.  Recorded Casualties Sustained by 114 Tribes during the American Indian Wars 
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0-10 casualties: Achumawi, Chetco, Chickasaw, Chinook, Choctaw, Coeur d’Alene, Crow, Haida, Havasupai, 
Hupa, Kalispel, Kansa, Karankawa, Kichai, Klamath, Koasati, Luiseno, Nanticoke, Niantic, Nipissing, Nisqually, 
Nomlacki, Palouse, Pawnee, Pomo, Ponca, Puyallup, Quapaw, Spokane, Squaxon, Susquehannock, Tahltan, 
Tenino, Tolowa, Tonkawa, Tutuni, Umatilla, Walapai, Wallawalla, Wichita, Wintun, Wiyot, Yuchi, Yuki. 
11-50 casualties: Apalachee, Arikara, Atsina, Blackfeet, Caddo, Cahuilla, Catawba, Cayuse, Coquille, Fox, 
Gosiute, Lipan Apache, Menominee, Modoc, Mohave, Navajo, Osage, Pequot, Quechan, Shasta, Taos, Waco, 
Yakima, Yankton Sioux, Yavapai, Yokut. 
51-100 casualties: Arapaho, Cayuga, Jicarilla Apache, Mescalero Apache, Mingo, Pamunkey, Pocumtuck, Sauk, 
Wampanoag, Weanock, Western Apache, other Apache bands. 
101-200 casualties: Bannock, Chippewa, Kiowa, Miami, Narragansett, Nez Perce, Seneca, Takelma, Ute, 
Winnebago, Wyandot, Yamasee. 
201-500 casualties: Cheyenne, Chiricahua Apache, Comanche, Delaware, Kickapoo, Mohawk, Nipmuc, Paiute, 
Powhatan, Santee Sioux, Tuscarora. 
501-1000 casualties: Cherokee, Creek, Ottawa, Seminole, Teton Sioux. 
1001-2000 casualties: Abenaki, Potawatomi, Shawnee. 
 
Figure 4.4.  Recorded Casualties Inflicted by 114 Tribes during the American Indian Wars 
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Figure 4.5.  Recorded Casualties Inflicted by Tribes per Engagement 
 
Figure 4.5 orders the 2,958 engagements in the data set from fewest to most recorded casualties 
inflicted on U.S. or British forces. This makes clear how the vast majority of armed engagements 
with the tribes resulted in relatively few casualties for the United States or the British – Custer’s 
defeat at Little Bighorn is in the 99th percentile, and the median number of recorded U.S./British 
casualties per engagement is zero. 
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Custer, for his part, had participated in six previous engagements against the Sioux and 
Cheyennes. Across these engagements, Custer had lost a total of 27 men killed in action, an 
order of magnitude less than what his regiment lost in a single day at Little Bighorn. Custer’s 
previous experience included an attack on a Cheyenne village on the Washita in 1868, which 
many historians believe was the model for the assault at Little Bighorn. Custer had been 
criticized for taking too many risks in this attack, too, but it had still succeeded at a cost of only 
21 U.S. combat deaths. Custer’s regiment, the Seventh U.S. Cavalry, had participated in 41 
recorded engagements in the decade since it was formed. Most of these engagements involved 
Sioux or Cheyennes, and they had generated a total of just 43 U.S. combat deaths. So when 
Custer arrived at Little Bighorn, past experience overwhelmingly suggested that his opponents 
would not stand, fight, and exploit his vulnerabilities. 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates this pattern more broadly, showing how the distribution of casualties 
inflicted by Native American tribes is similar to the distribution of casualties inflicted on Native 
American tribes: it is skewed and it has a few prominent outliers, but most tribes caused 
relatively little damage to U.S. or British forces. The mean tribe in the data set inflicted 131 
recorded casualties on its opponents, and the median is just 23. Keep in mind, moreover, that 
these numbers describe the total casualties inflicted by each tribe across the entire data set, while 
Little Bighorn was a single battle. Thus if we instead examine the 3,000 individual engagements 
on file (as shown in Figure 4.5) then the average frontier fight led to six U.S/British casualties, 
with the median engagement generating no recorded casualties at all. These measures help to 
place in proper perspective how the fight at Little Bighorn was truly a radical outlier.  
In order to predict the extraordinary performance of Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse’s followers, 
U.S. commanders would thus have needed some way of predicting how extensively they differed 
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from the average tribe. (And even from the way that the Sioux and Cheyenne had themselves 
fought in the past.40) This would naturally have been quite difficult. At the time – and this was 
true in most of the American Indian Wars – U.S. Army commanders possessed little information 
on the specific tribes that they were fighting. In most cases, the central challenge was simply 
finding the tribe in question, to say nothing of assessing the complex military, social, and 
political dynamics underlying its resiliency and combat effectiveness. In 1876, these dynamics 
would have been especially difficult to pin down. The campaign took place at the same time that 
thousands of Sioux left their reservations for the annual hunting season. Determining just how 
many of these “Summer Roamers” intended to fight with Sitting Bull was severely challenging. 
Intelligence estimates of Sitting Bull’s force size varied widely, and according to one staff 
officer, they were “wildly conjectural.”41 
One way in which organizational factors could have hindered assessments of the Sioux and 
Cheyennes in 1876 was that commanders did not have the benefit of institutional wisdom in 
sizing up their adversaries. The U.S. Army did not release military doctrine for fighting the 
tribes, and West Point generally did not include the subject in its curriculum.42 At the same time, 
even if there were more institutional wisdom on frontier warfare, it is not clear what lessons it 
                                                 
40
 Prior to the Battle of Little Bighorn, the data record Teton Sioux and Cheyenne forces 
inflicting an average of 3.7 combat deaths over 309 total engagements. Other than Little Bighorn 
there were just two engagements where these tribes inflicted more than 25 battle casualties on 
the U.S./British: the 1854 Grattan Fight (29 casualties) and the 1866 Fetterman Fight (79 
casualties). 
41
 The quote is from Bourke 1891: 246. See Gray 1976 on the “Summer Roamers.” In Report of 
Lieut. Gen. P. H. Sheridan, Sheridan wrote that he initially believed his opponents comprised a 
small band of 30-40 lodges, with roughly 70 warriors under Sitting Bull and roughly 200 
warriors under Crazy Horse. 
42
 See Utley 1973: chapter 3, Wooster 1988: 39, 143, 211, and Birtle 1998: 10, 13, 61. 
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Table 4.1. Time, Population, and Region as Predictors of Tribes’ Casualty Sustainment 
          Hazard Ratio Std. Err. p 95% Conf. Int. 
Year of 1st Conflict 1.011 0.003 0.00 [1.00 1.02] 
 
Tribe’s Population 1.000† 0.000 0.07 [1.00 1.00] 
 
Region 
  California 0.832 0.332 0.65 [0.38 1.82] 
  Great Basin 0.367 0.177 0.04 [0.14 0.95] 
  Northeast 1.898 0.965 0.21 [0.70 5.14] 
  Northwest 0.692 0.343 0.46 [0.26 1.83] 
  Plains 0.728 0.277 0.40 [0.34 1.54] 
  Southeast 0.876 0.525 0.83 [0.27 2.84] 
  Southwest 0.362 0.135 0.01 [0.17 0.75] 
 
Dummy variable for Plateau region dropped 
† Coefficient and standard error bounds slightly below 1     N=114 
 
 
Table 4.2. Time, Population, and Region as Predictors of Tribes’ Casualty Infliction  
          Hazard Ratio Std. Err. p 95% Conf. Int. 
Year of 1st Conflict 1.002 0.003 0.46 [1.00 1.02] 
 
Tribe’s Population 1.000† 0.000 0.00 [1.00 1.00] 
 
Region 
  California 2.342 1.008 0.05 [1.01 5.44] 
  Great Basin 0.543 0.252 0.19 [0.22 1.35] 
  Northeast 0.207 0.108 0.00 [0.07 0.58] 
  Northwest 0.723 0.344 0.50 [0.28 1.84] 
  Plains 0.567 0.227 0.16 [0.26 1.24] 
  Southeast 0.265 0.162 0.03 [0.08 0.88] 
  Southwest 0.541 0.201 0.10 [0.26 1.12] 
 
Dummy variable for Plateau region dropped  
† Coefficient and standard error bounds slightly below 1     N=114 
 
 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 use Cox proportional hazard models to examine whether there are any 
consistent relationships between time, population, geography, and the tribes’ military behavior. 
If these relationships are estimated using ordinary least squares regression, then even fewer of 
them appear to be statistically significant. Ordinary least squares regression models are not 
appropriate for modeling cumulative dependent variables like casualty counts, but they 
demonstrate how the basic findings of Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are not simply being driven by model 
choice. Negative binomial regressions for predicting event counts also do not return 
substantively different results. 
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would have drawn, and how these would have helped to predict the behavior of the Sioux, the 
Cheyennes, or any other tribe ex ante. Tables 4.1 and 4.2, for instance, examine how the tribes’ 
sustainment and infliction of recorded casualties varied by time, region, and population.43 These 
tables show that tribes in the Great Basin and the Southwest sustained more casualties than the 
norm; tribes in the Northeast and Southeast inflicted more casualties than the norm while tribes 
in California dealt less damage to U.S. and British soldiers, on average and all else being equal. 
But no broad lessons present themselves here that might have indicated that the Sioux would 
have been especially problematic in 1876. Indian Wars were actually becoming less violent, on a 
per-tribe basis, over time. Larger tribes were able to sustain and inflict more casualties on 
balance, but only marginally so.44 Plains tribes were not consistently more violent than the norm, 
as shown by the wide confidence bands around the estimated hazard ratios for this variable.45 
                                                 
43
 Tables 4.1 and 4.2 represent the output of survival models, where the dependent variable is the 
number of casualties that each tribe was able to sustain or inflict in fighting the U.S. or British 
Armies. Survival models are appropriate tools for this analysis because casualty counts are 
cumulative, and because the quantity that these models are estimating is how far these counts 
could progress before the tribes were unable to resist any further. Thus the “duration” variable in 
the survival models captures the number of casualties inflicted on or by each tribe, and the 
moment of “failure” is when the war ends.  In cases where a tribe received or inflicted 0 
casualties, this value was replaced with a coding of 1 – otherwise, the statistical model cannot 
interpret the observation.   
44
 The hazard ratios on tribal population as a predictor of casualty sustainment and infliction are 
0.99995 and 0.99991, respectively. Cox proportional hazard models measure relative risk, and 
the standard deviation for the population of tribes in the data set is 4,175. A standard deviation 
increase in a tribe’s population would thus correspond to decreasing the hazard rate on casualty 
sustainment and infliction by roughly one-third, an effect size substantially smaller than the 
hazard ratios on a majority of the regional dummies in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
45
 One of Crook’s aides reports a moment where he at one point directly considered regional 
factors in forming his strategic assessments. Comparing the Sioux to the Apaches (a 
southwestern tribe Crook had recently fought against), Crook “expressed himself freely in regard 
to the coming campaign,” saying that “while the Sioux and Cheyenne were brave and bold 
people they would never stand punishment as the Apaches had done. The tribes of the plains had 
accumulated too much property in ponies and other things, and the loss of that would be felt 
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These data therefore suggest it may often have been perfectly reasonable for commanders like 
Custer or Scott to enter conflicts with the perception that it would not be particularly costly to 
achieve their objectives – though there were many instances in which those perceptions proved 
to be false, ex ante they were supported by substantial empirical evidence. And as the previous 
chapter demonstrated, if military decision makers enter conflicts with the belief that they can 
obtain their objectives at reasonable expense, we should not necessarily expect them to become 
more any pessimistic as those conflicts drag on.  
This is another claim that we can directly evaluate in the context of the American Indian 
Wars, because with the empirical distribution of tribal “types” in hand, we can plug this 
information back into the theoretical framework from Chapter 3 in order to examine the way that 
commanders updated their expectations about the resilience of the opponents they were facing. 
This is the purpose of Figure 4.6: the shaded area in the figure represents the epanechnikov 
kernel density for how many casualties a tribe could sustain. The lines in Figure 4.6 capture the 
way that Expected Total Cost and Expected Remaining Cost would have varied along this 
distribution. In other words, Figure 4.6 explains how, conditional on already inflicting some 
number of casualties on a tribe, decision makers might have updated their expectations about 
how much more coercive punishment that tribe might be able to sustain. 
Because Figure 4.6 is dealing with real data, the patterns here are neither smooth nor 
monotonic. Nevertheless, they provide a useful lens through which to view U.S. military 
behavior in the Second Seminole War. In particular, Figure 4.6 shows why it might not be so 
                                                                                                                                                             
most deeply” (Bourke 1891: 286). Table 4.1 shows that Crook’s reasoning here was correct in a 
general sense: Plains tribes were, on the whole, less casualty-resistant than tribes in the 
Southwest. 
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Figure 4.6.  Expected Total/Remaining Cost Progression during the American Indian Wars 
 
Figure 4.6 combines the empirical distribution of tribal “types” (shaded in gray, representing the 
proportion of tribes that conceded after sustaining a certain number of casualties) with the 
theoretical framework from the previous section. Based on this distribution, the figure shows how 
many casualties a randomly-chosen tribe could sustain, conditional on already conducting a 
certain amount of fighting. The main takeaway from Figure 4.6 is that, across most of the 
distribution, Expected Remaining Cost does not increase. This is in contrast to standard 
theoretical models, which predict that military decision makers should become more pessimistic 
about their future prospects as they fail to defeat their opponents. 
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surprising that these commanders did not become more pessimistic about their prospects as the 
war continued. In fact, across much of Figure 4.6, Expected Remaining Cost either declines or 
stays relatively constant.  
Of course, this is not a descriptive model of how any decision makers actually formed their 
views, and these data alone cannot say whether it was reasonable for commanders ever to think 
that one more large battle could have caused the Seminoles (or any other tribe) to concede.46 But 
at the very least they help to show that this expectation would not necessarily have become any 
more implausible as the war progressed, even though prominent theoretical frameworks and 
historical scholarship have argued the very opposite. This contrast demonstrates the way that the 
concepts in this paper diverge from the existing literature, and where they can potentially shed 
light on salient experience. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 Though it is important to point out that there were plenty of reasons to believe, ex ante, that 
Scott’s column-and-detachment strategy might work. For instance, while one of the war’s most 
prominent historians criticized the idea for being “somewhat European,” he also mentions that 
Andrew Jackson had used a similar strategy in the First Seminole War (1817-18), which was 
widely viewed as an overwhelming success (Sprague 1848: 145-146). Jackson had also been able 
to decimate the resistance of the Creeks – a neighboring tribe that was closely related to the 
Seminoles – in the 1814 Battle of Horseshoe Bend, a conventional fight which led to the death or 
capture of roughly one thousand Indians and brought the war to a rapid close (Nunnally 2007: 
68). In fact, the use of converging columns to strike enemy camps was one of the only tactics 
that commanders widely believed to be effective in fighting hostile tribes (Wooster 1988: 212). 
So while one of Scott’s biographers criticized the general for using “Napoleonic tactics,” he also 
concedes that the plan was “not without merit.” (Peskin 2003: 92.) Another Scott biographer 
writes that “from the strategic point of view [the plan] was a perfectly sound one” and that its 
failure was less a matter of the concept, and more due to a failure of its execution (Elliott 1937: 
299-300). 
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Section 4.4. Connections to broader scholarship 
A popular adage states that “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over 
again and expecting different results.” It is a catchy phrase that repeatedly recurs in debates 
about military strategy – but its logic is based on the dynamics of slot machines and has little to 
do with the actual analytic challenges that military decision makers face. For in many cases, it 
would also be inappropriate to abandon a course of action just because it does not succeed 
immediately. Rational behavior lies somewhere between the extremes, but it can be difficult to 
say exactly where. The theoretical discussion in Chapter 3 combined with the empirical 
discussion here have aimed to show that conventional judgments of strategic assessment may be 
in need of further analysis themselves.  
It is frustrating when military strategies do not succeed quickly, or when decision makers do 
not seem to be changing their policies or their expectations as a result. Military leaders who do 
not abandon unsuccessful strategies are often portrayed as being in a state of denial or under the 
influence of other nonrational factors. U.S. commanders during the American Indian Wars are 
generally thought to fit this mold. But this chapter showed why, in contrast, why might actually 
expect these decision makers to have remained optimistic about their chosen strategies, even as 
they did not succeed. There is no prima facie reason to presume that this behavior is irrational – 
that kind of presumption is common in historical analysis, political debate, and theoretical 
scholarship, but it is not necessarily sound. 
To be clear, this chapter did not provide a critical test of one theory versus another; its goal 
was to show how this dissertation’s theoretical framework for connecting cumulative dynamics 
to strategic assessment plausibly explained military behavior in the “least-likely” context of the 
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American Indian Wars, rather than to assign causal weight to those dynamics in relation to other 
factors like organizational behavior, domestic politics, or psychology. A chapter that intended to 
distinguish the explanatory power of rival theories would look very different than this one: it 
would need to focus the majority of its attention on deductively identifying observable factors 
that would help to discriminate among these mechanisms in specific cases, and then conduct an 
empirical search for which of those factors indeed exist. Yet to the extent that it is difficult to 
distinguish just how much explanatory power to assign to the genuine analytic challenges of 
assessing cumulative dynamics in relation to nonrational factors, this is precisely why we should 
not assume that those nonrational hold pride of place in explaining why decision makers often 
fail to realize and correct their strategic mistakes.  
Perhaps the most fundamental implication of this exercise is that it therefore shows how the 
theoretical framework in this dissertation provides an opportunity to re-evaluate whether some 
forms of behavior are truly as irrational or as puzzling as they appear. U.S. Army commanders 
during the American Indian Wars such as George Custer and Winfield Scott are good examples, 
as they are widely believed to have acted in a manner largely influenced by organizational 
inertia, cultural prejudice, or personal hubris. Yet this chapter provided both theoretical and 
empirical reasons to question those judgments, suggesting that many strategic decisions we 
consider faulty ex post may have been reasonably justified ex ante. George Custer could 
doubtlessly have been more careful in planning his attack on Little Bighorn, but it would have 
strained credulity had he presented a judgment to General Sheridan that he expected the Sioux 
and Cheyennes to kill more than two hundred and fifty of his cavalrymen in a single afternoon. 
Similarly, it would have seemed ludicrous if General Scott had predicted at the outset of the 
Second Seminole War that his opponents would continue to fight after nine-tenths of their tribe 
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had been killed or captured. Because these cases were so extreme, they would have been 
inherently difficult to understand and predict. And as we have seen throughout this dissertation, 
the cumulative dynamics of warfare can make it difficult for decision makers to adapt their prior 
assumptions in a way that allows them to realize the extent of these initial misperceptions, no 
matter how rational they may be. 
With that said, it is important to point out that cumulative dynamics are properly viewed as a 
complement – and not a substitute – for alternative explanations. Commanders like Custer and 
Scott were human and fallible, and they operated under the direction of a War Department and a 
Congress whose decisions were surely influenced by nonmilitary considerations. These factors 
undoubtedly played important roles in structuring U.S. policy during the American Indian Wars, 
just as they undoubtedly affected U.S. decision making in Iraq, Vietnam, and other conflicts. 
And it actually becomes more likely that these factors could have played decisive roles in these 
cases if it turns out that this apparently puzzling behavior is much closer to rationality than what 
is commonly believed. Just as “trembles” are more important in game theory when it is easier to 
divert players onto a nonequilibrium path, strategic assessment and military decision making 
should become more sensitive to nonrational factors when the analytic problems they engage are 
genuinely hard.47 And ultimately, it is not possible to evaluate whether or not some leader, 
organization or state is acting rationally without having a sense of what rational behavior would 
                                                 
47
 For a similar line of reasoning, see Fearon 1995: 409: “a better understanding of what the 
assumption of rationality really implies… may actually raise our estimate of the importance of 
particular irrational and second-image factors.” 
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actually entail – from a theoretical standpoint, the fundamental purpose of this dissertation is to 
help rethink and re-establish that baseline.48  
 
The misleading nature of conditional perceptions 
From an empirical standpoint, another broad implication of this chapter is the importance of 
assessing decision making in light of the full array of relevant past experience. The data used in 
this chapter were informative largely because they contained information on all of the American 
Indian Wars, regardless of their intensity.  
Most data sets on inter- and intra-state conflict, however, are left-censored, as many of them 
examine only cases which meet a threshold of causing 1,000 battle deaths. This can give the 
impression that certain kinds of armed conflicts tend to be more violent than they really are. 
Figure 4.7 helps to demonstrate this point by presenting information on battle deaths in intra-
state conflicts published by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo.49 These data are revealing 
because their threshold for inclusion is only 25 battle deaths. As Figure 4.7 shows, more than 
half of the conflicts recorded in these data (122 or 51 percent) caused fewer than 1,000 total 
battle deaths. The median conflict is thus censored out of data sets that impose a 1,000 battle-
death threshold for inclusion. By relaxing this threshold from 1,000 to 25, the median number of 
casualties inflicted in internal wars between 1946-2008 drops by nearly an order of magnitude, 
from roughly 9,000 to 1,000; the mean drops by half, from roughly 37,000 to 19,000. 
                                                 
48
 See Glaser 2010: 2-3: “theories of suboptimal behavior, whether built on arguments about 
domestic politics or errors in individual decision making, rely at least implicitly on a rational 
theory.”   
49
 Lacina and Gleditsch 2008. 
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Broader perceptions of armed conflict may often be biased in much the same way. Take 
another look, for instance, at the tribes listed in Figure 4.3. Readers will presumably be familiar 
with almost all of the groups who fought protracted wars (such as the Creeks, Seminoles, and 
Sioux) but almost none of the tribes (such as the Atsinas, Nisquallys, and Umatillas) that did not. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. What Conventional Casualty Thresholds Exclude 
 
Figure 4.7 presents the kernel density for total casualties across 240 intrastate conflicts from 
1946-2008 (data from Lacina and Gleditsch 2005). The figure shows how conventional data 
sets that exclude conflicts causing fewer than 1,000 casualties censor out a substantial portion 
(and in fact the slight majority) of recorded experience, leading to misleading inferences about 
how long these wars typically take and how much they typically cost. 
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Yet these less violent tribes were far more common. They constituted the bulk of the opponents 
that a U.S. commander in the frontier army would have faced, and this kind of context is 
important for evaluating these commanders’ prior assumptions. Yet historical memory tends to 
be censored just like scholars’ data sets, focusing on the cases that are salient but not necessarily 
representative.50  
Just as understanding the full distribution of American Indian Wars was important for 
understanding why U.S. Army commanders found it difficult to foresee and adapt to extreme 
cases like the Great Sioux and Second Seminole Wars, understanding the full distribution of 
armed conflicts is important for framing judgment of military decision making elsewhere. The 
Vietnam War was such a formative experience in U.S. military history, for instance, that it is 
easy to forget just how unusual the case was. Communist forces in Vietnam sustained roughly 
one million casualties in fighting the French and the United States, giving them perhaps the 
highest threshold for casualty tolerance (at least in absolute terms) for any insurgent movement 
in the last century.51 Similarly, a vast amount of research in international relations focuses on 
decisions and military planning leading up to the World Wars. Because these experiences are so 
important in their own right, they deserve extensive study. But in conducting those studies, it is 
important to keep in mind that they are outside the norm and thus in many ways at odds with 
                                                 
50
 For comparison: the Correlates of War data on intra- or extra-state conflict do not includes any 
tribes besides the Sioux; Lyall and Wilson’s data on insurgencies contains observations of eight 
Native American tribes; the data used in this chapter indicate that at least 114 different tribes 
fought against U.S. or British forces. 
51
 Some data sets estimate that Afghan forces sustained more losses in fighting the Soviet 
occupation and that Yusoglavs sustained more losses in resisting the Nazis, but in both instances, 
it is difficult to separate military and civilian casualties. 
Chapter 4: Empirical Application 
146 
 
reasonable expectations.52 Rather than asking why decision makers did not understand the nature 
of these challenges, a more relevant question may be to ask how they could have understood 
them.53 This chapter explains why that can be genuinely difficult. 
 
Switching strategies 
How then can decision makers deal with these difficulties? What then might drive decision 
makers to change their strategies when they do not seem to be succeeding? This will be the 
subject of the following chapter, and as a way of foreshadowing this discussion, it is useful to 
return briefly to the experiences of the Great Sioux and Second Seminole Wars. 
After the U.S. military disaster at Little Bighorn, Army strategy changed course in short order. 
In a political climate that now favored making almost any expenditure to defeat Sitting Bull and 
stave off further embarrassment, Congress and the War Department quickly appropriated 
additional money and forces to the campaign. With these resources, General Sheridan 
constructed two new posts that allowed his units to exert territorial control over the Yellowstone 
area rather than sending detachments on prolonged excursions to find opposing forces and fight 
                                                 
52
 See Boot 2013 for a recent argument about how defense analysts may seriously overrate the 
military potential of insurgencies by focusing their attention on outlying cases. 
53
 Thomas Schelling made a similar argument in a roundtable on the lessons of Vietnam, writing: 
“I am still impressed by the enormous quantity of money, people, and technology that was 
poured into Vietnam, and by the fact that it did not do the job. If in 1964 one had added up what 
the United States was going to commit – everything from B-52s to the latest in fighter aircraft 
and ultimately ‘smart bombs’ and electronic fences – anybody would have said, ‘you don't need 
sixty-four times as much as you think it will take.’ We committed enough to sink the country, 
and I think America slowly realized that it would always take more. One would have to go back 
and imagine 1964, when McNamara had his little pictures of barbed wire fences around those 
‘pacified strategic hamlets,’ to realize how astounding it is in retrospect that all that material and 
all those people and all that money could not do the job” (Hoffmann et al. 1981: 9). John Mueller 
(1980) extends a similar argument in more detail. 
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them far from bases of support. In addition, the U.S. Army was given authority to administer the 
nearby Indian agencies, where it could control the Sioux’s food supply and monitor population 
movements more effectively. As Sheridan reflected later, “It seems to have required some 
disaster like that which happened to Custer” before the U.S. Army could switch to a different 
strategy.54 The Sioux and Cheyennes surrendered the following summer. 
By contrast, the Second Seminole War never precipitated the kind of sharp, political crisis that 
could make the costs of occupying the Everglades seem worthwhile. Quite the opposite, one of 
the government’s foremost priorities at the time was keeping the federal budget low.55 In 1835, 
there were just seven thousand soldiers in the entire U.S. Army, spread across 53 posts 
nationwide.56 This force was far too small to occupy Seminole territory, especially since much of 
this territory consisted of swampland that impeded movement and logistics. Congress did 
approve three marginal expansions of the Army during the Second Seminole War, but in each 
instance, the main effect was less to increase the number of soldiers in Florida than to replace 
militia with regular troops. Total manpower (regular and militia) was at 5,901 in 1836; it peaked 
at 8,411 in 1837, and then hovered between four and six thousand for the remainder of the war.57 
The cost of switching to a more manpower-intensive strategy was far beyond what Congress was 
willing to pay at the time – and as we saw earlier, military commanders and political leaders 
                                                 
54
 Division of the Missouri, Office of the Chief Engineer, Annual Report of the Chief of 
Engineers for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1876. 
55
 See Mahon 1967: 114 on this context for the Second Seminole War in particular, along with 
Utley 1967: 17, 71, Wooster 1988: 30, and Fehrenbach 1974: 379 on Congress’s general 
reluctance to appropriate funds for the American Indian Wars. 
56
 Mahon 1967: 116. 
57
 Sprague 1848: 103. 
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continually maintained that they were on the verge of defeating the Seminole resistance anyhow 
– so the war continued to drag on with U.S. military strategy in stasis. 
Unlike Custer’s defeat at Little Bighorn in the Great Sioux War, the Second Seminole War 
thus offered no significant pivot point that caused decision makers to rethink the basic nature of 
the war they were fighting and whether their methods for doing so were appropriate. In the next 
chapter, we will see that similar issues play a prominent role in understanding U.S. policy during 
the occupation of Iraq, another context in which a war dragged on far longer than many people 
originally anticipated without seeming to cause any significant change in the way decision 
makers viewed the problem or how they sought to fix it. 
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Appendix. Data on the American Indian Wars 
 
The data used in this chapter come from an event-level compilation of military engagements 
between Native Americans and U.S. or British forces that took place between the founding of 
Jamestown on May 14, 1607 and the Battle of Wounded Knee on December 29, 1890. These 
data track several variables listed below, along with the number of recorded casualties – defined 
as the number of people killed, captured, or mortally wounded – that occurred as a direct result 
of these engagements. The data include engagements within the continental United States or 
those that involved pursuits into neighboring territory (such as expeditions into Mexico to 
capture Geronimo). The analysis includes armed engagements of any intensity, ranging from 
small-scale raids to large battles. The data include engagements fought by regular and militia 
forces, and they include noncombatant casualties. 
In some cases, it is ambiguous whether a particular engagement should be seen as occurring 
“between U.S. and Native American forces” (thus warranting inclusion within these data) as 
opposed to isolated interpersonal or intercommunal violence that was essentially nonpolitical in 
nature. Scholars disagree as to what constitutes “political violence” in general, and similar 
conceptual ambiguity applies to many aspects of fighting on the U.S. frontier. This study adopts 
an inductive approach to dealing with this issue by including information from a broad range of 
sources, and thus letting the sources “say” which engagements belong in the data. To the extent 
that there is disagreement here, the present study thus errs on the side of inclusiveness, while 
following the lead of the literature on which it aims to build. 
The sources for this data collection effort comprise several anthologies that record violent 
engagements during the American Indian Wars. One of the most comprehensive is George W. 
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Webb’s Chronological List of Engagements between the Regular Army of the United States and 
Various Tribes of Hostile Indians (1939) which lists 1,177 engagements between the United 
States Army and Native American tribes from 1790 to 1890. Webb’s book is itself a compilation 
of two official records: the U.S. Army Adjutant General’s Chronological List of Actions, &c., 
with Indians (printed in the early 1890s) and the U.S. Army War College Historical Section’s 
Compilation of Indian Engagements (1925). These records are certainly incomplete and 
inaccurate in some respects, but they are generally well-regarded.58 
Several additional sources help to flesh out the data used in this analysis. Among these, 
perhaps the best-known is Gregory Michno’s Encyclopedia of Indian Wars (2003), which 
describes 787 engagements occurring after 1850; Gregory and Susan Michno’s follow-on work, 
Forgotten Fights (2008) adds another 334 engagements to this list dating to 1823. Alan 
Axelrod’s Chronicle of the Indian Wars (1993) surveys 222 engagements after 1607. Though 
Axelrod’s work contains the smallest collection of engagements used for constructing data here, 
it is still regarded as being relatively comprehensive, and it was the source which Spirling (2011) 
used to define the case universe of armed conflict between the United States and the Native 
Americans in a previous study published in the American Journal of Political Science. Steve 
Ratjar’s Indian War Sites (1999) and Michael Nunnally’s American Indian Wars (2007) also 
provide information spanning the full period of observation, covering 773 and 1,278 
engagements, respectively. Each of these anthologies includes transparent sourcing; consistent 
                                                 
58
 See Peters 1966. In a related discussion, Michno 2003: 353 discusses the potential accuracy of 
government event reports. He writes: “[T]here is reason to be confident that the army estimates 
were reasonably accurate…. [T]he army lived by a strict code of honor, particularly in its official 
reports, and even if the unit leader tried to inflate numbers, he would face correction and perhaps 
ostracism by other soldier-witnesses.” The appendix in Delay 2008 offers a similar discussion in 
describing the potential accuracy of his event-level data set covering engagements between 
Native Americans and Mexicans. 
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information on the date, location, casualties, and tribe(s) involved in each engagement; and broad 
temporal and geographic coverage. Together, they comprise material from more than one 
thousand unique references. Based on these sources, the data set contains information on the 
following variables: 
Engagement: Identified by date (month/day/year), location (e.g., “Little Bighorn, MT”) and, 
where applicable, name (e.g., “Custer’s Last Stand”). 
U.S./British commander: The leader of U.S./British forces in the engagement, available for 
1,918 observations (65%).    
Tribe commander: The leader of Native American forces in the engagement, available for 561 
observations (19%). This information is primarily useful for determining what tribe fought in the 
engagement if that information is not explicitly provided. For instance, Native Americans 
fighting under Geronimo are presumably Chiricahua Apaches.     
Tribe(s): The name(s) of the tribe(s) involved in the fighting, available for 2,630 observations 
(89%). 3,725 casualties accrued to tribes that were not identified by the sources. In these 
instances, the relevant tribe was interpolated based on (1) whether an engagement had been 
fought in the same location with a known tribe in the last three years; (2) if the U.S./British 
commander involved in the engagement had been fighting a particular tribe in that state during 
this period; (3) if the location of the engagement could be identified on a map, whether that 
location was clearly within the homeland of a tribe as recorded in Gerlach (1970) or Waldeman 
(1985). Observations with interpolated tribes are explicitly marked in the data set, comprising 
2,133 casualties. After interpolation, only 1,592 casualties (less than 5%) were inflicted on 
unidentified tribes. 
Chapter 4: Empirical Application 
152 
 
Tribe population: Estimates of each tribe’s population, primarily from Sturtevant (1978-), and 
supplemented with information from Malinowski et al. (1998) and Swanton (1952). Population 
estimates were coded as close as possible to the year of the first recorded military engagement 
with the U.S./British. 
U.S./British casualties: The number of U.S./British soldiers or civilians killed, captured, or 
mortally wounded in each engagement. In 55 cases, U.S./British casualties were listed as being 
“several,” or “a few,” or “a number” – in each instance, this number is approximated with a 
coding of 5 (comprising less than 1% of total recorded U.S./British casualties). If members of an 
allied tribe were killed, captured, or mortally wounded while assisting U.S./British forces during 
an engagement, they count as U.S./British casualties.   
Tribe casualties: The number of Native American warriors or civilians killed, captured, or 
mortally wounded in each engagement. There were 97 observations where phrases such as 
“several” or “a few” were interpolated as 5 (comprising roughly 1.5% of total recorded Native 
American casualties). In cases where multiple tribes were involved in an engagement (12% of 
observations), casualty infliction and sustainment were coded as being divided among the tribes 
evenly. In some cases Army records attempt to distinguish casualties inflicted on each group, but 
this was rare and presumably imprecise. Moreover, assigning recorded casualties in this way 
works against the empirical claim that this variable was distributed in a highly uneven manner.  
 
Tribal classifications 
The event reports contain information on engagements involving Native American groups 
with 175 different names. This does not mean that the data span 175 separate tribes. Some tribes 
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had multiple names (e.g,. Chippewas/Ojibways, Atsinas/Gros Ventres); some reports refer to 
specific bands within a larger tribe (e.g., Sakonnets are a subunit of Wampanoags and 
Chickamaugas are a subset of Cherokees); and some reports refer to warriors by the name of a 
town or landmark where they lived (e.g., “Hillabee” and “Tehama” warriors presumably refer to 
Creek and Nomlacki towns, respectively). After relabeling and merging groups where 
appropriate, the data contain information on 114 groups, each of which was positively identified 
as being a separate tribe.59 
These coding decisions were based primarily on consulting the Smithsonian Institution’s 20-
volume Handbook of North American Indians (Sturtevant 1978-), which contains well-regarded 
discussions of more than two hundred tribes, while paying close attention to enumerating the 
subgroups and synonymies that are important for accurate classification. Two other useful 
sources were Wissler (1966), which is one of the most prominent anthropological texts on the 
Native Americans, and Swanton (1952), a work specifically devoted to enumerating tribal 
distinctions. In cases where proper classification was unclear, the decision rule was to combine 
groups that were relatively nonviolent and to disaggregate groups that were relatively violent.60 
This decision rule pushes against the central empirical claim of this paper that violence in the 
American Indian Wars was skewed. 
 
                                                 
59
 See Friedman 2013a for a more complete enumeration of American Indian tribes which 
includes another 53 groups that did not engage in recorded fighting with U.S. or British forces. 
60
 For example, Apaches and Sioux are disaggregated into their main components (Chiricahuas, 
Jicarillas, Lipans, Mescaleros, Western Apaches; Tetons, Yanktons, Santees), while some 
“tribelets” in California and the Pacific Northwest were considered as components of their 
broader linguistic families (e.g., Shastas, Yokuts).  
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Comprehensiveness 
In total, the data comprise 2,958 military engagements, recording 33,207 Native American 
casualties and 18,044 U.S./British casualties. Of course, these totals are not comprehensive, and 
interpreting these data requires having some sense of how they compare to the actual totals. For 
this purpose, one would ideally be able to compare the figures in this paper to some other, 
credible estimates of how many people were killed during the American Indian Wars. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear that there are any credible estimates of this figure (perhaps because 
no other source has attempted to compile these data in such a comprehensive fashion). There are, 
however, several ways in which to view the data presented here. 
For example, we can compare the data on violent deaths in the American Indian Wars to the 
tribes’ populations. If we combine population estimates for the 114 tribes in the data set then the 
tribes comprise a total of roughly 400,000 people overall. Most treatments assume that roughly 
one-fifth to one-quarter of a tribe would have been military-age males. A total of 33,207 
casualties sustained across these tribes would thus amount to roughly thirty to forty percent of 
their military-aged male population at any given time. This proportion does not appear to be 
implausibly low, although interpreting these estimates still requires making assumptions about 
what the true proportion “should” look like. 
An alternative way to assess these data is to draw on previous studies showing that data on the 
severity of violent events often resembles a specific kind of distribution defined by the “power 
law.”61 Roughly speaking, if data are distributed according to a power law, this means that when 
                                                 
61
 See, for instance, Richardson 1948, Cederman 2003, Bohorquez et al. 2006, Clauset et al. 
2007. 
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they are represented on a “log-log” plot (in which the logarithm of the event’s severity is given 
on the x-axis and the logarithm of the probability of an event being at least that severe is given 
on the y-axis), then data will form a straight line. Figure 4.8 shows how this is also true with data 
on the American Indian Wars when viewed at the level of the individual engagement. This 
provides additional support for thinking that the data are reasonably comprehensive, as their 
distribution largely conforms to theoretical expectations.62 
                                                 
62
 Friedman 2013b provides more detail on how power law relationships can be used to evaluate 
the comprehensiveness of event-level data on armed conflict. The main argument is that, since 
data on armed conflict are generally distributed according to power laws, it is possible to use the 
distribution of event-level data in order to draw inferences about the comprehensiveness of 
event-level data. Since larger-magnitude events are presumably well-recorded, it is possible to 
use the events we do see on the right side of the distribution in order to extrapolate the number of 
smaller-scale events we do not see on the left side of the distribution. The results of this analysis 
suggest that the data used in this chapter capture roughly half of total casualties sustained by 
tribal forces during the American Indian Wars, and perhaps ninety percent of casualties sustained 
by U.S. forces. 
 
 
Figure 4.8.  Log-Log Plots of the Data, Engagement Level 
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Chapter Five: Practical Implications 
THE REFERENCE CLASS PROBLEM AND THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ 
 
 
 
After deposing Saddam Hussein during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, U.S. forces settled in for what 
many officials found to be a surprisingly long haul. Violence and political turmoil ensued 
quickly and grew for four years. Nevertheless, throughout much of this period the Bush 
administration and top military officers largely stuck to their initial strategy and maintained that 
the war was going well. 
To much of the public, the administration’s seeming inability to realize and correct its 
strategic mistakes indicated that it was in a “state of denial”1 or that it was playing politics with 
the war. Critics have said that officials were determined “to win the political game at virtually 
any cost”;2 that “stubborn and misguided”3 commanders had their minds fogged by a “cloud of 
cognitive dissonance;”4 that decision makers “latched onto every positive event as a sign that 
better times were ahead,”5 and that they demonstrated a “determined refusal or inability to 
consider certain elements of the problem.”6 Few cases in recent memory have led more people to 
                                                 
1
 Woodward 2006. 
2
 McClellan 2007: 209. 
3
 Kaplan 2013: 190. 
4
 Ricks 2006: 168. 
5
 Hashim 2006: 31. 
6
 Allawi 2007: 8. 
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question why it is that military decision makers seem to struggle to evaluate their policies, or 
why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long. These are the questions which 
motivate this dissertation, and this chapter examines them in the context of the U.S. occupation 
of Iraq. 
One could justify selecting this case on grounds that it is another least-likely scenario for 
evaluating strategic assessment through a rationalist theoretical lens. And to some extent, the 
ideas developed in this dissertation do seem to shed light on some of the challenges of evaluating 
progress (or lack thereof) during the occupation’s early years. Throughout this time, civilian and 
military leaders insisted that progress in Iraq would be cumulative: that it was only once Iraqis 
had reached a political consensus at the top that the country would consolidate and the 
insurgency would lose momentum. In this sense, even as critics pointed to unfavorable violence 
trends, there was a logic to U.S. officials’ claims that they were meeting their benchmarks, and 
that just because the strategy had not worked yet this did not necessarily mean that it would not 
work soon. Section 5.1 describes these issues in more detail. 
However, the main purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate U.S. military decision making 
empirically or to test the plausibility of this dissertation’s theoretical framework, which were the 
intended functions of Chapter 4. The principal reason for focusing on the occupation of Iraq in 
this chapter is rather to use the case as a vehicle for developing arguments about how military 
decision makers can potentially deal with the analytic challenges that cumulative dynamics 
present for strategic assessment. Previous chapters of this dissertation have explained why 
military decision makers will not necessarily be able to learn, adapt, and realize their strategic 
mistakes simply by observing that their policies have previously been unsuccessful. If this kind 
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of information is not as meaningful as scholars generally believe, then it is important to think 
about other ways in which decision makers can revise their expectations and improve their 
strategic assessments, and that is the goal here. 
Yet if the focus of this chapter is on practical implications, the following sections still revolve 
around theoretical development. In particular, Section 5.2 describes how existing scholarship on 
the “reference class problem” (a topic in the philosophy of statistics dating back to the English 
mathematician John Venn) provides a useful perspective on the difficulties of strategic 
assessment. Simply stated, the reference class problem deals with the importance of diagnostics 
before prescription: depending on the way that decision makers define the problems they 
confront and select other cases for comparison, this will often suggest very different policy 
responses. 
This may sound truistic, but Section 5.3 shows how decision makers, military doctrine, and 
public debate typically skirt around the reference class problem in both overt and subtle ways, 
rather than dealing with it directly. Section 5.4 goes on to explain why approaching the reference 
problem rigorously requires a depth of analysis that scholars largely neglect as well. Both 
military doctrine and empirical social science generally focus on identifying common patterns 
that hold across cases, all else being equal. These patterns are important, but this chapter argues 
that when it comes to strategic assessment and military decision making, it is often just as 
important to understand the ways in which cases differ, and how those differences should shape 
the prior assumptions which drive strategic assessment. 
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Section 5.1. Strategic assessment in Iraq, 2003-2007 
Misleading prior assumptions 
According to the U.S. Army’s official history of the occupation, On Point II, “conditions in 
Iraq proved to be wildly out of synch with prewar assumptions.”7  At the outset of the 
occupation, senior officials did not expect to be confronted with a prolonged insurgency. In their 
memoirs, the president, the secretary of defense, and the director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency all discussed how they were surprised when organized violence emerged after the fall of 
Saddam.8 Their misperceptions were widely shared throughout the government and most 
planning efforts for the war, including those conducted by civilian agencies. On Point II 
describes how “none of the organizations involved in [the planning] effort came to the 
conclusion that a serious insurgent resistance would emerge after a successful Coalition 
campaign against the Baathist regime.”9   
One of the common themes that emerges from the literature on pre-war planning for the 
occupation of Iraq is that U.S. officials misperceived not just the duration of the mission, but also 
the nature of the challenges it would confront. Instead of anticipating an organized insurgency, 
the administration formulated its prior assumptions based on previous experiences with “post-
war reconstruction.” For instance, President Bush reflected in his memoirs that “I had studied the 
                                                 
7
 Wright and Reese 2008: 153, 79. 
8
 See Bush 2010: 258, Rumsfeld 2011: 520, 664, Feith 2008: 275-76, 415, and Tenet 2007: 318. 
9
 The plans surveyed in On Point II include the initial “Phase IV” plan for stabilization and 
reconstruction operations, the Coalition Forces Land Component Command’s “ECLIPSE II” 
plan; the Department of State’s Future of Iraq compendium; a 2002 National Defense University 
planning document; and a 2002 U.S. Army War College planning document. See, e.g., Wright 
and Reese 2008: 88-89.    
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histories of postwar Germany, Japan, and South Korea” – all cases where U.S. forces had played 
a prominent role in helping to consolidate stability, but where they did not face substantial 
violent opposition.10 Similarly, when violence broke out in Baghdad during widespread looting 
after the invasion, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld viewed the problem through the lens 
of postwar Germany.11 The historian’s office at the U.S. Department of State framed an analysis 
                                                 
10
 Bush 2010: 356. 
11
 Rumsfeld 2011: 476. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Violence Trends in Iraq, 2004-2007 
 
Violence in Iraq continually escalated during the early years of the U.S. occupation, shown 
here by way of officially-recorded “Significant Activities” (SIGACTs) and Iraqi civilian 
deaths as measured by the independent group Iraq Body Count. Violence rose particularly 
during the summer of 2006, as a wave of sectarian violence followed the bombing of the 
Golden Dome mosque in Samarra. The Surge was announced in January 2007 and violence 
fell substantially in that year. 
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of Iraq in terms of the “success stories of post-World War II Germany and Japan.”12 A widely-
circulated RAND report on the lessons of America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to 
Iraq also framed its analysis of postwar planning around the challenges of “post-conflict 
reconstruction.”13 The report warned of some “episodic, guerilla-style violence” but also stated 
that “defeated or liberated populations are often more docile, cooperative, and malleable than 
usually anticipated.”14  
Many U.S. military decision makers and analysts thus structured their prior assumptions for 
the occupation of Iraq around misleading analogies. These analogies, in turn, supported the 
mistaken view that the occupation would not be confronted with significant or protracted 
violence. And as we have seen so far in this dissertation – through both the theoretical analysis in 
Chapter 3 and the empirical analysis in Chapter 4 – once decision makers enter conflicts with 
misleading priors, they can often find it difficult to revise their expectations in a manner that 
indicates they should change course. 
 
                                                 
12
 Marc J. Susser, “Occupation and Postwar Government: Precedents and Options,” 
Memorandum to the Secretary of State, 28 February 2003.Similarly, a memorandum from 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman stated that “Historical analogies have been 
invoked, especially a comparison with experience in Afghanistan and the model of occupied 
Germany and Japan after WWII.” Rodman argues that these comparisons may be flawed, but in 
their stead he invokes a similar example: “A more interesting analogy is with postwar France.” 
Rodman, “Who Will Govern Iraq?” Memorandum to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, 15 August 
2002. 
13
 The director of the Coalitional Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer III, recalled in his 
memoirs how that RAND report served as the basis for much of his thinking heading into the job 
(Bremer 2006: 9-10, 12, 14, 106).  The report stated that “The cases of Germany and Japan set a 
standard for postconflict nation-building that has not since been matched” (Dobbins et al. 2003, 
xiii, 168). 
14
 Dobbins et al. 2003: 172, 195. 
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Counterinsurgency in Iraq as a cumulative process 
This dissertation has explained why these analytic challenges result from the cumulative 
dynamics of armed conflict, and the Bush administration’s strategy in Iraq was indeed largely 
framed in similar terms. The ultimate goal of the occupation was to stabilize the country long 
enough to buy space for political reconciliation, kill or capture enough insurgents to undermine 
their effectiveness, and progressively build the size and capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces 
until they could defend the country on their own. In their recent history of the occupation, 
Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor wrote that “At the White House, the hope was that the 
push toward sovereignty would soothe the Iraqis’ grievances over the occupation and take the 
steam out of the insurgency. Politics, in effect, was to enable the military strategy.”15 As with 
U.S. officials in Vietnam, decision makers in the Bush administration often characterized their 
strategy in terms of making cumulative progress towards making a major breakthrough. 
Secretary Rumsfeld wrote in 2005 that the “key question” was “when there will be a clearly 
discernible ‘tipping point.’ Eventually, more and more Iraqi people will decide that they will no 
longer side with the enemies of the legitimate Iraqi government and move to the middle. And the 
people in the middle, at some point, will decide that there is going to be a legitimate, free Iraqi 
government.”16 
Just as U.S. decision makers in Vietnam and the American Indian Wars struggled to assess 
their progress towards achieving similar breakthroughs, so too did Bush administration officials 
struggle to revise their views about how long it might take and how much it might cost in order 
                                                 
15
 Gordon and Trainor 2012: 56. 
16
 Donald Rumsfeld, “Progress in Iraq,” memorandum to President Bush, 29 November 2005. 
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to achieve these objectives in Iraq. Seen through this lens, rising violence did not necessarily 
indicate that the strategy was failing, because it was only once a legitimate political consensus 
had formed in Baghdad that the insurgency was expected to lose its momentum – politics was to 
enable the military strategy, and the not the other way around. In fact, opposition forces were 
very much expected to step up their efforts to block political consolidation the closer Iraqis came 
to achieving it.17  
In light of these prior assumptions, President Bush recalled his thoughts at the initial 
instability in the aftermath of the invasion. “The chaos and violence we witnessed were 
alarming,” he wrote, “but it was still early…. I refused to give up on our plan before it had a 
chance to work.”18 Events that administration officials hoped would precipitate political 
consolidation included the capture of Saddam Hussein in 2003; the passage of Iraq’s Transitional 
Administrative Law in 2004; military operations in Fallujah that killed or captured several 
thousand insurgents in fall 2004; Iraq’s first national elections in January 2005; and the death of 
Al-Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006.19 Of course, none of these events proved 
to be the turning points that Bush administration officials hoped for; but even if the occupation of 
Iraq was not panning out as expected, many top officials still believed that their strategy was on 
track.  
                                                 
17
 Gordon and Trainor 2012: 97: “The assumption was that the period leading up to the January 
2005 vote would be one of maximum vulnerability, but that if the election were held, the main 
danger would pass.” 
18
 See Bush 2010: 259, along with similar reflections by Rumsfeld 2011: 531 and Feith 2008: 
124. 
19
 See Wright and Reese 2008: 37, 45, 228, 357, 475-76 and Cordesman 2008: 338. 
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If the occupation of Iraq had been a repeated process – if the odds of U.S. policy paying off 
stayed the same from round to round like a slot machine or a roulette wheel – then the behavior 
and perceptions of U.S. officials during this period would have been clearly irrational, consistent 
with behavior like the “gambler’s fallacy.” But because the war was a cumulative process, this is 
not an appropriate framework for evaluating the case. When rational decision makers are 
observing cumulative processes, they should not necessarily become more pessimistic over time 
as they implement their policies without achieving success.  
Figure 5.2 helps to demonstrate this point by showing how the expected remaining duration of 
an insurgency does not necessarily increase as the war progresses. The top of Figure 5.2 presents 
data on the durations of 286 insurgencies.20 As in previous figures, the shaded area represents 
probability density, which in this case is the proportion of insurgencies that terminate in a given 
year of the war. Based on this information, the solid line in the figure represents the expected 
total duration of an insurgency, conditional on lasting for one year, two years, three years, and so 
on. The dashed line then represents the expected remaining duration of the insurgency as it 
develops, and the important thing to note is that this stays relatively constant. (The bottom of 
Figure 5.2 reproduces the same pattern when limiting the sample to the subset of these cases 
which counterinsurgents won according to the data.)  Thus as we saw with the analysis of U.S. 
commanders in the American Indian Wars, the fact that military leaders did not become 
markedly more pessimistic about their strategies even as they did not succeed is actually 
consistent with empirical patterns for how long insurgencies typically last. 
 
                                                 
20
 Lyall and Wilson 2009. 
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Figure 5.2. Expected Total/Remaining Duration of Insurgencies 
 
Figure 5.2 plots data based on the duration of insurgencies from 1808-2002 based on Lyall and 
Wilson 2009. As in Chapters 3 and 4, the shaded area of the figure represents probability 
density, which in this case represents the probability that a randomly-selected insurgency will 
end in a given year of the fighting. The solid line represents the expected total duration of an 
insurgency, conditional on the insurgency lasting for a particular period of time. The dashed 
line represents the expected remaining duration of an insurgency, conditional on lasting for a 
particular period of time. Figure 5.2 shows how expected remaining duration stays relatively 
constant as an insurgency progresses. The top panel plots data for all recorded insurgencies 
(N=286), the bottom panel plots only data for wars that counterinsurgents won according to 
Lyall and Wilson (N=152). 
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And in fact, as the occupation dragged on, many top officials assumed that the problem was 
not that they were pursuing the wrong strategy, but rather than they were not pursuing their 
current strategy wholeheartedly enough. General George Casey, the top commander of U.S. 
forces in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2007, had titled his campaign plan “Transition to Self-
Reliance.” Based on the assumption that the goal of U.S. policy should be to assist Iraq’s central 
government in developing the capacity and legitimacy to govern, this plan stated that “we will 
succeed by increasingly putting Iraqis in charge across all lines of operations.” To the extent that 
violence was not declining in Iraq, Casey thus argued that the solution was to expand the Iraqi 
Security Forces faster and reduce the U.S. military footprint further, so as to accelerate the 
consolidation of political power in Baghdad. This notion was captured in the oft-repeated slogan 
“As they stand up, we will stand down.” During his last year in Baghdad, General Casey often 
expressed his view that the principal problem with U.S. policy in Iraq was that this transfer of 
responsibility was not occurring quickly enough.21 As with many policy debates concerning 
cumulative processes, what many people saw to be a failure of the concept, others viewed mainly 
as flawed execution. 
On this point, General Casey was actually in accordance with many critics of the occupation, 
who also believed that the central cause of rising violence was a U.S. military presence that 
provoked militant nationalism and prevented the Iraqi government from developing the kind of 
ruling authority that it would only earn by standing on its own. Debates about U.S. strategy in 
Iraq in large part converged in 2006 around a high-profile independent commission called the 
Iraq Study Group, chaired by former Republican Secretary of State James Baker and former 
Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton. The Iraq Study Group’s final report began by stating 
                                                 
21
 On Casey’s campaign plan, see Gordon and Trainor 2012: 200 and Kaplan 2013: ch. 12. 
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that “The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.” Its two principal recommendations for 
dealing with this situation were to enhance “diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the 
region” and to change the mission of U.S. forces in a way that would “enable the United States to 
begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly” such that “the Iraqi government moves 
forward with national reconciliation.” The Iraq Study Group further warned that “Adding more 
American troops could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by 
the view that the U.S. presence is intended to be a long-term ‘occupation.’”22 Gordon and 
Trainor place these statements in the following context: 
 
For all the expectation that the group would come up with an alternative strategy on 
military matters, it largely favored the status quo: a gradual handover to the Iraqis and 
an American drawdown, with the hope that a strategy that had not worked in 2005 and 
most of 2006 would somehow bear fruit over the next eighteen months. Casey noted as 
much in an account of his Iraqi strategy, which he issued years after leaving. ‘I found 
the report a useful validation of what we were doing,’ he said of the [Iraq Study 
Group] assessment.23 
 
Well into 2006, debates about U.S. policy in Iraq were thus largely mired in a state of inertia. 
U.S. officials were attempting to transfer responsibility to Iraq’s central government. It was clear 
that this strategy had not achieved its goals, and yet decision makers and analysts still held out 
the prospect that continuing and perhaps accelerating this process could facilitate a legitimate 
                                                 
22
 Baker and Hamilton 2006: xiii, 50. It is worth mentioning that the Iraq Study Group report 
then hedged its position on troop levels by stating that “We could, however, support a short-term 
redeployment or surge of American combat forces to stabilize Baghdad, or to speed up the 
training and equipping mission, if the U.S. commander in Iraq determines that such steps would 
be effective.” 
23
 Gordon and Trainor 2012: 280. 
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and capable regime in Baghdad, and this political consolidation might, in turn, undermine the 
growing insurgency.  
This dissertation has attempted to explain why debates about military strategy often get stuck 
in this fashion. Previous chapters have showed how the basic line of reasoning espoused by the 
Bush administration, General Casey, and the Iraq Study Group – that just because the strategy 
had not worked yet this does not necessarily mean that it would not work soon – has a genuine 
logic to which military decision makers often appeal, and that often makes sense for them to 
adopt. Though existing scholarship (and public opinion) generally hold that military decision 
makers should become increasingly pessimistic when their strategies fail to succeed, this 
dissertation has explained why this argument is not necessarily sound, and why rational decision 
makers might often conclude the very opposite. 
This is not to claim that U.S. officials actually assessed Iraq in a rational manner. It is entirely 
possible that top officials expressed views at the time (which they then repeated later in 
reflecting on the experience) in strategic ways that were designed to hold up in public debates. 
But if that were true, then it would only reinforce the notion that these arguments possess a logic 
that can be genuinely difficult to disprove. If only from the standpoint of determining how to 
effectively critique policies like those that U.S. officials espoused in Iraq from 2003 through 
2006, it may be necessary to engage the analytic issues developed here. In doing so, it is 
important to understand why many common expectations about the way that military decision 
makers can (and should) learn and adapt may often be misleading, and why arguments to that 
effect often fail to carry the day.  
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Changing assumptions, switching strategies 
What then did eventually precipitate strategic change in Iraq? Even if many people believed 
that the United States stuck to its initial occupation strategy for too long, this strategy did not 
remain unchanged forever. In January 2007, President Bush announced his decision to “surge” 
30,000 additional forces into Iraq, to replace George Casey with a new commander in General 
David Petraeus, and to adopt a substantially new military strategy for employing U.S. forces. 
Instead of the previous emphasis on maintaining a low profile and primarily acting as an enabler 
to the Iraqi government, U.S. forces would now play a much more direct and visible role in 
protecting the population. De-emphasizing the rapid expansion of the Iraqi Army and Police, the 
United States would now in fact support the creation of local security forces (the so-called Sons 
of Iraq units) which took over a large portion of responsibility for protecting their home areas. 
And while previous commanders largely saw their mission as being to work with and through 
Iraq leaders, General Petraeus took a much more aggressive stance in dealing with Iraq’s Prime 
Minister Nouri al-Maliki, insisting that U.S. forces be allowed to operate in areas that were 
previously off-limits because they belonged to the regime’s base of support. 
There is already a substantial literature on what this change in strategy entailed, and how U.S. 
officials arrived at it.24 Some aspects of this process remain unclear. Yet there is a general 
consensus that U.S. officials did not decide to change strategies simply because they ran out of 
patience with existing policy. Though standard theoretical frameworks generally argue that the 
number of “rounds of fighting” decision makers conduct without obtaining their objectives is a 
                                                 
24
 On the Bush administration’s deliberations over the surge, see Woodward 2008, Robinson 
2008, Cloud and Jaffe 2009, Ricks 2009, Feaver 2011, Marsh 2011, Gordon and Trainor 2012, 
and Kaplan 2013. 
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primary mechanism by which they learn and adapt (and though the administration’s initial 
refusal to change strategies despite the mounting violence in Iraq was a major source of 
consternation for critics), this is not what seems to have been the key mechanism precipitating 
the surge.  
Instead, it appears as though the change in U.S. policy was precipitated by a fundamental shift 
in decision makers’ views about what was really driving the violence in Iraq. As the occupation 
progressed into 2006, it became clear that military decision makers had underestimated the 
extent to which the war revolved around Sunni-Shiite sectarian fault lines in addition to pro-
Baathist or anti-occupation sentiment. The sectarian nature of Iraq’s violence became 
particularly clear after the Sunni group al-Qaeda bombed the Shiite Golden Dome Mosque in the 
city of Samarra in February 2006. As sectarian violence escalated in the months following this 
attack, it sparked a basic rethinking of the problem that the occupation of Iraq confronted.  
A different diagnosis of the conflict naturally suggested a different prescription for what to do 
about it. President Bush recalled: “In the months after the Samarra bombing, I had started to 
question whether our approach matched the reality on the ground. The sectarian violence had not 
erupted because our footprint was too big. It had happened because al Qaeda had provoked it. 
And with the Iraqis struggling to stand up, it didn’t seem possible for us to stand down.” Bush 
also wrote that “Only after the sectarian violence erupted in 2006 did it become clear that more 
security was needed before political progress could continue.”25 Secretary of Defense Donald 
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Rumsfeld recalled the situation similarly: “looking back, it is now clear that the effect of the 
bombing proved a game changer in Iraq.”26 
In comparison to its relative stasis over the previous three and a half years, U.S. policy shifted 
in relatively short order following this reconceptualization. In November 2006, National Security 
Adviser Stephen Hadley visited Iraq and reported back to the White House that instead of 
pushing for a broadly-inclusive and legitimate central government, Prime Minister Maliki was 
largely supporting “a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.” Though it was unclear 
whether Maliki was a “witting participant” in this process, his government was making an 
“aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence.”27 This made it implausible to think 
that violence in Iraq would decline as a result of transferring more responsibility to the central 
government – if the government was a party to the conflict then increasing its capabilities and 
freedom of action was probably making the problem worse. 
Shortly afterward, the White House formally launched a review of its Iraq strategy, and then 
announced the surge in January 2007. When David Petraeus took command in Iraq, he 
assembled a “Joint Strategic Assessment Team” of military and civilian analysts to help critique 
Casey’s previous campaign plan and replace it with a new one. As Gordon and Trainor describe 
it, the “central point” of the team’s report “was that the war had been grievously misunderstood: 
the entire character of the conflict had changed, but U.S. military strategy had been 
unresponsive, increasingly irrelevant, and, at times, counterproductive to boot.” The increasing 
sectarian violence in Iraq had demonstrated that “The nation was in the middle of a ‘communal 
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power struggle’ among Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions squabbling and killing each other… a 
development the American command had misdiagnosed and inadvertently abetted.”28 The 
principal changes in U.S. strategy described above – emphasizing population security, partnering 
with local security forces, and adopting a more aggressive posture in dealing with Maliki’s 
government – were all measures designed to manage these intersectarian tensions in ways that 
the previous strategy had overlooked. By the end of 2007, violence in Iraq had declined by 
roughly ninety percent. 
 
Key features of strategic assessment in Iraq 
There is evidence to indicate that this change in U.S. strategy was indeed partly responsible 
for reducing Iraq’s violence, but the issue remains disputed, and it is beyond the scope of the 
analysis here.29 For the purposes of this dissertation, the key question is not what caused violence 
to decline in Iraq, nor whether the Surge was justified. The topic of this dissertation is strategic 
assessment and military decision making, and the point of this review is to examine why it is that 
U.S. officials changed their views so substantially in 2006 but not before. The review presented 
in this section suggests that this generally had little to do with how long the war had lasted and 
whether the previous strategy had been unable to reduce violence as quickly as planned (though 
this is the primary mechanism on which existing models of learning and adaptation in armed 
conflict tend to focus). Rather, the strategic shift in Iraq seems to have largely revolved around a 
reframing of the fundamental problem that U.S. policy was intended to address. 
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Given the theoretical argument in Chapter 3, this should not be surprising. One of the central 
takeaways from Chapter 3 was that decision makers’ prior assumptions crucially shape the way 
that they perform strategic assessment. This theoretical framework emphasized that the simple 
fact that a strategy has not been successful is largely indeterminate for determining how rational 
decision makers should think or behave moving forward. That argument helped to explain why 
debates about strategic assessment in Iraq, Vietnam, the American Indian Wars, and elsewhere 
often seem to obtain such little resolution, even after strategies are implemented for substantial 
periods of time without achieving their desired goals. 
This theoretical framework, along with the review of Iraq policy provided in this section, thus 
suggest that a more effective way to approach strategic assessment is to focus on refining 
decision makers’ views of what kind of challenge they are facing – something that essentially 
amounts to examining decision makers’ prior assumptions in a way that is more fundamental 
than the kinds of gradual updating and revision that are the primary focus of existing scholarship. 
This is a form of learning and adaptation that the theoretical framework in Chapter 3 indicates 
should make a difference for approaching strategic assessment, and the Iraq experience suggests 
that this is something that does make a difference in salient cases. Yet as the remainder of the 
chapter will explain, this is nevertheless a subject that scholars and decision makers often 
underemphasize. 
 
Section 5.2. The significance of the reference class problem in forming prior assumptions 
As previous chapters have discussed, military decision makers often face substantial uncertainty 
about the type of opponents or challenges that they face. We have seen that existing scholarship 
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generally conceives of “type” in a quantitative way, defined as the probability of defeating an 
opponent in each battle or “round of fighting” and thus, by extension, determining how long it 
might take or how much it might cost for decision makers to achieve their intended goals. Before 
characterizing this kind of uncertainty, however, decision makers face a more fundamental 
question in determining what kind of conflict they are dealing with, and thus which potential 
“types” of opponent are relevant to the analysis at all. This problem was clearly evident in the 
run-up to the Iraq war, where U.S. officials structured their thinking around past cases of post-
war reconstruction, rather than looking to examples of past insurgencies (let alone insurgencies 
that specifically revolved around communal divisions like those that drove violence in Iraq). 
A bumper-sticker way to characterize this logic might be “diagnostics before prescription,”30 
and there is a substantial literature on this subject in the field of statistical philosophy. This 
literature describes what scholars call the reference class problem, and the origins of this subject 
are typically attributed the 19th century English mathematician John Venn. (His “Venn diagrams” 
are a way of representing reference classes visually.) Since then, the reference class problem has 
been applied to a wide range of topics in the social and natural sciences.31 
The root of the reference class problem is that in order to make predictions about some event, 
analysts typically draw on information from other, similar cases. Venn used the example of 
trying to predict whether a hypothetical John Smith, aged 50, would live to the age of 51. In 
order to predict that probability, we could think of John Smith as a typical 50-year old man; then 
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we could estimate his probability of surviving the year by looking at the percentage of all 50-
year old men who do so.  
But Smith no doubt has other salient characteristics, too. For instance, in Venn’s example 
Smith lived in northern England and he has tuberculosis. So when we think about his chances of 
living another year, we could limit our “reference class” to the population of 50-year old 
northern English male consumptives, a group whose life expectancy is probably different from 
Smith’s age cohort on the whole. Of course, this line of reasoning could extend forever and in 
numerous directions. “It must be remembered,” Venn explains, that “every individual thing or 
event has an indefinite number of properties or attributes observable in it, and might therefore be 
considered as belonging to an indefinite number of different classes of things.”32 Many of John 
Smith’s “properties or attributes” will presumably affect our estimates of whether he will live to 
age 51. The crux of the reference class problem is that there is no way we can take them all into 
account, and yet we will have to find some way of making a prediction anyway. 
Similarly, when thinking about military strategy, there are any number of ways that decision 
makers can stratify past experience in order to structure their thinking. Even if U.S. officials had 
studied insurgencies rather than post-war reconstruction efforts in planning for the occupation of 
Iraq, they could have studied all insurgencies, just those insurgencies that took place in the 
Middle East, just those insurgencies that involved external occupiers, just those insurgencies that 
occurred in “recent years” (however defined), or reference classes involving any combination of 
these and other attributes. This decision about which reference class to examine comes logically 
prior to determining the possible distribution of opponent “types” – it is not possible to 
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determine how long it might take or how much it might cost to meet some challenge without first 
defining what that challenge entails. 
So what would have been the proper reference class for thinking about the occupation of Iraq? 
One of the most important aspects of the reference class problem – and the reason that this 
literature falls within the subfield of statistical philosophy – is that there is usually no clear, 
objective way to answer that question. Venn writes: “When therefore John Smith presents 
himself to our notice without, so to say, a particular label attached to him informing us under 
which of his various aspects he is to be viewed, the process of thus referring him to a class 
becomes to a great extent arbitrary…. [T]here are no logical grounds of decision; the selection 
must be determined by some extraneous considerations.”33 Venn is not being agnostic here – he 
is not saying that any reference class is as good as another. Rather, his point is that it is often 
possible for analysts to define reference classes in different, but equally well-reasoned ways.  
One should therefore expect that when evaluating military strategy (or policy problems of 
most kinds) there will be debates about defining the proper reference class. Even after careful 
discussion, some uncertainty will probably remain about which reference class is most 
appropriate for structuring expectations ex ante. And thus as decision makers begin dealing with 
the problem, it may be important for them to in turn revisit their prior assumptions about the kind 
of case they are dealing with.  
In a sense, this also involves learning about an opponent’s “type,” but in a way that is much 
more fundamental than how existing theoretical scholarship on armed conflict approaches the 
subject. Current frameworks generally focus on the way that battlefield gains and losses should 
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allow decision makers to gradually learn about how resilient their opponents are, and thus to 
progressively revise their inferences about how long it might take or how much it might cost for 
decision makers to achieve their desired goals.  
The reference class problem, by contrast, suggests that different ways of framing the problem 
can suggest entirely different sets of relevant past experience on which to draw, along with 
entirely different ways of defining the key problems that military strategy should be structured to 
address. The U.S. experience in Iraq is a prime example of how revising these kinds of prior 
assumptions may often play a more decisive role in strategic assessment than the kinds of 
gradual learning about an opponent’s capabilities and resolve that tend to be the primary focus of 
existing theoretical frameworks. As Section 5.1 described, reframing the “reference class” 
through which decision makers viewed the occupation from a problem of nationalist sentiment to 
one of communal conflict led officials to reverse key aspects of their military strategy: from 
keeping U.S. forces low-profile to making them the centerpiece of protecting the population; 
from building up the Iraqi security forces to cooperating with decentralized “Sons of Iraq” units; 
from bolstering the Maliki government to restraining its sectarian agenda. In each of these ways, 
new diagnostics drove new prescriptions. 
 
Section 5.3. Obstacles to managing the reference class problem 
It is not just existing theoretical frameworks that tend to marginalize the role of the reference 
class problem in strategic assessment, as decision makers, military doctrine, and public debate 
also tend to give this issue short shrift. Some ways of resisting the reference class problem are 
overt, others less so, and this section describes some of these issues in more detail. 
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Overt constraints on dealing with the reference class problem 
The occupation of Iraq provides several examples of how military decision makers can overtly 
constrain discussions of the reference class problem, as some U.S. officials essentially forbid 
debate about whether they had misdiagnosed the nature of the war. Paul Bremer, for instance – 
the top U.S. civilian official in Iraq from May 2003 to June 2004 – reportedly did not allow 
subordinates to draw analogies between Iraq (which he saw as a case of post-war reconstruction) 
and Vietnam (a case of counterinsurgency that would require a very different response).34 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld similarly forbade his staff from referring to Iraq’s violence as 
constituting an “insurgency” or a “civil war,” resulting in a “strange semantic fight”35 in White 
House and Defense Department press conferences over what exactly to call the situation in Iraq. 
Some people saw these word-choice debates as being a side-show from discussing substantive 
issues,36 but this view masks the importance that these kinds of labels can have for framing the 
problem at hand. For instance, in searching for an acceptable term for violent elements in Iraq, 
U.S. officials generally employed labels such as “dead-enders,” “former regime elements,” “ex-
Baathists,” and “Sunni rejectionists,” names implying that to the extent the resistance had any 
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Chapter 5: Practical Implications 
179 
 
political motivation, it was driven by deposed members of the Saddam-era elite who viewed the 
new government as being illegitimate. This was, at the very least, a substantially incomplete 
characterization of the sources of violence in Iraq, neglecting the notion that in some places 
Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds viewed each other as being direct threats to their physical survival, 
planting groups in the middle of local sectarian security dilemmas that largely stood apart from 
political battles in Baghdad.37 
Thus even if U.S. officials had admitted earlier that they had a potentially severe civil conflict 
on their hands, it would still have remained for them to determine just what kind of conflict it 
was. For pundits and the general public, the natural analogy was to the War in Vietnam. But as 
Stephen Biddle wrote in an article published just prior to the Samarra mosque bombing in 2006, 
it was important to make sure that the emerging debate about the nature of Iraq’s violence did 
not coalesce around the wrong historical model: 
If the debate in Washington is Vietnam redux, the war in Iraq is not. The current 
struggle is not a Maoist ‘people’s war’ of national liberation; it is a communal civil war 
fought with very different dynamics…. Unfortunately, many of the policies dominating 
the debate are ill adapted to the war being fought. 
…In a people's war, handing the fighting off to local forces makes sense because it 
undermines the nationalist component of insurgent resistance, improves the quality of 
local intelligence, and boosts troop strength. But in a communal civil war, it throws 
gasoline on the fire. Iraq's Sunnis perceive the ‘national’ army and police force as a 
Shiite-Kurdish militia on steroids. And they have a point: in a communal conflict, the 
only effective units are the ones that do not intermingle communal enemies.38 
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Here, Biddle was making an argument about the dangers of faulty diagnostics driving faulty 
prescriptions. Even if U.S. officials revised their assessments of the conflict’s “type” in a 
quantitative sense – accepting that the occupation would be far more violent and protracted than 
they initially believed – it was still critical to define the qualitative nature of that conflict in order 
to devise a military strategy that dealt with the key problems in a way that U.S. policy failed to 
do prior to 2007. 
It would be mistaken to imply that no one in the government worried about these problems or 
questioned the assumptions driving U.S. strategy in Iraq. From the beginning, there were 
dissenters whose perceptions of the violence in Iraq appear more or less vindicated by 
hindsight.39 These voices, however, were generally marginalized from debates. For example, 
when President Bush called a retreat at Camp David in April 2006 to assess the problem of 
escalating violence, debates about the nature of that violence were not on the agenda, and 
officials with access to these kinds of discussions were generally unwilling to air those kinds of 
dissenting views in front of the secretary of defense, senior military commanders, or the 
president.40 These dynamics constituted a fairly direct barrier to debating the reference class 
problem during the occupation of Iraq. 
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Limitations of military doctrine 
Along with these relatively overt ways of marginalizing debates about the sources and nature 
of violence in Iraq, there are subtler (and broader) indications of how military decision makers 
may often underemphasize the importance of defining reference classes carefully.  
Military doctrine, for instance, largely skirts the issue. Almost all military activity is guided 
by doctrine, much of which is conveyed in field manuals which provide a “body of thought on 
how Army forces intend to operate.”41 In this sense, military doctrine essentially formulates prior 
assumptions that help decision makers to ground their strategic assessments and prescriptions.42  
This doctrine, however, places most of its emphasis on defining patterns that hold across 
cases, rather than identifying ways in which different scenarios might require different 
approaches. This focus on ceteris paribus reasoning marginalizes the reference class problem 
rather than offering commanders structured guidance for how to deal with it. On this issue, it is 
useful to examine the U.S. Army’s field manual on Counterinsurgency (FM 3-24) which was 
released in December 2006.43 As this manual was written at a time of especially intense debate 
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about U.S. policy, it was widely viewed (and in many ways intended) to serve as a focal point for 
driving discussion about how the military could improve its performance in Iraq.44  
As the authors explain in the manual’s forward, FM 3-24 articulates “fundamental principles” 
that form a “solid foundation for understanding and addressing specific insurgencies.” The 
manual asserts that its purpose is to present “basic historical trends” that are “applicable 
worldwide,” though this is not to say that the manual provides a rigid blueprint for military 
action: indeed the authors of FM 3-24 stress that “every insurgency is contextual and presents its 
own set of challenges” and that “users should assess information from other sources to help them 
decide how to apply the doctrine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them.” It 
is possible to read these words as being analogous to the core logic of Bayesian decision theory, 
in which doctrine offers prior assumptions, and decision makers then revise those priors based on 
information they receive in particular contingencies.  
The problem with this model, however, is that it is unclear that a single set of prior 
assumptions can provide strategic guidance that is both actionable and “applicable worldwide.” 
This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that all cases are not necessarily equal when it comes to 
defining key challenges and devising proper strategies for dealing with them, but here, FM 3-24 
offers little guidance. The manual briefly discusses how insurgent methods often fall into one of 
six different categories,45 how they vary in their purposes and objectives,46 and how 
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“contemporary insurgents may use different approaches at different times.47 But though the 
manual mentions distinctions among insurgencies and makes clear that decision makers should 
be sensitive to them, there is very little discussion of just how commanders should actually adjust 
their behavior from one case to another. In total, FM 3-24 contains 63 figures and tables 
summarizing key points. Nearly all of them establish general principles for counterinsurgency 
without providing commanders with explicit guidance on how to adapt to particular 
circumstances. The one exception48 distinguishes among different ideal-type opponents without 
saying how these diagnostics should affect a commander’s prescriptions. As political scientist 
Stathis Kalyvas argues, FM 3-24 thus “espouses a definitively nomothetic posture, adopting a 
unified framework that sees these differences as variations on a single theme. It thus focuses on 
the common or universal characteristics of all insurgencies.”49 
To emphasize this point, it is worth mentioning that even though General Petraeus was one of 
the two military commanders who oversaw the development of FM 3-24, many of the most 
important changes he made to U.S. strategy in Iraq in 2007 worked against (or at least outside) 
the field manual’s recommendations. As Biddle describes it, “the manual assumes that 
insurgencies represent a contest for the loyalty of a mostly uncommitted general public that 
could side with either the government or the insurgents.”50 In this way, FM 3-24 adopts the 
perspective that counterinsurgency generally constitutes an ideologically-driven problem like the 
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War in Vietnam, and its guidance is thus much more in accordance with the way that General 
Casey assessed the conflict from 2004-2006 than the way that General Petraeus approached the 
problem in 2007. 
While the manual describes the importance of using counterinsurgent forces to protect the 
population, for instance, it generally describes the role of these forces as being to support the 
host nation and to reinforce its legitimacy – but in Iraq, where one of the central problems was 
that the central government was not an impartial ruler seeking to exercise legitimate authority 
over the whole country, it was a mistake to assume a common interest. FM 3-24 emphasizes the 
importance of rapidly developing host nation security forces – but in Iraq, the Army and Police 
were often enablers or direct participants in sectarian conflict, and thus one of the most important 
innovations of U.S. policy in 2007 was supporting widespread decentralization of security 
provision by way of the Sons of Iraq units which lay outside of formal security structures. This 
kind of measure, though widely seen as being critical to the reduction of violence in Iraq, is not 
described in FM 3-24 at all.51 
“Perhaps ironically,” Biddle thus wrote in his review, “Iraq is precisely the kind of 
nonideological communal war of identity that the manual is least suited for,” even if many of its 
recommendations (on matters such as employing unified command, limiting the use of force, and 
emphasizing human intelligence) were nevertheless relevant to that case.52 These tensions help to 
demonstrate how when it comes to laying out prior assumptions like those in FM 3-24, one of the 
key challenges is sorting through which assumptions apply in certain cases, which are irrelevant, 
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and which may in fact be counterproductive. This is essentially a matter of dealing with the 
reference class problem, and it is a subject which existing doctrine tends to underemphasize. 
 
Limitations of public debate 
If military doctrine did not provide structured guidance for managing the reference class 
problem in Iraq, public debate about the occupation generally skirted the issue as well. A full 
review of this debate is beyond the scope of the analysis here, but without making too many 
broad generalizations about the nature of that debate on the whole, it is possible to identify 
several ways in which even critics of U.S. policy did not necessarily engage with the war’s 
cumulative dynamics, or deal with the importance of diagnostics before prescription. 
For example, critics of the occupation focused a large part of their attention on establishing 
the extent to which U.S. officials had underestimated the extent of political violence following 
the invasion of Iraq. Central to this debate were efforts to convince the Bush administration to 
drop its insistence that the violence fell short of a “civil war” or an “insurgency”; to ridicule of 
the president’s claim of “mission accomplished” following the close of major combat operations; 
and to publicize the rising costs of soldiers and civilians killed as a result of the war. Debates 
about the number of civilian casualties in Iraq were a topic of special attention as violence 
mounted in the summer of 2006. While the U.S. government claimed that roughly 50,000 
civilians had died as a result of the violence, a widely-reported study published in the British 
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journal The Lancet used survey methods to argue that this estimate should instead be more like 
600,000.53  
These casualty estimates, which thus ranged by an order of magnitude, took center stage in 
debates about whether to “stay the course,” switch strategies, or withdraw from Iraq. Questions 
about the costs of the conflict (and the extent to which U.S. officials had underestimated them) 
were valid and important in their own right. But as this dissertation has explained, just because a 
military strategy has not worked yet, this does not necessarily imply that it will not work soon, 
and there are many cases where rational decision makers should not become more pessimistic 
about their policies, even when they have invested substantial resources in them without 
succeeding. Logically speaking, focusing on the costs of the occupation of Iraq in hindsight did 
not say much about the prospective costs of fighting moving forward. And from a practical 
standpoint, those arguments did not gain much traction with U.S. officials. 
One of the ironies of debates about U.S. policy in Iraq was thus that both the administration’s 
supporters and its critics often staked their claims on the fallacy of sunk costs. For advocates of 
continuing the occupation, this illogic was borne out in arguments about how it was important to 
finish the job in Iraq so as to justify the costs of the war, and to ensure that soldiers and civilians 
had not died in vain. There were political reasons to adopt this stance, of course, but from a 
purely rational standpoint, that argument is unsound – past costs should have no influence on 
thinking about the prospective costs and benefits of adopting some course of action moving 
forward. But by the same token, it is also unsound to use prior costs as an argument against 
continuing a given policy. As Chapter 3 made clear, all that matters for rational strategic 
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assessment is the expected remaining costs of fighting, and when it comes to dealing with 
cumulative processes, previous effort should not necessarily make decision makers more 
pessimistic about their policies. This dissertation has aimed to demonstrate that is genuinely 
difficult to determine how to revise expectations during the course of conflict about how much 
longer it might take and how much more it might cost in order to achieve strategic goals; 
backward-looking debates about the prior costs of the conflict are not well-suited to resolving 
this uncertainty. 
The previous sections of this chapter have also indicated that when public debates about U.S. 
policy in Iraq focused on the nature of the conflict, they generally did so in the context of 
drawing parallels to the War in Vietnam – an analogy that was not particularly relevant, and 
often actively misleading, when it came to dealing with the sources of the violence confronting 
U.S. forces.  
As a rough heuristic for establishing the widespread use of the Vietnam analogy, Figure 5.3 
plots the number of times that Iraq and Vietnam were mentioned in the same newspaper reports 
from 2003 through 2006.54 For comparison, Figure 5.3 also plots the number of times that Iraq 
was mentioned in the same article as Bosnia or Kosovo, two recent cases where U.S. forces were 
employed to stop communal violence that was much more similar to the dynamics of the War in 
Iraq than the ideological nature of counterinsurgency in Vietnam.55 Throughout the timeline, 
references to Vietnam significantly outnumber those to the wars in the Balkans, generally by a  
 
                                                 
54
 These tabulations were created from a LexisNexis search of major U.S. newspapers and wires, 
with media mentions aggregated by quarter. 
55
 See Biddle 2006 on the comparative relevance of the Vietnam and Balkans analogies. 
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Figure 5.3. Media Mentions of Iraq and Vietnam or Bosnia/Kosovo, 2003-2006 
 
Figure 5.3 displays the number of articles in U.S. newspapers and wires, aggregated by quarter 
from 2003 through 2006, mentioning Iraq and Vietnam, or Iraq and either Bosnia or Kosovo. This 
is a rough way of capturing how often these cases were associated in the U.S. public debate about 
the occupation of Iraq. The figure shows that Iraq and Vietnam were associated far more often 
than Iraq and Bosnia/Kosovo during the first four years of the war. There is no change in the 
pattern even throughout 2006, as intersectarian violence in Iraq was becoming more pronounced 
and the Vietnam analogy was becoming less tenable. 
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factor of four or greater. Moreover, the imbalance does not noticeably change during the course 
of 2006, even as sectarian violence spiraled after the bombing of the Samarra mosque. 
Perhaps as a result of this “Vietnam redux” (to quote a passage cited above), even critics of 
the Bush administration’s policies like the Iraq Study Group did not significantly challenge the 
basic premises of U.S. military strategy which was designed to deal with problems of political 
ideology and nationalist resentment rather than the intersectarian drivers of communal conflict. 
People certainly disagreed on issues of feasibility, with administration supporters arguing that 
the strategy had a worthwhile chance of succeeding if given more time and detractors arguing 
that it was not worth staying the course with a policy that had yet to demonstrate results. But by 
and large, debates about U.S. policy took place within these parameters, without major 
alternatives views about the fundamental origins of Iraq’s civil violence. 
There are several reasons why it is not necessarily surprising that the public debate did not do 
more to engage the reference class problem in Iraq. First, the Vietnam War was such a salient 
and formative experience that it would have naturally occurred to many people as being the 
analogy of first resort.56 Second, the Vietnam analogy held obvious rhetorical appeal for critics 
of U.S. policy – while more recent experiences with peacebuilding in the Balkans might have 
been better comparisons in terms of dealing with the kinds of communal violence the United 
States confronted in Iraq, those operations had been much more successful than the Vietnam 
War, and this could have detracted from the political message critics were attempting to convey. 
Third, arguing that the Bush administration had misdiagnosed the conflict in Iraq may have 
                                                 
56
 See Hoffmann 1968, May 1973, Jervis 1976, Khong 1992, Reiter 1996, Rosen 2005, and 
Kahneman and Renshon 2007, among others, for literature on how people often view foreign 
policy through the lenses of analogies that, while suggested by salient surface similarities, may 
nevertheless impede careful analysis of fundamental problems. 
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opened the logical possibility that switching strategies might well achieve markedly better 
results, potentially justifying the notion that it would be worth deferring withdrawal in favor of 
experimenting with a different approach.  
Perhaps for these and other reasons, the idea that Iraq’s violence was being driven by 
intersectarian divisions quite separate from ideological and national resistance to the U.S. 
occupation remained a minority view among the general public through at least the summer of 
2006. By focusing discussion on the prior cost of the war and by not challenging the prevailing 
“theory of the case” about the nature of violence in Iraq, both U.S. officials and their critics were 
unable to engage with the analytic challenges of strategic assessment in a convincing manner, 
and these debates failed to converge towards consensus. The theoretical framework in this 
dissertation has explained why that lack of convergence is not necessarily surprising given the 
cumulative dynamics of armed conflict, and suggested that improving strategic assessment 
largely depends on honing conceptions of the proper reference class for viewing a given conflict. 
But while the Iraq case indicates that changing policy makers’ views of the nature of the conflict 
was indeed a critical component of their decision to switch strategies, this issue was not a major 
aspect of public debates at the time.  
 
Section 5.4. The role for scholarship 
In principle, scholarship can play an important role in providing rigorous, evidence-based ways 
of dealing with the reference class problem in strategic assessment. The reference class problem 
is in large part a matter of empirical analysis, examining open questions about the extent to 
which hypothesized distinctions among cases actually seems to correlate with meaningfully 
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different dynamics. What are the most important ways in which conflicts tend to differ? How do 
these dynamics impact the efficacy of different strategies for stabilization or conflict 
management?  
Answering these questions forces analysts to deal with issues of defining the proper case 
universe, operationalizing relevant variables and gathering appropriate data, and then analyzing 
that evidence in structured ways that are sensitive to common confounds such as omitted 
variables bias and strategic selection. There is little inherent difference between forming the 
kinds of prior assumptions that drive strategic assessment and conducting theoretically-informed, 
empirically-grounded social science – these enterprises essentially involve the same analytic 
issues, with the traditional distinction being largely a matter of how rigorously analysts approach 
those issues, and how they intend for their findings to be used. 
Dealing with the reference class problem in strategic assessment is thus a place where there is 
an unusual amount of overlap between the kinds of information that decision makers need in 
order to structure their decisions effectively, and the kinds of information that the social 
scientist’s toolkit is suited to provide. As while few social scientists have access to the kinds of 
classified information that drive the final outputs of military decision making, the basic doctrinal 
assumptions which guide that process are – in the words of FM 3-24 – a matter of “broad 
historical trends” that are the traditional focus of cross-sectional scholarship on armed conflict.57 
This does not mean that analyzing these trends is actually easy to do. In fact, one of the 
reasons that it is important to approach the reference problem carefully is that so many 
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 For a broader discussion of the interrelationships between military doctrine and social science, 
see Friedman 2012. 
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seemingly obvious ways to divide conflicts into different subsets do not in fact lead to the 
observable distinctions one might expect. To demonstrate this point, Table 5.1 presents data on 
286 insurgencies between 1815 and 2006.58 These data are parsed into 15 different reference 
classes that could be potentially relevant for structuring expectations about the typical durations 
of insurgencies. For each of these reference classes, Table 5.1 reports three statistics: the mean 
duration of insurgencies within the reference class; the median duration of insurgencies within 
the reference class; and if we considered the war in Iraq to be a member of that reference class 
what its percentile rank would be in terms of duration.59  
Across all 286 insurgencies examined here, the average conflict lasts 6.8 years, the median 
insurgency lasts only 3.4 years, and thus the insurgency in Iraq is one of the longer insurgencies 
on record (it falls into the 77th percentile). Table 5.1 then demonstrates – perhaps surprisingly – 
that several ways of making the reference class more relevant to the characteristics of Iraq could 
have made it even harder to predict the extended nature of the insurgency.  
 
                                                 
58
 These data are drawn from Lyall and Wilson 2009: 70, who define an insurgency as a 
movement that “(1) uses small, mobile groups to inflict punishment on the incumbent through 
hit-and run strikes while avoiding direct battle when possible and (2) seeks to win the allegiance 
of at least some portion of the noncombatant population. An insurgency is therefore not 
synonymous with “civil war” since civil wars can be fought conventionally (that is, with direct 
battles between opposing armies), with guerrilla tactics, or through nonviolence.” 
59
 For the purposes of drawing these estimates, the “duration” of the insurgency in Iraq is 
considered to be eight and one-third years: the time between the end of major combat operations 
in April 2003 and the official conclusion of all U.S. combat operations in August 2010. It is 
important to note that this is probably an underestimate of the duration of the insurgency in Iraq 
because that insurgency continued after the official conclusions of U.S. combat operations (and 
U.S. troops stayed in Iraq past this date to continue assisting with the counterinsurgency effort). 
Needless to say, underestimating the duration of the insurgency in Iraq will make that conflict 
seem like less of an outlier, bringing the case closer to the mean of each reference class in Table 
5.1. 
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For instance, it is typically assumed that the insurgency in Iraq was fueled by animosity 
against an external occupier. But insurgencies fought against external occupiers are on average 
shorter than the norm: they last only 4.5 years at the mean and 2.6 years at the median (a finding 
Table 5.1. Comparing the Duration of Insurgencies across Different Reference Classes 
    
 Reference Class  N Mean Median Iraq pct.         
  
 All insurgencies 286 6.8 3.4 77th   
 
 All insurgencies since 1914 171 7.1 4.4 70th  
 All insurgencies since 1945 129 8.0 5.2 65th  
 All insurgencies since 1975 59 6.9 4.4 70th  
 
 Insurgencies involving external occupation 112 4.5 2.6 85th  
 Ethnic or religious insurgencies 171 6.3 3.5 75th  
 Ethnic insurgencies only 151 5.9 3.4 77th 
 Religious insurgencies only 75 6.9 2.5 72nd   
Religious insurgencies w/ Muslim insurgents 37 4.7 2.3 84th  
 Insurgencies involving great powers 108 4.4 2.4 86th  
 Insurgencies in the Middle East 53 4.9 2.4 81st  
 Insurgencies in Iraq  6 2.5 0.8 100th  
 
Ethnic/religious insurgencies in the Mid. East 42 5.2 2.5 79th  
Ethnic/religious insurgencies in the Mid. East,  
                                         with occupiers 21 3.8 2.0 91st   
 Ethnic insurgencies in the Middle East,    
 with occupiers, since 1945 6 6.4 5.1 86th  
 
 
For each reference class of insurgencies, Table 5.1 gives: the number of relevant insurgencies 
recorded in Lyall and Wilson (2009); the mean duration of those insurgencies, in years; the 
median duration of those insurgencies, in years; and what percentile rank in the data the 
occupation in Iraq would be if we considered its duration to be 8.33 years.  Note that in all 
reference classes – and especially in the more precise reference classes at the bottom of the list – 
the occupation of Iraq had an unusually long duration. 
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that may be driven by the notion that occupiers tend to be great powers who bring powerful 
military capabilities which host nations often lack by themselves). Iraq’s insurgency has both 
ethnic and religious components. Yet these factors do not correspond to significantly longer 
insurgencies on average, either. In fact, the average Muslim insurgency lasts only 4.7 years and 
the median Muslim insurgency lasts only 2.3 years. While the Middle East is typically thought to 
be a particularly challenging region in which to fight, insurgencies there also tend to be relatively 
short (4.9 years at the mean and 2.4 years at the median). Insurgencies in Iraq itself have been 
particularly brief, with the occupation of Iraq being longer than any of the other six Iraqi 
insurgencies in Lyall and Wilson’s data.60  
The bottom of Table 5.1 examines the way that reference classes overlap: the categories here 
are ethnic/religious insurgencies in the Middle East, ethnic/religious insurgencies in the Middle 
East with external occupiers, and ethnic/religious insurgencies in the Middle East with external 
occupiers that have occurred since World War II. As these reference classes narrow, they 
become more conceptually precise. But they do not come any closer to being able to predict the 
protracted nature of the insurgency in Iraq, whose duration would fall at or above the 79th 
percentile in each of these reference classes. Ironically, narrowing the reference class make 
misperceptions about the prospective duration of the insurgency in Iraq seem more reasonable. It 
may very well be true that “most senior civilian and military leaders failed to review the 
historical records of military occupations and of Middle Eastern or Iraqi history”61 and it may be 
                                                 
60
 The six insurgencies in Iraq listed in Lyall and Wilson 2009 are the Iraqi-British campaign 
(1920-21), four Kurdish Rebellions (1961-66, 1974-75, 1980-88, and 1991) along with the Shia 
Rebellion in 1991. Note, however, that even when looking solely at insurgencies in Iraq, the 
members of this reference class have borderline relevance for thinking about the invasion in 
2003.  
61
 Wright and Reese 2008: 569. 
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true that key members of the Bush administration were irrationally overconfident.62 But it is not 
entirely clear how an objective overview of that history would have necessarily demonstrated 
that certain assumptions were flawed.63 
Table 5.1 also helps to raise a second important challenge in dealing with reference classes, 
which is that as these groupings become more precise, this constrains the amount of data that are 
available for drawing inferences. The last reference class in Table 5.1 – ethnic/religious 
insurgencies in the Middle East with an external occupier that was fought since World War II – 
is still a very broad-brush way to think about the nature of the occupation of Iraq. But there are 
only six examples of previous insurgencies (at least, according to Lyall and Wilson’s well-
regarded data) that fit these criteria. As we have progressively less previous experience to work 
with, it becomes increasingly difficult to draw useful lessons. 
 Ideally, we would like to think that when we make reference classes more conceptually 
precise, then their predictions would also become more statistically precise. In reality, these 
characteristics generally trade off. As Wesley Salmon explains, “since increasing the reliability 
of statistics generally tends to broaden the class and since narrowing the class often tends to 
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 Johnson 2004: ch. 8. 
63
 Perhaps the most important historical warning sign of a protracted insurgency in Iraq was the 
fact that Saddam Hussein needed to result to widespread, repressive measures in order to contain 
Shiite resistance to his regime. In this interpretation, U.S. officials could have based their 
expectations not on the insurgencies that did occur in Iraq, but rather those that might have 
occurred if Saddam had not employed such brutal tactics (which the United States was not 
willing to reprise). There is nothing in this chapter which suggests that this line of reasoning is 
invalid. However, this argument relies on the interpretation of historical counterfactuals, which 
is very different from interpreting historical evidence. Historical counterfactuals play an 
important role in scholarship and policy analysis, but they are notoriously difficult to define or 
evaluate with precision. It is unclear how a rational decision maker should draw on this kind of 
information in structuring expectations, though again, this is not to say that counterfactual 
reasoning should not have played a role in planning for the occupation of Iraq. 
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reduce the reliability of the statistics, the principle involves two desiderata which pull in opposite 
directions.”64 Especially when dealing with relatively small data sets – which is usually the case 
in cross-sectional analysis within strategic studies – narrowing the reference class can quickly 
lead to vanishingly small sample sizes and expanding amounts of predictive uncertainty. 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates this problem by progressively narrowing the reference class based on 
the following elements of the occupation of Iraq: (1) it is an insurgency; (2) it takes place in the 
Middle East; (3) it revolves in part around ethnic/religious issues; (4) the counterinsurgent is a 
foreign occupier; (5) the conflict takes place since 1918; (6) the conflict takes place since 1945; 
(7) the counterinsurgent is a great power. Each time we nest one of these characteristics within 
the others, the reference class gets smaller. The mean duration of conflicts within these reference 
classes does not change very much across each grouping, but the uncertainty surrounding these 
estimates (shown in Figure 5.4 as the 95% confidence interval of how long the average conflict 
within each reference class should last) continues to widen. Even though the reference class 
becomes more conceptually precise as we continue to narrow it, the resulting estimates become 
less useful. In the final category, the uncertainty is so large that the confidence interval is literally 
meaningless: it includes the possibility that the average insurgency might have a negative 
duration. 
In determining just what kinds of factors make a difference when it comes to estimating how 
long it might take or how much it might cost to defeat an insurgency, therefore, there are real 
constraints on performing rigorous analysis and the answers are not necessarily obvious. And if 
the last section showed how military doctrine tends to focus on ceteris paribus patterns rather 
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 Salmon 1970: 41. 
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Table 5.2. Predicted duration of insurgencies, by nested reference classes 
 
Reference Class 
 
N Average Duration, Low Bound 
Average Duration, 
High Bound 
 
Insurgencies 
 
286 
 
5.1 
 
6.9 
 
Insurgencies in the Middle 
East 
 
53 
 
3.3 
 
6.4 
 
Ethnic insurgencies in the 
Middle East 
 
39 
 
3.4 
 
7.3 
 
Ethnic insurgencies in the 
Middle East, with foreign 
occupiers 
 
21 
 
1.8 
 
5.8 
 
Ethnic insurgencies in the 
Middle East, with foreign 
occupiers, since 1918 
 
15 
 
1.8 
 
7.1 
 
Ethnic insurgencies in the 
Middle East, with foreign 
occupiers, since 1945 
 
6 
 
0.1 
 
12.7 
 
Ethnic insurgencies in the 
Middle East, with great 
power foreign occupiers, 
since 1945 
 
3 -1.2 11.3 
 
Table 5.2 provides the 95% confidence interval for the mean duration of insurgencies that 
fall into increasingly specific reference classes.  As the reference classes become more 
specific, there are fewer observations within them.  As a result, the confidence intervals 
grow.  In the final reference class, the confidence interval is so large that it conveys 
information that is literally meaningless: it includes the possibility that the average 
insurgency might have a negative duration. 
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than ways in which cases differ, the same might generally be said for scholarship on armed 
conflict as well. As with work in the social sciences more broadly, empirical work on armed 
conflict often aims to capture “average treatment effects”: the way that independent variables 
relate to outcomes, all else being equal.65 The significance of those patterns is typically judged 
by how consistent they are and how little they vary. These findings are important in their own 
right, but as this chapter has shown, this information is by definition ill-suited to giving decision 
makers the information that they need in order to perform strategic assessment and to understand 
actionable links between diagnostics and prescription.  
Together, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation along with the U.S. 
experience in Iraq suggest that effective strategic assessment revolves around a set of conceptual 
issues and empirical information that tend to fall outside the scope of policy discussions, 
doctrinal manuals, theoretical frameworks, and public debates. The following chapter will 
conclude by summarizing these arguments and drawing out some of their lessons and broader 
implications.
                                                 
65
 For example, Sambanis 2001: 259 provides the following characterization of the literature on 
civil war initiation: “A wave of theoretical and empirical research has recently helped identify 
important economic and political determinants of civil war onset and prevalence. However, 
common to all these studies is the practice of aggregating civil wars in a single category.” 
  
 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
LESSONS AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
For roughly forty years, one of the most prominent debates in physics revolved around a particle 
called the Higgs boson. The Higgs boson plays a key role in explaining how matter in the 
universe comes to be endowed with mass; it was once famously dubbed the “God particle,” and 
governments around the world have spent billions of dollars trying to find it. Particle accelerators 
like the Tevatron in Illinois or the Large Hadron Collider in Switzerland smash matter together at 
high energies in a way that dislodges subatomic fragments. Using this method, physicists have 
made many important discoveries, but decades of searching for the Higgs boson initially came 
up empty. 
The problem with hunting for the God particle was that scientists were unsure of how to find 
it. Standard theoretical models predict that the particle will emerge if accelerators operate at high 
energies – but they cannot say exactly how much energy is needed in order to obtain this result. 
For that reason, physicists had to search for the particle across a wide range of experimental 
conditions. Careful measurement could indicate that the particle does not appear at a given 
energy level, but this said little about whether the next setting might be the one that produced the 
major breakthrough. Thus while some physicists often predicted that the discovery was just 
around the corner, there were always others who were not so sure: some experts hypothesized 
that we might not have the technical capacity to find the Higgs boson for decades; some argued 
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that it is impossible to detect or that physicists were looking for it in the wrong way; and of 
course, it was always possible that the particle simply did not exist at all.1 
The bottom line was that, at any given point in time, scientists had little idea of how much 
longer it might take or how much more it might cost to find the Higgs boson. And this led to 
heated debates because particle accelerators are so expensive. The Tevatron, for instance, had an 
operating budget of roughly $100 million per year. Fermilabs continually needed to make the 
argument that its lack of success in the past did not preclude finding the Higgs particle in the 
future, that its experiments were always becoming more efficient and precise, and that it was 
closing in on one of the most important discoveries in modern science. When an economic 
recession forced the U.S. Department of Energy to cut more than a billion dollars in spending, it 
finally closed the Tevatron in October 2011. Many physicists howled that the government was 
pulling the plug just as the project hung on the cusp of success. And sure enough, when the 
Large Hadron Collider went into operation the following summer, its scientists announced that 
they had found the Higgs boson (or, at least, evidence strongly consistent with the notion it 
exists), an event that constituted one of the most high-profile discoveries in modern science. 
The previous chapters have shown how debates about military strategy often play out in 
similar ways, as decision makers struggle to form and revise their expectations of how long it 
might take or how much it might cost to achieve their desired goals, and debate whether their 
past failures preclude the hope of subsequent success. This dissertation has explored the analytic 
challenges in doing so, and argued that understanding these challenges can shed new light on 
                                                 
1
 On the hunt for the Higgs particle in general, see Folger 2011, Lederman 1993, and Sample 
2010. On physicists’ forecasts, see Brumfiel 2011. Various views about the discovery potential 
of recent experiments include Jakobs and Schumacher 2008, Stancato and Terning 2009, and 
Hawking 1996.  
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theory, history, and public policy debates. Chapter 6 concludes that effort by summarizing main 
points. It then extends the analysis in additional directions, describing why understanding 
cumulative dynamics has significant implications for empirical research design, as well as how 
the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation applies to fields beyond national security, 
including the search for scientific breakthroughs. 
 
Section 6.1. Summary of main arguments 
This dissertation has examined the conceptual foundations of strategic assessment, explaining 
how decision makers form prior assumptions about how long it might take and how much it 
might cost to achieve desired goals, and how they revise those expectations in the course of 
implementing their policies. In almost all forms of armed conflict and in many other kinds of 
national security policy, one of the central questions scholars ask is why decision makers find it 
so difficult to evaluate their policies or why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so 
long. This behavior is often assumed to represent nonrational influences such as organizational 
constraints, domestic politics, or psychology, but the previous chapters have developed a 
theoretical framework for explaining how even rational actors may often display these 
tendencies. 
This theoretical framework begins with the problem of assessing uncertainty. Before 
hostilities begin, decision makers must account for the notion that opponents can vary a great 
deal in terms of their capabilities and resolve. Through a combination of inductive and deductive 
reasoning, decision makers must make subjective judgments about the expected costs of fighting. 
But even when these judgments are formed in ways that are deductively reasonable and 
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empirically grounded, there will often be cases in which decision makers’ prior assumptions 
substantially understate the challenges that they face: all distributions have outliers, and those 
outliers are by definition difficult to predict ex ante.  
The second component of strategic assessment is revising prior expectations as an armed 
conflict unfolds. Here, this dissertation made an especially sharp break from existing literature 
by explaining how once decision makers have formed initial misperceptions of how long it might 
take and how much it might cost in order to achieve their goals, then even perfectly rational 
learning may not allow them to realize the extent of their initial errors. When war is seen to be a 
cumulative process, then even if the expected total costs of fighting will continuously increase as 
a war progresses, the expected remaining costs of fighting can remain constant or even decline. 
Altogether, this framework explains why decision makers will often be unable to avoid, realize, 
and correct their strategic mistakes. 
The previous chapters have demonstrated not just that this theory can be logically constructed 
in the abstract, but that it also serves as an empirically plausible way to reinterpret salient 
historical experience. In the American Indian Wars, for instance, one of the central challenges 
facing U.S. commanders was to identify the outliers like the Sioux and Seminoles, groups who 
could sustain and inflict exceptional levels of punishment in relation to the bulk of historical 
experience. Similarly in the Vietnam War, U.S. decision makers struggled to understand that the 
insurgents would be able to withstand levels of attrition that were all but unprecedented. A half 
century later, U.S. officials entered the occupation of Iraq with prior assumptions that were 
grounded in historical experience – but it was a misleading set of historical experience on which 
to draw, and it took nearly four years for civilian and military leaders to understand not just the 
extent of instability in Iraq, but also the nature of the violence that confronted them.  
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The difficulties of strategic assessment do not condemn decision makers to failure. Ultimately 
the United States defeated its opponents in almost every one of the American Indian Wars.2 The 
tribes which commanders most severely underestimated also tend to be the ones that stand out 
most prominently in historical memory, but Chapter 4 made clear how they were far from being 
the norm. The opening stages of the occupation of Iraq may have been mishandled, but the 
change in strategy in 2007 preceded a drop of violence of roughly ninety percent that seemed to 
offer at least temporary promise. And in some cases, worries that set in amidst initially 
unsuccessful military operations simply end up seeming misplaced. When initial foreign military 
support to Libyan rebels did not topple Muammar Qaddafi’s regime in spring 2011, for instance, 
criticisms that the mission had been seriously botched were at one point a matter of high concern 
for the United States and its NATO allies – but the Libyan rebels regrouped and ousted Qaddafi 
by the fall, and the pessimism that once swirled around this campaign will probably end up being 
a historical footnote at best to what will likely be remembered as a relatively smooth instance of 
international intervention.  
Yet these examples only serve to emphasize that even in cases where military decision makers 
achieve the objectives they were looking for, they still tend to find it difficult to assess strategic 
progress in clear and rigorous ways. The principal aim of this dissertation has been to explain 
why this task involves genuine analytic challenges which contemporary scholarship typically 
does not take into account. Here are some of the main takeaways from this analysis. 
 
                                                 
2
 This is not to endorse U.S. military decision making, but only to show that the assumptions 
behind strategic decisions were often much more in line with objective, empirical evidence than 
the conventional wisdom entails. 
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1. War is not a slot machine 
The central argument of this dissertation is that war involves cumulative dynamics that clash 
with many prominent theoretical frameworks (and often people’s basic intuitions), which 
typically revolve around analogies to repeated processes like gambling. Repeated processes form 
the basis of a wide range of scholarly literature on learning and adaptation. In this literature, the 
notion that decision makers are observing outcomes that are independent and identically 
distributed is essentially the assumption of first resort. Comparisons to slot machines, roulette 
wheels, and card tables appear regularly in descriptions of relevant models, while people often 
use terms like “the gambler’s fallacy” or “doubling down” to describe decision makers’ behavior 
more broadly. Armed conflict, however, involves cumulative processes that have very different 
dynamics, along with a different logic for how rational actors should form and revise their 
expectations. These cumulative dynamics affect strategic assessment and decision making in 
ways that scholars typically overlook. Understanding these dynamics helps to explain why many 
debates about military strategy – much like the debate about hunting the Higgs boson – do not 
converge over time, why military decision makers often find it so difficult to evaluate their 
policies via trial-and-error, and why they often stick to unsuccessful strategies for so long. 
 
2. Just because a strategy has not worked yet, this does not imply it will not work soon 
This is not to justify “staying the course” when military strategies are unsuccessful, or to 
argue that this will always be the case, but to point out how existing theoretical frameworks 
provide an incomplete and potentially misleading foundation for understanding learning and 
adaptation in armed conflict. For instance, Chapter 2 showed how prominent international 
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relations literature on the bargaining model of war explicitly relies on the notion that armed 
conflict is a repeated process. This literature predicts that the longer decision makers go without 
achieving their intended objectives, the more pessimistic they should become about their ability 
to do so, and the more likely they should be to change course. One of the principal implications 
of this literature is that warfare is thus a self-terminating process, automatically providing 
information that gradually eliminates the bargaining problems that can cause war in the first 
place.  
Understanding how war is a cumulative process, however, provides an opportunity to re-
evaluate this theoretical framework and to question the assumptions that drive its main findings. 
The simple act of fighting without achieving strategic goals offers indeterminate implications for 
strategic assessment, and can cause combatants’ perceptions to diverge. It can be perfectly 
logical for decision makers to become more optimistic about their strategies even when they 
continually fail to achieve their intended goals. The notion that this kind of behavior is irrational 
depends either on the notion that war is a repeated process, or on the notion that decision makers 
have certain kinds of prior assumptions about the kinds of conflicts they are waging and what the 
distribution of potential opponents types might be. Contemporary models of learning and 
adaptation in war generally do treat war as a repeated process, and they generally do not see 
strategic assessment as being conditional on prior assumptions. This dissertation argued that 
these are both important oversights with significant implications for the theory and practice of 
military decision making. 
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3. The value of establishing a rational baseline 
One reason that it is important to question these theoretical frameworks is that they serve as 
benchmarks for assessing historical experience and policy debates. It is difficult to evaluate the 
rationality of any particular decision makers’ behavior unless we first define what rational action 
would actually entail.  
For instance, this dissertation examined U.S. military behavior during the American Indian 
Wars, the War in Vietnam, and the occupation of Iraq. In all of these cases, decision makers who 
struggled to realize and correct their mistakes are typically seen to have acted in a manner largely 
influenced by organizational inertia, political agendas, psychological constraints, or personal 
hubris. Yet this dissertation provided reasons to question those judgments. In some cases, inertia 
may be inevitable when it comes to strategic assessment and military decision making. In some 
cases, the relevant question might not be why decision makers failed to understand the nature of 
the challenges they were facing, but rather how they could have understood them – especially in 
cases like the World Wars or Vietnam, which are extremely salient experiences, but largely on 
account of how much they differed from historical norms.3  
At the very least, the previous chapters have aimed to show that decision makers in these 
kinds of cases confront genuine analytic challenges which even perfectly rational actors would 
struggle to resolve, and that even these decision makers’ sharpest critics tend not to engage 
                                                 
3
 As Chapter 1 pointed out, theories of rational action can thus play an important role in framing 
empirical analysis, even without assuming that rational actor theories are descriptive. Anthony 
Downs’s economic theory of democracy, for instance, substantially restructured debates about 
political participation – whereas previously the empirical puzzle had been why voter turnout was 
so low, Downs explained why it might be more relevant to ask why anyone voted at all given the 
infinitesimal probability that their ballot would make a difference in an election’s outcome. See 
Downs 1957 and Monroe 1991.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
207 
 
directly. Understanding how cumulative dynamics affect strategic assessment thus offers a new 
rational baseline on which historical judgments, empirical predictions, and policy implications 
depend. 
 
4. Diagnostics before prescription 
Defining the analytic challenges of assessing cumulative processes is also, of course, the first 
step in determining how to mitigate them. This was the central subject of Chapter 5, which 
explained how decision makers and military doctrine tend to place insufficient emphasis on 
defining the proper reference class for viewing specific armed conflicts. Scholars, too, tend to 
place a great deal of emphasis on identifying common patterns that hold across cases, rather than 
identifying ways in which circumstances differ and thus require different responses. Developing 
rigorous taxonomies for matching diagnostics and prescription in this way is a difficult challenge 
that is typically underappreciated. This is especially the case given that (as Chapter 3 
demonstrated) describing decision makers’ prior assumptions is a logical requirement of 
predicting whether they should become more optimistic or more pessimistic as rounds of fighting 
proceed. 
 
5. Focus on the theory of the case, not rounds of fighting 
One of the more pessimistic implications of this analysis is that in many circumstances, there 
may simply be no feasible way to analyze a policy’s prospects based on the extent of time and 
resources that decision makers have already sunk into it. The American Indian Wars were such a 
useful set of cases to examine here because they offer scholars an unusual opportunity to sidestep 
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the challenges of dealing with the reference class problem in forming inductively-oriented 
assumptions about the typical cost and duration of armed conflict. Because the American Indian 
Wars offer a relatively large cross-section of comparable cases, it was possible to evaluate 
decision makers’ expectations in light of objective empirical evidence. But for other cases – the 
wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, for instance – it is much less clear what the relevant 
historical comparisons should be. Without an objective base of evidence on which to draw, there 
are clear limits on scholars’ ability to specify the kinds of prior assumptions that would have 
driven rational strategic assessment. It is even harder to imagine that kind of analysis making 
headway in contentious political debates about ongoing military operations. 
Perhaps the most effective way to improve (or to challenge) existing strategic assessments is 
thus to focus on the basic assumptions policy makers put forth about the kind of challenge they 
are facing, and how they define the reference class of previous experience for structuring their 
policies and expectations. As Chapter 5 demonstrated with respect to debates about the 
occupation of Iraq, changing the “theory of the case” played a substantial role in causing U.S. 
officials to abandon an unsuccessful strategy – but both the administration and its critics tended 
to avoid discussing these assumptions directly in the war’s early years. Much of the debate about 
the war in Iraq revolved around how long it had already taken and how much it had already cost. 
This dissertation has explained why those arguments will often be inconclusive, and why it may 
be best to focus on other factors when analyzing military strategy. 
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Section 6.2. Implications for empirical research design 
In addition to reframing basic expectations of strategic assessment and military decision making, 
cumulative dynamics have important implications for empirical research design when it comes to 
identifying patterns of military cause-and-effect. To draw out this issue, consider the question of 
whether killing or capturing insurgents tends to increase or reduce the probability that 
counterinsurgents will be successful. This is one of the most fundamental questions in the study 
of modern military strategy, and it is hard to imagine that scholars can develop a convincing 
answer to this question without taking the cumulative dynamics of conflict into account.4 
The intuitive way to investigate this question would be to use a standard regression 
framework. We could plot attrition on the x-axis and outcomes on the y-axis; a regression model 
would estimate the slope of this relationship, and this would produce an estimated “average 
treatment effect” for attriting insurgents. Empirical scholars would presumably go on to refine 
these estimates by accounting for potential confounds such as measurement error, sampling bias, 
and selection effects. These are important issues that regularly impede causal inference. But even 
if these issues were resolved, cumulative dynamics would still raise fundamental confounds to 
drawing causal inferences. 
The problem stems from the fact that different insurgencies will presumably respond to 
attrition in different ways. The data will thus constitute a mixed population. Of course, almost all 
populations are mixed in some respects, and typically this does not block statistical inference. 
This is why the output of statistical analysis is generally interpreted as an “average” treatment 
                                                 
4
 For overviews of the debate about the use of force in counterinsurgency, see Smith 2005, Ucko 
2009, Kilcullen 2010, and Kaplan 2013, among others. 
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Figure 6.1.  Cumulative Dynamics and Mixed Populations (Theoretical Schematic) 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2.  Insurgent Attrition and Counterinsurgency Outcomes (Actual Data) 
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effect: though individual cases presumably deviate from this average in any number of ways, it 
still often represents a reasonable estimate for whether some policy “works,” all else being equal.  
But when dealing with cumulative dynamics, regression models are not only imprecise tools 
of capturing policy effectiveness – their output can also be fundamentally misleading. Figure 6.1 
helps to explain why this is so. Figure 6.1 assumes that insurgencies constitute a very simple 
kind of mixed population, in which each member belongs to one of two groups. To be consistent 
with the contemporary theoretical literature, we can characterize these groups by how they 
respond to multiple “rounds of fighting.” The first group is not affected by the mounting costs of 
fighting, and so it is labeled “Resistant”: no matter how many rounds of fighting they conduct, 
their odds of being defeated always remain a constant probability, α. By contrast, the second 
group of opponents becomes increasing brittle as their losses mount, and opponents in this 
“Susceptible” group are thus more likely to be defeated in each round of fighting. For simplicity, 
define the probability of defeating a susceptible opponent in the #$ round of fighting as 
px  α " βx.5 Figure 6.1 plots rounds of fighting on the x-axis, and the chances of defeating 
each kind of opponent on the y-axis. 
Given the way we have designed this thought experiment, the average treatment effect of 
fighting is positive. We assumed that there is no case in which fighting is counterproductive. The 
chances of defeating an opponent in each round of fighting are never less than α, and when 
facing Susceptible opponents, the odds of strategic success continually increase.  
                                                 
5
 Of course, the probability of defeating susceptible opponents cannot exceed 1. The pattern 
would not be much different if we modeled the Susceptibles’ response to casualties as a probit or 
logit function; nor would it be much different if we randomized β – see the appendix for a more 
thorough and formal discussion. 
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Yet this is not what a standard regression framework will capture, because regression models 
examine population averages, and these averages will tell a different story. The population 
average in Figure 6.1 is represented by the solid curve, which captures the proportion of 
insurgents who are expected to concede in each round of fighting. Note how this curve rises 
initially, but then it peaks and continuously declines. 
An appendix to this chapter provides a more formal discussion of this phenomenon, but to see 
why it occurs, consider what takes place in the first few rounds of fighting, in the region of the 
figure labeled with a ‘1.’ Moving rightward from the origin, the proportion of opponents 
defeated in each round of fighting rises as Susceptibles surrender at an increasing rate. However, 
as more of the Susceptible opponents are defeated, they will comprise a progressively smaller 
fraction of the population that remains. The population of opponents that we observe in each 
round of fighting will thus continually “improve” itself, as the Susceptible opponents are culled 
out.6 By the time we get to the latest rounds of fighting (the region in the figure denoted with a 
‘3’) there are almost no Susceptible opponents left. For this reason, the observed relationship 
between fighting and strategic success converges to the constant, α. This means that somewhere 
                                                 
6
 In discussing the ability of mixed populations to “improve themselves” over time, one can draw 
an analogy to a large literature on survival rates in the medical sciences. Timo Hakulinen (1977), 
for instance, studied patients being treated for colon cancer: he found that the risk of death 
dropped sharply across this population following an intervention, but explained how it was 
difficult to determine how much of this improvement was due to people recovering from surgery, 
and how much was due to the way that heterogeneous populations naturally improve themselves 
as their least resilient members die off. Donald Shepard and Richard Zeckhauser (1980) extended 
a similar logic to evaluating the effectiveness of hernia repair, and took a significant step forward 
in generalizing the logic to a wide range of topics including students dropping out of school, 
rates of machine malfunctions, and patterns of criminal recidivism. Nancy Tuma and Michael 
Hannan (1984: 165-174) have since discussed these dynamics in the context of marital longevity; 
Mary Jo Bane and David Ellwood (1986) used a similar approach to modeling the length of time 
that households spend in poverty; Peter Leahy, Terry Buss, and James Quane (1995) built a 
related model to capture the amount of time that different households spend on welfare. 
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in the middle of the distribution (the region of the figure denoted with a ‘2’) the population 
average for the percentage of insurgencies who concede in each round of fighting must reach a 
maximum and begin to decline – even though the actual impact of fighting is positive, by 
definition, throughout.7  
The observed population average captured by the solid curve in Figure 6.1 is not just a noisy 
approximation of real causal relationship. It is totally misleading: in many places, it has the 
wrong sign, and throughout it has the wrong functional form. And while we know that these 
results are misleading because they come from a thought experiment, it is unclear what we 
should make of similar patterns when we see them in actual data. 
To demonstrate this point, Figure 6.2 does present actual data about the observed relationship 
between the amount of attrition inflicted on more than 200 insurgent movements, and whether 
those insurgencies were defeated.8 The population average of these data is represented with 
locally-weighted scatterplot smoothing. The result is exactly the kind of curve that we saw in the 
thought experiment: it rises, peaks, then falls. (The data even match the theoretical model in 
terms of second-derivatives: prior to the peak the curve is generally concave, and after the peak it 
is generally convex.) 
                                                 
7
 The axes in this figure are not labeled so as to emphasize the generality of the dynamics it 
represents. The precise parameter values are: E  .05 and G  .025; Susceptible opponents 
comprise two-thirds of the initial population. Those parameters were chosen in order to make the 
misleading nature of the population average clear. The chapter’s appendix provides a more 
precise discussion of how these dynamics play out more generally. 
8
 This dependent variable is drawn from Lyall and Wilson’s 2009 study: they define a “defeat” 
for insurgents (and thus a win for counterinsurgents) as a situation where “the insurgency is 
militarily defeated and its organization destroyed or the war end without any political 
concessions granted to insurgent forces.” The independent variable on attrition represents the 
same data that were introduced in Chapter 3.  
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
214 
 
Because Figure 6.2 is not the result of a thought experiment, we have little basis for judging 
what these patterns really mean. For example, it is possible that the actual relationship between 
attrition and success rises and falls: perhaps there is some middle ground where a judicious use 
of force will degrade the insurgency without enflaming the opposition further. This interpretation 
would be consistent with a wide range of theoretical literature; there is certainly no reason to rule 
this interpretation out, and if this interpretation were true, it would have important implications 
about the necessity of rationing the use of force in counterinsugrency. 
But as this section has shown, the pattern in Figure 6.2 is also consistent with a model in 
which the effect of attrition is strictly positive, just not uniformly so. It is entirely possible that if 
we separated the data on insurgencies into relevant subgroups – that is, if we divided cases into 
different reference classes – then we would find that counterinsurgent success rates strictly 
increased as a function of attrition. This is also consistent with a wide range of theoretical 
literature, and it would have very different implications for thinking about the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and for structuring expectations about military strategy more broadly. 
This discussion shows how cumulative dynamics make it difficult to interpret even the most 
seemingly basic properties of the data, such as whether a downward sloping coefficient means 
that a policy is counterproductive. (In fact, the more effective the policy is over a subset of the 
population, the more steeply we should expect the population average to fall as the susceptible 
opponents drop out of the sample more quickly.9)  
It is also worth reiterating that the problem here is largely separate from the standard 
confounds to causal inference that empirical scholars often wrestle with. The problem this 
                                                 
9
 Again, see the appendix for a more formal discussion of this point. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
215 
 
section explained has little to do with issues like measurement error, missing data, or reverse 
causality. Nor is it related to selection effects: the confound does not originate with the way that 
policies are chosen – it is in the way that opponents respond to those policies as their impact 
builds over time. Some insurgencies are bound to be more sensitive to attrition. As this pressure 
mounts, these opponents are more likely to concede, at which point the war will stop, and the 
“treatment” cannot extend any further. In effect, this means that the amount of pressure that 
militaries can place on their opponents is right-censored. This problem would exist even if the 
relevant policies were randomized.10  
Thus while empirical methodology is not the main focus of this dissertation, this section 
indicates how a theoretical understanding of the cumulative dynamics of armed conflict has basic 
implications for thinking about empirical research design. Moreover, one of the key challenges 
in performing this kind of analysis is once again dealing with the reference class problem, as this 
section has shown how understanding the way that different cases will respond differently to a 
given strategy is an important prerequisite for evaluating the effectiveness of that strategy on the 
whole. The next section will switch gears to talk about the ways in which this theoretical 
                                                 
10
 Put differently: techniques like instrumental variables, Heckman selection models, regression 
discontinuity, and matching all attempt to screen out selection biases in how policies are applied. 
The assumption is that policymakers recognize the degree of difficulty in each case as they are 
making policy decisions, but that they do this imperfectly. Thus if we could control for the 
decisionmaking process (through propensity scores, instruments, exogenous shocks, natural 
discontinuities, etc.) then any remaining variation might be plausibly random: in some cases the 
policy would be applied too much and in some cases it would be applied too little. But because 
military actions generally terminate once they succeed (or fail), it is difficult to imagine a case 
where they are ever applied too much. (For example, if governments continue to kill or capture 
their opponents after the war is over, then this is generally thought to be something very different 
from battlefield attrition, and there are entire data sets devoted to capturing these kinds of 
“massacres” or “one-sided killings” as distinct phenomena worth studying in their own right.) 
Artificial randomization will not change this property of the data, and thus it cannot remove the 
obstacle to causal inference 
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framework can be extended in another direction, by discussing what it implies for public policy 
and decision making in fields outside of strategic studies. 
 
Section 6.3. Cumulative dynamics and decision making beyond national security 
When Lord Simon (Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer in the late 1930s) described his 
country’s arms race with Germany, he compared Britain to a “runner in a race who wants to 
reserve his spurt for the right time, but does not know where the finishing tape is.”11 This 
metaphor nicely captures the challenge decision makers face in dealing with cumulative 
dynamics. Even when they believe that it is possible to achieve a desired goal, and even when 
they believe they are making progress towards doing so, it is often difficult to determine how 
long it will take and how much it will cost to get there: the location of the “finishing tape,” 
however that goal is defined, can be hard to predict. 
Armed conflict and national security policy offer many salient examples of decision makers 
wrestling with these issues, but similar analytic challenges recur in many other areas of public 
policy. It is thus worth closing this dissertation by emphasizing that while military decision 
making has been the primary subject matter discussed in this work, the underlying theoretical 
framework is one that can generalize much more widely than this. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
 The quote is from Cabinet minutes cited by Walt 1992. 
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Scientific programs and the HIV vaccine 
For instance, just as with the pursuit of the Higgs boson discussed at the beginning of this 
chapter, a wide range of scientific research requires patiently pursuing major breakthroughs. One 
of the most salient examples from the last several decades has been the global attempt to develop 
a vaccine for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). In most respects, there is no similarity 
between this initiative and a military campaign like the war in Afghanistan. But seen through the 
theoretical lens of cumulative dynamics and decision making, these topics in fact share 
fundamental analytic features.12 
More than 30 million people are currently living with HIV. Every year roughly two million 
people die from HIV-related causes, and about three million people will be newly infected. 
About six hundred thousand Americans have died as a result of contracting the virus. There are 
more than a dozen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa where infection rates are more than five 
percent of the adult population, and a handful where that fraction is more than one-quarter. 
Shortly after the virus was discovered in the early 1980s, developing an effective vaccine 
became one of the most high-profile goals in the biomedical sciences. In 1984, the U.S. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler predicted that this could be achieved 
in two years.  
                                                 
12
 This section is based on summaries of HIV vaccine development that were published in 
scientific journals, including Graham’s review in the Annual Review of Medicine (2002), 
Desrosiers’s review in Nature Medicine (2004), Berkeley and Koff’s review in the Lancet 
(2007), Dieffenbach and Fauci’s review in the Annals of Internal Medicine (2011), and 
Maurice’s review in Lancet World Report (2011). Statistics are reported from the Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), whose most recent data is from 2009. 
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Of course, this prediction was wildly off the mark, as nearly three decades later scientists are 
still not particularly close to developing a functional vaccine. At the same time, it is not clear 
how anyone could have understood, ex ante, just how difficult a challenge HIV would present. 
For instance, a recent study chronicled more than three hundred vaccines that were developed for 
preventing twenty-eight different diseases during the twentieth century.13 Almost by definition, 
each successful instance of vaccine development involved achieving important scientific 
breakthroughs that helped to address major health policy problems. Some of these vaccines took 
decades to discover; but others were “low-hanging fruit” that were obtained rather quickly – and 
in any case, science today is far more advanced than it was just decades ago. In forming 
expectations about how long it might take and how much it might cost in order to develop an 
HIV vaccine, there are thus a wide ranges of reference classes to choose from, and plenty of 
evidence to suggest that biomedical research can clear difficult hurdles. 
One of the main difficulties in making any predictions about HIV research is that the virus is 
in many ways idiosyncratic, which makes it hard to know how to benchmark current efforts in 
light of past experience – that is to say, it is extremely hard to determine the proper reference 
class for structuring predictions about HIV-related research. For example, there were initially no 
known examples of humans possessing immunity to the virus. This makes it difficult to develop 
candidate vaccines through the standard method of examining potential correlates of protection.14 
Since animals do not contract HIV, this makes it difficult to gain headway through animal 
                                                 
13
 Hoyt 2012. 
14
 Perhaps the best known example is the way that Edward Jenner and his colleagues developed 
the smallpox vaccine after noticing that milk maids were resistant to the disease once they had 
been exposed to cowpox. By observing a protected population (the milk maids) Jenner inferred 
that their immunity had something to do with being exposed to cows, and this suggested cowpox 
as a potential vaccine. 
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research.15 HIV has many known variants, and each of them mutates rapidly – developing a 
comprehensive vaccine thus requires finding some “Achilles heel” that holds across the virus’s 
multiple forms. 
Without any of these rungs to stand on – observed immunity, satisfactory animal models, or a 
common weakness across viral strains – there was almost no chance of developing a functional 
vaccine for HIV in short order. But this is a far cry from saying that the challenge was 
insurmountable. To use the terminology from Chapter 2, this simply means that scientists began 
developing the HIV vaccine in a Buy-In Phase, where a great deal of basic research was clearly 
needed before there would be any chance of achieving the ultimate goal. 
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed the challenges of forming and revising expectations about the how 
long it might take and how much it might cost in order to complete this kind of Buy-In Phase. 
These chapters also described how (at least in the military context) scholars generally assume 
that rational decision makers should become more pessimistic as they invest increasing amounts 
of resources in a policy that does not succeed. Similarly in the case of the HIV vaccine, many 
prominent scientists concluded after decades of work that their objective might be infeasible. 
Richard Horton (editor of the British medical journal The Lancet) wrote in 2004 that  
Contrary to the predictions and promises of most AIDS experts, the signs are that a 
vaccine to prevent HIV infection will not be found for, at the very least, several decades 
to come – if at all…. The sum total of our knowledge about the genetics, biology, and 
geographical distribution of HIV indicates that vaccine scientists may have met their 
match in this adaptable foe. The reality seems to be that a vaccine against AIDS is 
becoming little more than a pipe dream. 
                                                 
15
 Primates do contract “simian immunodeficiency viruses” (SIVs), and scientists do study them; 
but strains of SIV and HIV tend to differ in significant ways, such that most advances in 
protecting primates against SIV have not shown much utility in developing a vaccine for 
humans. 
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Robert Desrosiers (director of the New England Primate Research Center) gave a similarly 
pessimistic assessment in that same year, as he characterized ongoing efforts as little more than 
“empirical trial-and-error” or the “continued testing of feeble long-shots.” Scientists were at the 
time testing at least thirty different candidates for vaccine development, and all trials to that point 
had essentially failed. But one of the key arguments in this dissertation is that when decision 
makers are assessing cumulative dynamics, it is important to keep in mind that when some 
measures fail, this does not necessarily have any bearing on whether other, independent efforts 
will be any more or less successful. Though this dissertation has primarily dealt with 
contemporary models of “rounds of fighting,” it is not too much of a stretch to apply this same 
logic to rounds of clinical trials. And indeed, in recent years there have been several notable 
advances indicating that scientists may in fact be gaining the kind of traction they need in order 
to develop functioning defenses against HIV. 
In September 2009, a trial conducted across 16,000 subjects in Thailand produced an 
estimated 31 percent efficacy in preventing HIV infection. Though the effect was modest, many 
scientists believe it nevertheless indicates major progress as researchers can now examine 
distinctions between populations who respond differently to the virus. In that same month, other 
scientists discovered two antibodies that were capable of neutralizing multiple strains of HIV, 
indicating potential movement towards identifying the long-sought “Achilles heel.” Meanwhile, 
researchers have significantly refined animal models, and in May 2011, some of them identified 
a partially effective (but permanent) vaccine that works in monkeys.  
These developments are all grounds for optimism because they show how some of the main 
barriers to HIV vaccine research are gradually being worn down. It is probably appropriate to 
think that the Buy-In Phase of this research is ending, as scientists now have findings to use in 
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designing clinical trials that have positive probabilities of achieving impactful results. As Seth 
Berkley (former head of the International Aids Vaccine Initiative) recently stated, “We’ve seen 
more progress than ever over the past decade. There is no doubt in my mind that we are now at a 
critical turning point and the pace of progress is clearly accelerating…. I can’t predict when the 
problem will be solved. But I know it will be.”16 
At the same time, it is important not to be too sanguine about this progress. Previous chapters 
have provided many examples of decision makers who similarly envisioned themselves on the 
cusp of success and later proved to be wrong. And if research on the HIV vaccine continues 
without success then this will entail genuine costs – both in terms of the time and effort invested 
in this research program and because these investments could have been directed towards other 
research that might have produced a better rate of return. Scientific resources for global health 
are limited, and there are many pressing concerns besides HIV: for example, efforts to develop 
vaccines for malaria, anthrax, and the avian flu have all received substantial public attention in 
recent years as well.  
So how should governmental organizations like the U.S. National Institutes of Health (or non-
profit grantmakers like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) allocate their resources among 
these programs? These questions raise exactly the kinds of analytic challenges that occupy 
military decision makers who are deciding how to allocate their forces or assessing the benefits 
of pursuing certain objectives at all. Most people do not intuitively think of biomedical research 
and military planning in the same terms. But the similarities in strategic assessment across these 
fields should not be surprising, since both fundamentally revolve around estimating how long it 
                                                 
16
 Quoted in Maurice 2011: 213. 
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might take or how much it might cost to achieve various goals. In this sense, these fields provide 
different examples of the same basic dynamics of decision making. 
 
Development assistance 
Just as scholars and policymakers discuss the prospects for breaking “conflict traps” in 
warfare, a great deal of research on economic development discusses the difficulties of helping 
low-income countries climb out of “poverty traps.”17 The international community provides 
about a hundred billion dollars in official development assistance each year. Much of it is 
intended to help recipients break out of poverty traps and begin a cycle of self-sustaining growth.  
There have been some significant success stories: Botswana, for instance, is often cited as a 
country that made smart use of foreign aid and natural resources to maintain one of the world’s 
highest economic growth rates for the last four decades. In general, developing countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa experienced an average growth in per capita GDP of roughly 10 percent per year 
from 2000-10. But there are also a number of prominent development failures, countries like the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Ethiopia, where critics argue that foreign assistance has had 
little positive effect, especially for these countries’ poorest citizens. And much of Africa’s recent 
economic growth has been driven by countries like Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria, and 
Sudan, whose advancement has substantially depended on indigenous oil wealth. Many 
developing countries that lack large industries for exporting natural resources, such as Burundi, 
                                                 
17
 See Bowles, Durlauf, and Hoff 2006 and Collier 2007 for reviews. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
223 
 
Haiti, Liberia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, have not even kept pace with the expansion of the 
world economy as a whole.18 
How much longer will it take and how much more will it cost to help these states develop 
healthy governments and economies? And is this goal even feasible at all? This is an additional 
set of prominent policy questions that runs up against the same basic analytic challenges that 
were discussed throughout the previous chapters. Thus on the one hand there are some 
economists (most prominently William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo) who argue that many aid 
programs are misguided and even counterproductive, facilitating corrupt governments that are 
dependent on external funding rather than the kinds of self-sufficient systems that donors intend 
to facilitate. And on the other hand there are economists (most prominently Jeffrey Sachs) who 
argue that the aid programs are basically well-designed, and that the main problem is that the 
international community has not provided enough aid.  
The contours of this debate resemble the kinds of disagreements about military strategy that 
have recurred throughout this dissertation. When dealing with cumulative processes, policy 
disagreements often become mired in seemingly intractable arguments about whether past 
failures are more a matter of the concept or the execution – whether the problem is that 
policymakers are pursuing the wrong strategies or that they have not implemented the right 
strategies extensively enough. And the reason that these kinds of debates recur so widely is that 
they are only partly about military strategy or economic assistance per se. More generally, these 
disagreements reflect the difficulty of analyzing cumulative dynamics.  
                                                 
18
 These figures are from the World Bank’s data unit. The GDP per capita of developing 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa grew by an average of 9.6 percent per year from 2000 through 
2010. The global average for annual GDP growth per capita in these data is 5.7 percent per year.  
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Section 6.4. Conclusion 
There are many other examples one could choose in order to demonstrate how cumulative 
dynamics play into broader scholarship and policy debates. As of this writing, related questions 
include whether economic sanctions will cause Iran to disable its nuclear weapons program 
before developing a functional bomb; how long it will take in order to develop political 
consensus (both nationally and internationally) to stop climate change; and how much fiscal 
stimulus it will take in order to jumpstart growth in the U.S. economy. These dynamics appear in 
other aspects of politics, too, such as competition among political campaigns. As columnist 
David Brooks wrote during the run-up to the 2012 election between President Barack Obama and 
the Republican challenger, former Governor Mitt Romney,  
 
Both campaigns fervently believe that more spending leads to more votes. They also 
believe that if they can carpet bomb swing voters with enough negative ads, then 
eventually the sheer weight of the barrage will produce movement in their direction. 
There’s little evidence that these prejudices are true. But the campaigns are like World 
War I generals. If something isn’t working, the answer must be to try more of it. 
 
Though this passage was written ironically, it captures a real connection between decision 
makers in armed conflict and many other fields who share common struggles in evaluating 
cumulative processes. All of the debates reviewed in chapter (and many others like them) 
involve supporters and detractors who either argue that previous experience has demonstrated 
that some policy will not work, or who argue that previous policies have not succeeded in large 
part because they have not been implemented extensively enough. This dissertation has 
explained why it can be genuinely difficult to evaluate the validity of these arguments. In almost 
any field, scholars and practitioners wrestle with questions about how long it might take or how 
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much it might cost to achieve a particular goal. Viewing these efforts as related attempts to 
assess similar dynamics opens up opportunities to take established ideas across disciplinary lines, 
and to bring new ideas to bear on diverse subjects. 
In closing, there is another reason why it is important to view the study of cumulative 
dynamics and policy assessment as a fundamentally interdisciplinary matter. This is because 
investing resources almost always involves managing difficult tradeoffs with the pursuit of other 
goals. The U.S. government makes significant investments in all of the subjects discussed in this 
chapter: fighting the war in Afghanistan, finding the Higgs boson, developing an HIV vaccine, 
and providing economic assistance. These priorities are necessarily competing because they 
consume scarce resources, both in terms of taxpayer dollars and policymakers’ attention. Any 
rational scheme for dividing scarce resources among these priorities must be based, at least to 
some degree, on a sense of how likely these efforts are to pay off, and the extent to which 
additional investments (or cutbacks) will affect these programs at the margin. 
For example, many readers may be uneasy with the notion that the U.S. government allocates 
about $1 billion each year to developing a vaccine for HIV (a virus that leads to the annual death 
of roughly two million people worldwide, and that has killed more than half a million Americans 
in total), while it spends more than $600 billion each year on its military. Many readers would 
probably support a proposal for shifting a billion dollars from the latter to the former, believing 
that it would do more good in expectation if the U.S. government doubled annual funding for 
HIV vaccine research in exchange for cutting the annual defense budget by less than one-sixth of 
one percent.  
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But how do you prove that? How would you make an analytically rigorous argument to shed 
some light on this issue? And if you cannot make an analytically rigorous argument, then how 
confident can you be in advocating these sorts of policy shifts? How convincing can you be in 
advocating these sorts of policy shifts? 
This is not to say that policymaking is entirely driven by the kind of rational analysis that has 
been the subject of this dissertation. But analysis has to enter the process somewhere, because we 
cannot expect government agencies to propose their own budgets in disinterested ways. The U.S. 
military will almost always demand more resources for promoting national security. The 
National Institutes of Health will almost always demand more resources for protecting 
Americans in a different fashion. Determining “how much is enough” in supporting these efforts 
is an inherently relative question that requires assessing competing priorities in comparable 
terms. The previous chapters have shown that current scholarship offers limited tools when it 
comes to estimating how long it might take or how much it might cost to achieve important 
objectives. The study of military strategy is just one of many fields that will benefit from 
continued attempts to examine and rebuild these conceptual foundations. 
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Appendix.  Formal supplement to Section 6.2 
 
Assume that we are studying a population that can be stratified into two homogeneous groups. 
These groups respond differently to a particular policy. One population of cases is Susceptible to 
the policy, such that as decision makers invest more effort in this policy they become more likely 
to achieve strategic success. The second population of cases is Resistant to the policy, so that 
investing in these measures does not make it more likely that decision makers will achieve their 
intended goal. The size of these respective populations are proportional to H and A such that 
H " A  1. We can now examine how this kind of heterogeneity affects the way we might 
perceive the effectiveness of the policy we are studying.  
The discussion will begin by studying a case where the probability of achieving strategic 
success is determined by a linear function of how much decision makers have invested in the 
policy; the second part of the appendix will then generalize more broadly. To help make this 
discussion more concrete (and more consistent with the formal theoretical literature on armed 
conflict) it will be framed in terms of studying the impact of multiple “rounds of fighting.” There 
is nothing in this discussion which is particular to military strategy however, and this discussion 
avoids making any assumptions that should not be relevant to a wide range of subjects. 
 
Linear case 
Assume that the probability of defeating susceptible opponents within  rounds of fighting is 
I  E " G, where G is assumed to be a positive number. The probability of defeating the 
resistant group does not change based on the number of rounds fought, so that IJ  E. Since 
the probability of defeating an opponent must be between 0 and 1, we can restrict the analysis to 
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values of E that are greater than zero, and values of  such that E " G K 1; beyond this point, 
there is no possibility of seeing any more susceptible opponents, the population can thus no 
longer be mixed, and so there would be no reason to be concerned about a mixed population 
confounding empirical results. 
The term I is capitalized here to emphasize that it effectively represents a cumulative 
distribution function, much like the ones used to represent decision makers’ prior expectations in 
Chapter 3. Just as a cumulative distribution function 3 represents the probability that a draw 
from a random variable will be less than or equal to , the function IL represents the 
probability than a randomly-chosen opponent will concede in or before the #$ round of fighting. 
In other contexts, we could think of  as representing levels of investment more generally, such 
as dollars spent, time invested, or any other index that can be expressed in terms of consistent 
units. 
Within this framework, the probability of defeating a randomly-chosen opponent in or before 
the #$ round of fighting is @  I · H " IJ · A. To see that the overall probability of 
defeating an opponent is increasing in , take the first-order condition, @ ′  HG. We could 
call @ ′ the unconditional treatment effect for conducting a single round of fighting. Needless 
to say, the unconditional treatment effect is both positive and constant. 
The word “unconditional” is important here, because it emphasizes that @ ′ is only a good 
approximation of the policy as applied to an opponent that is selected at random from the entire 
initial population. As the policy is implemented, however, the population of cases will not 
remain the same: as rounds of fighting mount and Susceptible opponents are defeated, they 
should comprise a progressively smaller proportion of the opponents remaining. To see this, 
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define H and A as the proportion of Susceptible and Resistant opponents that we would 
expect to see remaining after round . We can express these proportions in terms of I and IJ, 
while reweighting the results so that they still sum to 1.19 By doing this, we find that 
H 
H1  G
H1  G " A
 
A 
A
H1  G " A
  
Given that H " A  1, we can also express these functions as 
H 
H1  G
1  GH
 
A 
A
1  G " GA
  
These expressions show how the proportion of Resistant opponents, A·, should be an 
increasing function of both  and G. (By definition, this means that the proportion of Susceptible 
opponents, H·, should be a decreasing function of both  and G.)  This is an intuitive result, 
reflecting the notion that as more of the Susceptible opponents are removed from the population 
(either because they have been exposed to more rounds of fighting or because they are defeated 
at a faster rate), they will comprise a decreasing proportion of the opponents that remain.  
                                                 
19
 Note that in doing this we can ignore the term E; this term is common to both populations, and 
so even though it reduces the aggregate number of opponents, it does not affect their relative 
proportions. If we eliminate opponents from both groups with probability E, then the remaining 
population will be proportional to 1  EH " 1  EA. In order to have this expression sum to 
1, we would simply divide by 1  E, which would return the proportions to H and A. 
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We can use this information to calculate a new expectation for the probability of defeating a 
randomly-chosen opponent in the #$ round of fighting, conditional on the fact that the opponent 
was able to reach the #$ round of fighting in the first place. We could call this the conditional 
treatment effect, denoted .. We can express . as the proportion of opponents in round  
who should be Susceptible, multiplied by the probability that these Susceptible opponents will in 
fact concede in the #$ round: 
.  H · I
′  
The conditional treatment effect for each round of fighting is once again strictly greater than 
or equal to zero.20 This result is not surprising, as we have assumed from the start that each round 
of fighting either raises the probability of defeating a Susceptible opponent or else has no impact 
on the probability of defeating a Resistant opponent. It is only logical that, under these 
assumptions, an additional round of fighting will never lower the probability of succeeding. 
This is not what we might infer, however, if we examined the data using a standard regression 
framework. Consider what happens if we were to study a cross-sectional data set of different 
counterinsurgency campaigns. If we were to plot the amount of attrition inflicted on each 
insurgency on the x-axis, and then the success or failure of each counterinsurgency campaign on 
the y-axis, then our data points would only reflect the subset of cases that terminated at each 
level of attrition. And when the regression models this, what it will be estimating is the way that 
these subsets change from one level of attrition to the next. This captures something that is very 
different from the policy’s actual impact. 
                                                 
20
 This is because in the current setup, I′   G, and the proportion H cannot be negative. 
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What the regression framework is modeling here is how the conditional treatment effect 
changes as a function of . We can express this function directly with the term M, and this 
demonstrates how misleading the regression model can be: 
M 
N
N
. 
N
N
·
GH1  G
1  GH
 
O       M 
GHH  1
1  GH
       91< 
Since H > 1, then the expression here shows that M will always be less than or equal to 
zero. This means that regression frameworks will always produce a negative slope coefficient 
given the assumptions described above. It would be very misleading to interpret this as 
indicating that the policy’s impact is negative, as we have in fact shown that this will never be 
the case. 
Moreover, note that as β increases, then the numerator in expression 91< will become a larger 
negative number, the denominator in expression 91< will become a smaller positive number, and 
thus NM/NG K 0. This means that as the policy becomes more effective, the slope of the 
regression coefficient will actually go down. This helps to demonstrate the basis for the main 
arguments in Section 4.3 about how standard regression models provide a misleading basis for 
analyzing cumulative dynamics in mixed populations.  
 
General case 
The discussion thus far has revolved around the assumption that the probability of defeating a 
Susceptible opponent is a linear function of the number of rounds of fighting. But there is of 
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course no reason that this need be the case, and it is worth examining what can happen when the 
probability of strategic success as a function of investment is either concave or convex. 
When I is concave, then this will only cause estimated regression coefficients to decline 
at an accelerating rate. Recall that the conditional treatment effect is expressed as .  H ·
I
′ , and that the regression model fits a slope to changes in ., which we can express by 
way of the product rule as: 
M 
N
N
.  H ′ · I
′  " H · I
′′ 
By definition, H is a positive number, and we have already shown that its first derivative is 
always less than or equal to zero; if I is concave, this means that I′′ K 0. This means that 
whenever I′  is positive, so that additional rounds of fighting make it more likely that 
Susceptible opponents will concede, then M is again guaranteed to decline. This makes sense 
given that a concave success function would indicate that each round of fighting eliminates fewer 
opponents at the margin. 
When I is convex, then M can take on a wide range of values, including the possibility 
that the conditional treatment effect will rise in some periods of fighting and then fall in others – 
this is the pattern demonstrated in Figure 6.1.21 
                                                 
21
 It may seem confusing to say that Figure 6.1 represents a convex success function given that 
the population averages for both Susceptible and Resistant opponents are represented as straight 
lines. However, keep in mind that in Figure 6.1, the y-axis represents the proportion of 
opponents that will be defeated in each round of fighting, whereas in the discussion in the 
appendix, I represents the cumulative probability that opponents will be defeated in or 
before each round of fighting. This change in notation helps to make the formal discussion in the 
appendix more tractable, and means that it is slightly different from the presentation in Section 
6.2. 
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To begin, note that when I is increasing and convex, then M will be expressed as the 
sum of a strictly negative term, H ′ · I′ , and a strictly positive term H · I′′. M will 
thus be positive so long as 1 · H ′ · I′  > H · I′′, and it will be negative when the 
reverse is true. Since we can express H ′ as a function of H and I, then we can see that M is 
only positive when:   
HII
′ 1  H
91  HI<
· I
′  >
H91  I<
1  HI
· I
′′ 
O       I
′ 
I1  H
91  HI<91  I<
> I
′′      92< 
Expression 92< shows how M will be positive so long as I is “convex enough” in 
relation to several factors. The expression therefore provides the following comparative statics. 
Keep in mind that all of the individual terms on the left-hand side of expression 92< are positive 
and less than or equal to 1.22 
• When I′  is smaller in relation to I′′, then M is more likely to be positive.23 This 
makes sense because I′  represents the proportion of Susceptible insurgents eliminated in 
the #$ round of fighting while  I′′ represents the way this proportion grows from one 
round of fighting to the next. If this proportion is relatively small in one round but relatively 
large in the next, then this makes it more likely that we will see a larger number of insurgents 
defeated in round  " 1. 
                                                 
22
 This shows again why I must be convex in order for M to be positive. 
23
 This is because the term I′  only appears in the numerator of the left-hand side of 
expression 92<. 
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• When H is larger, then M is more likely to be positive.24 This reflects the idea that 
when Susceptible opponents comprise a larger fraction of the initial population, then we are 
likely to see more of them in later rounds, where the probability of defeating them is larger 
(and thus the probability of defeating a randomly-chosen opponent who remains in the 
population would be larger as well). 
                                                 
24
 The derivative of the left-hand side of expression 92< with respect to H is II′ %  1 ·
1  %5 · 1  H%. Note that one of these terms, %  1, is strictly less than or equal to 
zero, while all of the other terms are positive. Thus, the derivative of the left-hand side of 
expression 92< with respect to H is strictly less than or equal to zero, and the inequality is more 
likely to hold. 
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